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RESEARCH ABSTRACT 
 
Currently, lawyers who represent parties in mediation are governed by the legal 
profession’s general rules of professional conduct which make no specific provision for 
mediation. A number of influential authors maintain that these rules are inappropriate for, and 
incompatible with, mediation. They claim that mediation is based on objectives and values 
that are fundamentally different from those of litigation. They also claim that legal 
representatives undertake different roles in mediation than those that they undertake in 
litigation and that those new roles require new professional conduct rules. These authors have 
called for the promulgation of rules requiring higher standards of disclosure, good faith 
participation, fair dealing and use of non-adversarial interest-based negotiation. These 
proposals are considered in this exegesis. 
 
This exegesis challenges the proposition that the legal profession needs new rules to 
govern the conduct of legal representatives in mediation. It examines and evaluates current 
rules of professional conduct governing lawyers in Australia and the United States as they 
apply to a range of ethical issues that confront legal representatives in mediation. Since the 
rules cannot be considered in isolation from other components of the law of lawyering, the 
research also examines obligations imposed on lawyers by general law, agreements to 
mediate (in the case of private mediations) and legislative directives to mediate (in the case of 
mandatory mediations). 
 
Additionally, the research examines the features, objectives and values of litigation, 
mediation and unassisted negotiation and the roles undertaken by lawyers in these processes 
with a view to ascertaining if there are any factors which indicate the need for new rules of 
conduct or alternatively, the desirability of maintaining existing rule systems.  
 
The research also critiques some of the proposals for new rules. It is argued that the 
rationale given for these proposals is flawed and that it is neither practical nor desirable to 
insist on full candour, good faith participation, non-adversarial behaviour and interest-based 
negotiation in mediation. It is argued instead that the current rules of professional conduct for 
lawyers are consistent with, and appropriate for, mediation. Together with certain external 
constraints which may operate on lawyers, the current rules and other components of the law 
of lawyering provide an adequate check on unethical behaviour in mediation. The current 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski xi 15- Aug-11 
general rules are also more appropriate than specific rules for application in highly contextual 
processes such as mediation. They allow lawyers to exercise discretion in relation to matters 
such as candour, good faith and cooperation, while encouraging adherence to core 
professional values.  
 
The exegesis concludes with an examination of some of the ethical complexities and 
problems that have arisen in the practice of collaborative law, a dispute resolution process in 
which participants explicitly agree to abide by obligations similar to those which proponents 
for new rules urge upon legal representatives in mediation. Collaborative law raises new 
ethical dilemmas without necessarily resolving the old ones and may offer some lessons in 
relation to ethical issues in mediation.  
 
The exegesis integrates, and extends, the research undertaken in a number of my 
published works. It also makes original contributions to the fields of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Ethics and legal professional regulation. There is presently a gap in our 
understanding of the factors which influence the ethics of legal representatives in mediation. 
This research will help close the gap. It may also be of assistance to law reform and 
regulatory agencies in Australia who are presently considering the issue of standards of 
conduct for participants in mediation and other dispute resolution processes. 
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction and Rationale for the Research 
 
Many lawyers are now involved in mediation, either as a mediator or as a legal 
representative for one of the parties to the mediation.
1
 These roles raise a host of new ethical 
dilemmas for lawyers. A central question arises as to whether or not these dilemmas can be 
resolved through the application of existing rules of professional conduct for lawyers. The 
focus of the literature published to date concerns the ethical complexities faced by 
mediators.
2
 One explanation for this focus is that the existing rules of professional conduct 
for lawyers seemed obviously not to fit the activities of lawyer mediators as mediators have 
‘no “client” in the classic sense of the term, as contemplated under bar regulatory systems’.3 
                                                          
1
 Legal disputes of virtually every kind are now subject to mediation: John Lande, ‘How Will Lawyering and 
Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?’ (1997) 24 Florida State University Law Review 839, 846. In 
particular, the involvement of lawyers in mediation has increased with the uptake of mediation, often in a 
mandatory form, by most state and federal courts and tribunals in Australia. For an account of the legislative 
position in each Australian jurisdiction, see David Spencer and Michael Brogan, Mediation: Law and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 272-304 and David Spencer and Samantha Hardy, Dispute Resolution in 
Australia: Cases, Commentary and Materials (Lawbook Co., Thomson Reuters, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 430-4. Similarly 
there has been widespread adoption of mandatory ADR through the federal and state court systems in the US: 
see Wayne D Brazil, ‘Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?’ (2002-2003) 18 Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution 93, 112. As Nancy Welsh notes, mediation ‘is now an integral part of the 
civil litigation system, used to resolve personal injury, contract, employment, divorce, child custody, and many 
other civil matters’: Nancy A Welsh, ‘Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real 
Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value’ (2003-2004) 19 Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 573, 583. Generally on the involvement of lawyers as legal representatives in mediation, see Chiara-
Marisa Caputo, ‘Lawyers’ Participation in Mediation’ (2007) 18 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 84. 
2
 Relevant literature includes: Rachael Field, ‘Rethinking Mediation Ethics: A Contextual Method to Support 
Party Self-determination’ (2011) 22 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 8; Naomi Cukier, ‘Lawyers 
Acting as Mediators: Ethical Dilemmas in the Shift From Advocacy to Impartiality’ (2010) 21 Australasian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 59; Charles Pou Jr, “‘Embracing Limbo”: Thinking About Rethinking Dispute 
Resolution Ethics’ (2003-2004) 108 Pennsylvania State Law Review 199; Robert P Burns, ‘Some Ethical Issues 
Surrounding Mediation’ (2001-2002) 70 Fordham Law Review 691; Diane K Vescovo, Allen S Blair and 
Hayden D Lait, ‘Essay – Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation’ (2000-2001) 31 University of Memphis Law Review 
59; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering’ (1999-2000) 27 
Florida State University Law Review 153 (‘Non-Adversarial Lawyering’); Robert P Schuwerk, ‘Reflections on 
Ethics and Mediation’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 757; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ethics in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibility’ 
(1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 407 (‘Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution’); Robert B Moberly, 
‘Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical For Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 
669; Robert A Baruch Bush, ‘Symposium: The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas 
and Policy Implications’ [1994] Journal of Dispute Resolution 1 (‘The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice’); 
Robert A Baruch Bush, ‘Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator’s Role 
and Ethical Standards in Mediation’ (1989) 41 Florida Law Review 253 (‘Ethical Standards in Mediation’); 
Leonard L Riskin, ‘Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation’ (1984) 26 Arizona Law 
Review 329. On the situation in the UK, see Andrew Boon and Jennifer Levin, The Ethics and Conduct of 
Lawyers in England and Wales (Hart Publishing, 2
nd
 ed,
 
2008) 421.  
3
 Phyllis E Bernard, ‘Dispute Resolution and the Unauthorized Practice of Law’ in Phyllis Bernard and Bryant 
Garth (eds), Dispute Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive Guide (American Bar Association Section of Dispute 
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Separate or supplementary ethical standards and guidelines have been developed for lawyer 
mediators in most jurisdictions by the professional bodies to which lawyers belong.
4
 
Additionally, relevant mediator standards have been developed by a number of other ADR 
practitioner accreditation organisations whose membership is not restricted to lawyers.
5
 In 
contrast, comparatively little attention is given in the literature to the ethical position of legal 
representatives in mediation
6
 and policy makers, law reform agencies and relevant 
professional bodies have been slow to consider the question of whether or not alternative or 
supplementary standards of conduct are required to govern their behaviour in mediation.
7
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Resolution, 2002) 89, 98. Much of the momentum towards the development of codes of conduct for mediators is 
attributable to a perceived need to professionalize the practice of mediation. Generally, on the subject of the 
regulation of mediators, see Rachael Field, ‘A Mediation Profession in Australia: An Improved Framework for 
Mediation Ethics’ (2007) 18 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 178.  
4
 In Australia, guidelines for mediators have been promulgated by the peak national associations for lawyers (ie 
the Law Council of Australia and the Australian Bar Association) and by various state and territory law societies 
and bar associations: see below n 491 and n 492 for further details. The position is similar in the US, see below 
n 493. 
5
 Most recently in Australia, standards have been promulgated in connection with the National Mediator 
Accreditation System (hereafter NMAS) which commenced operation on 1 January 2008. For more details on 
this system and other ADR practitioner accreditation organisations, see below n 493 and n 494. There are also 
some subject-matter based standards, details of which are discussed below n 496.   
6
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow drew attention to this gap in research almost 15 years ago: Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
‘Ethics in ADR Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues’ (1997) (Winter) Dispute Resolution Magazine 3 
(‘Ethics in ADR Representation’). As Catherine Morris notes, discussions about mediation and ethics often 
focus exclusively on the mediator’s role: see Catherine Morris, ‘The Trusted Mediator: Ethics and Interaction in 
Mediation’ in Julie Macfarlane (ed), Rethinking Disputes: The Mediation Alternative (Cavendish Publishing, 
1997) 301, 301. Also see John W Cooley, ‘Defining the Ethical Limits of Acceptable Deception in Mediation’ 
(2003-2004) 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Journal 263, 270 who makes a similar observation. There have 
been some contributions made to this area although as indicated by the titles, this work represents a piecemeal 
approach to the topic of ethics and legal representatives in mediation, for the most part, focusing on a particular 
context (such as construction law mediations) or a particular aspect of ethics (eg candour). The most significant 
contributions to this area are: Don Peters, ‘When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in Mediation 
and a Modest Proposal’ [2007] Journal of Dispute Resolution 119; Harold Abramson, ‘Problem-Solving 
Advocacy in Mediation: A Model of Client Representation’ (2005) 10 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 103; 
James M Bowie, ‘Ethical Issues in Construction Mediation: Are There Any Rules’ (2004) 24 Construction Law 
33; Patricia Hughes, ‘Ethics in Mediation: Which Rules? Whose Rules?’ (2001) 50 University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 251 (the author gives brief attention to the position in Canada); Kimberlee K Kovach, 
‘New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-
Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation’ (2000-2001) 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 935 (‘New 
Wine Requires New Wineskins’); James J Alfini, ‘Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A 
Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1’ (1999) 19 Northern Illinois University Law Review 255; Menkel-Meadow, Ethics 
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2 (although the focus of this work is on lawyer mediators); 
Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, ‘Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation’ (1997-1998) 73 Notre Dame Law Review 1369; 
and Gerard Sammon, ‘The Ethical Duties of Lawyers Who Act for Parties to a Mediation’ (1993) 4 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 190. The most recent contribution to this area is by Samantha Hardy and Olivia 
Rundle, Mediation for Lawyers (CCH Australia Limited, 2010) ch 7. Most general texts on mediation give little 
attention to the role of legal representatives in mediation. Schmitz examines the treatment given to the topic by 
three major texts, two of which are written for lawyers, and concludes that they ‘understate the importance of 
the lawyer’s role as ADR counselor and advocate, while simultaneously focusing too much on the lawyer’s role 
as mediator’: Suzanne J Schmitz, ‘What Should We Teach in ADR Courses?: Concepts and Skills for Lawyers 
Representing Clients in Mediation’ (2001) 6 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 189. 
7
 There are some exceptions. Guidelines for lawyers as legal representatives in mediation have been 
promulgated by the Law Council of Australia (Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediation (March 2007)) and the Law 
Society of New South Wales (Professional Standards for Legal Representatives in a Mediation, promulgated in 
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In the absence of specific standards of conduct, lawyers who represent parties in 
mediation are governed only by the general rules of professional conduct promulgated by the 
law societies and bar associations to which they belong, together with other components of 
the ‘law of lawyering’. However, a number of influential authors maintain that the legal 
profession’s general rules of conduct were fashioned with adversarial litigation in mind8 and 
that they are inappropriate for, and incompatible with, mediation
9
 - a process which, claim 
the critics, is based on objectives and values fundamentally different from those of litigation. 
Some of these authors (and occasionally, law reform agencies)
10
 have argued for the 
development of new ‘non-adversarial ethics standards’ for lawyers who represent clients in 
mediation and other ‘non adversarial’ contexts. 11  These authors have called for the 
introduction of rules requiring higher standards of disclosure than those owed by lawyers in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1993 and last updated 1 January 2008). These guidelines are discussed in more detail in Part 2. However, it is 
only recently that a dedicated national approach has been taken on the subject of participant conduct obligations 
in mediation. In July 2010 the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) was 
requested by the Federal Attorney-General to advise on legislative reform of the Australian federal civil justice 
system required to protect the integrity of different ADR processes. NADRAC delivered its report on 28 
February 2011: see NADRAC, Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes: From Principles to 
Practice Through People, A Report to the Attorney-General (February 2011) (‘Maintaining and Enhancing the 
Integrity of ADR Processes Report’). NADRAC considered the question of the statutory imposition of conduct 
obligations on participants, their representatives, and ADR practitioners. Also see NADRAC’s earlier report, 
The Resolve to Resolve – Embracing ADR to Improve Access to Justice in the Federal Jurisdiction, A Report to 
the Attorney-General (September 2009), Schedule 2 (‘The Resolve to Resolve Report’). Also see the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission (VLRC), Civil Justice Review, Report No 14 (March 2008) Chapter 3: ‘Improving the 
Standards of Conduct of Participants in Civil Litigation’ (‘Civil Justice Review Report’).  
8
 Robert C Bordone, ‘Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for Process-Enabling Ethical Codes’ (2005-
2006) 21 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 1, 3; Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, above n 2, 410; and Kimberlee K Kovach, ‘Good Faith in Mediation - Requested, Recommended, or 
Required? A New Ethic’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 575, 619 (‘Good Faith in Mediation’).  
9
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as Legal 
Institutions and Roles Evolve’ (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 84, 106; Christopher M Fairman, ‘Ethics and 
Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats on New Heads’ (2002-2003) 18 Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 505, 528; Kimberlee K Kovach, ‘Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace with Practice: Plurality in 
Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards’ (2002-2003) 39 Idaho Law Review 399, 
413-4 (‘Plurality in Lawyering Roles’); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 
410; Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above n 8, 620. Alfini also believes that the current rules provide little 
guidance: Alfini, above n 6, 266. 
10
 For instance, the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended the development of standards of conduct 
for legal representatives in negotiation and other ADR processes (with inclusion of a requirement that 
practitioners act in good faith): Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Managing Justice: A Review of 
the Federal Civil Justice System, Report No 89 (2000) [3.119] (hereafter referred to by the Commission’s 
reference ‘ALRC 89’). 
11
 Kovach, Plurality in Lawyering Roles, above n 9, 413-4; Fairman, above n 9, 528; Kovach, New Wine 
Requires New Wineskins, above n 6, 943, 953; Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, ‘Introduction: Lawyers’ Ethics in 
ADR’ (2000-2001) 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 891, 893-894; Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 453-4; Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above 8, 618-9. A number of authors 
also call for new rules to govern lawyers conduct in negotiations see eg Ysaiah Ross, Ethics in Law: Lawyers’ 
Responsibility and Accountability in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5
th
 ed, 2010) 523 and Jim Parke, 
‘Lawyers as Negotiators: Time for a Code of Ethics?’ (1993) 4 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 216.  
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litigation and negotiation context, good faith participation, fair dealing, cooperation and 
interest-based negotiation. These authors would have legal representatives in mediation 
governed by requirements similar to those accepted by the participants (lawyers and clients) 
in collaborative law. 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
This research examines and evaluates the current rules of professional conduct governing 
lawyers in Australia and, to a lesser extent, the United States as they apply to a number of 
common ethical issues that confront legal representatives in mediation.
12
 The rules are 
considered in the context of other components of the law of lawyering and conduct 
obligations which might be agreed to by the parties (in the case of private mediations) or 
imposed upon them by legislative directive (in the case of mandatory mediations). 
 
The research also examines the features, objectives and values of litigation, mediation and 
unassisted negotiation and the roles undertaken by legal representatives within these 
processes with a view to ascertaining if there are any factors which indicate the need for new 
rules of conduct or alternatively, the desirability of maintaining existing rule systems. 
 
Additionally, the research critiques the rationale given for, and the content of, a range of 
proposals for new rules of conduct for legal representatives in mediation. As mentioned 
above, these proposals typically call for the introduction of rules requiring higher standards of 
disclosure, good faith participation, fair dealing, cooperation and interest-based negotiation. 
The research explores the feasibility and desirability of these proposed new rules (in part, 
using collaborative law as an analytical framework) to determine if they offer more 
appropriate alternatives to the regulation of the behaviour of legal representatives in 
mediation than that provided by current rule systems governing lawyers.  
 
                                                          
12
 As other authors have noted, there is a ‘relative dearth of literature dealing with legal ethics in Australia and 
the UK’ so it is necessary to refer to, and draw on, literature published in the US: Mirko Bagaric and Penny 
Dimopoulos, ‘Legal Ethics is (Just) Normal Ethics: Towards a Coherent System of Legal Ethics’ (2003) 3 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 367, 368.   
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The research problem was chosen as a vehicle through which to integrate a number of my 
published works and to extend my research in a new direction, that of ‘Dispute Resolution 
Ethics’ or ‘ADR Ethics’13 and legal professional regulation.  
 
1.3 Objectives of Research and Research Questions 
 
There are seven objectives to be achieved in this research. They are: 
1. To identify and examine a number of ethical issues which arise in mediation from the 
perspective of legal representatives for the parties. 
2. To evaluate the current rules of professional conduct governing legal representatives 
in Australia and the US, for their appropriateness and compatibility with mediation. 
3. To identify factors, if any, which set mediation apart from litigation and unassisted 
negotiation and which indicate either a) the need for new rules of professional 
conduct for legal representatives in mediation or b) the desirability of maintaining 
existing rule systems, as may be the case. 
4. To evaluate the rationale given for, and the content of, a range of proposed alternative 
ethics systems for legal representatives in mediation. 
5. To identify other reasons, if any, which favour the retention of the current general 
rules of professional conduct for legal representatives in mediation or which indicate 
the need for additional or supplementary rules which are more specific in nature. 
6. To ascertain what place discretion has in ethical decision-making by legal 
representatives in mediation and to identify some of the factors which might influence 
the exercise of that discretion.   
7. To test the feasibility of some of the proposals for new non-adversarial rules of 
professional conduct through the framework of collaborative law. 
 
The research will address the following series of questions: 
1. What ethical issues commonly arise in mediation from the perspective of legal 
representatives for the parties to the mediation? 
                                                          
13
 The terms ‘Dispute Resolution Ethics’ and ‘ADR Ethics’ are now being used to describe this new field which 
combines ethics, legal ethics and dispute resolution: see eg Phyllis Bernard and Bryant Garth (eds), Dispute 
Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive Guide (American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, 2002) 
and Scott R Peppet, ‘ADR Ethics’ (2004) 54 Journal of Legal Education 72. 
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2. How might these ethical issues be resolved using the current rules of professional 
conduct and other components of the law of lawyering in Australia and the US? 
3. How is the resolution of these issues affected by conduct obligations agreed to by the 
participants (in the case of private mediations) or imposed by legislation (in the case 
of mandatory mediations)?  
4. What factors impact the ethics of legal representatives in mediation (and how are 
these factors different from, or similar to, those which affect legal representatives in 
litigation and unassisted negotiation)? 
5. Do these factors indicate the need for new rules of professional conduct for legal 
representatives in mediation? If not, why not? Alternatively, do these factors support 
the retention of the existing rules of conduct for lawyers and if so, why? 
6. What alternative rule systems have been proposed for legal representatives in 
mediation? What are the problems, if any, with these proposals? 
7. Are there other reasons for a) introducing new rules of professional conduct for legal 
representatives in mediation or b) retaining existing rule systems and if so what are 
they? 
8. What role does discretion play in ethical decision-making and what factors are 
relevant to the ethical evaluation process used by legal representatives in mediation? 
9. What lessons can be learned from collaborative law? 
 
1.4 Methodology and Literature Review 
   
This exegesis relies upon, integrates and extends the research undertaken in a number of 
my published works (details of which are given later in this part of the submission). The 
research in these works is doctrinal in nature. I have conducted extensive additional research, 
also of a doctrinal nature, to complete this exegesis. The research might best be categorised 
as ‘testing-out research’ aimed at ‘trying to find the limits of previously proposed 
generalizations’.14 The parent disciplines of this research are legal ethics (and more generally, 
ethics), negotiation, mediation and litigation. There is abundant literature in each of these 
fields but very little of it relates to the ethical position of legal representatives in mediation. I 
believe that this research makes a significant original contribution to the fields of ADR Ethics 
and legal professional regulation. My research will provide the foundation for further debate 
                                                          
14
 Estelle M Phillips and Derek S Pugh, How to Get a PhD: A Handbook for Students and Their Supervisors 
(Open University Press, 4
th
 ed, 2005) 52. 
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on issues of critical importance to lawyers in mediation. It may also be of use to policy 
makers and law reform agencies who are currently interested in the issue of participant 
conduct obligations in mediation and similar dispute resolution processes. 
 
I have not included a separate literature review in this submission. Every part of the 
exegesis contains a review of the literature relevant to the issues under discussion. I draw 
upon texts and law journal articles, upon case law on legal ethics in Australia and the US, and 
upon a range of policy reform proposals (including recommendations from law reform 
commissions, and from the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council in 
Australia). 
 
I also examine and critique a number of sources of ethical obligations for lawyers 
including: 
1. agreements to mediate; 
2. legislative directives to mediate; and 
3. standards and guidelines issued by professional bodies for the conduct of mediators 
and legal representatives in Australia (at both state and federal levels) and the United 
States (predominantly at the federal level).  
 
In the next section, I define key terms and set out the scope and limitations of the exegesis. 
 
1.5 Definitions and Scope of the Research 
 
This research examines the rules of professional conduct and other components of the law 
of lawyering governing legal representatives in mediation.  Some attention is also given to 
the ethical dimensions of negotiation, litigation and collaborative law. 
 
I use the term ‘legal representative’ or ‘legal practitioner’ to refer to a lawyer15 who has 
entered into a representative relationship with a client. For the purpose of this exegesis, it is 
                                                          
15
 A lawyer is a person who has been authorised to practise law and who holds a current practising certificate 
issued by an appropriate regulatory authority. In Australia, as elsewhere, statute prohibits a person who does not 
hold a current practising certificate from practising law. In Australia, see the relevant legal profession legislation 
(Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 16; Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 14(1); Legal Profession Act (NT) s 
18; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 24(1); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 21(1); Legal Profession Act 
1993 (Tas) s 53(1); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 2.2.2(1); and Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA) s 35(1). For 
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assumed that legal representatives act for a single entity rather than for multiple parties. It is 
outside the scope of this research to examine ethical issues which arise when one acts for a 
group of persons (for example, questions about the meaning of ‘consensus’ and possible 
duties to provide ‘adequate voice, participation, and involvement in agreements’).16  
 
The expression ‘the law of lawyering’17 refers to the body of law which regulates the 
behaviour of members of the legal profession. It consists of relevant portions of the law of 
contract, torts, equity, adjectival law, general legislation, legislation governing the practice of 
the law and the rules of professional conduct promulgated by the regulatory bodies to which 
lawyers belong. This research focuses on the rules of professional conduct.  
 
The rules of professional conduct are considered to be rules of ethics. A ‘rule’ may be 
defined as ‘a regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular area 
of activity’.18 The term ‘ethics’ is ‘loosely defined as the question of what is “right” or 
“good” behaviour from a moral, as opposed to an aesthetic, practical, etc, point of view’.19 
Ethics ‘grow out of particular philosophies, which purport to (1) define the nature of the 
world in which we live and (2) prescribe rules for living together’.20 Specialised rule systems 
have evolved for lawyers, giving rise to the expression ‘legal ethics’, a term used by 
Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson to refer to ‘a system of rules based on moral principles that 
directs the conduct of the legal profession’.21 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a discussion of the requirements to practise the law, see Bobette Wolski, Skills, Ethics and Values for Legal 
Practice (LawBook Co., Thomson Reuters, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 5-7.    
16
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Introduction: What’s Fair in Negotiations? What is Ethics in Negotiation?’ in Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow and Michael Wheeler (eds), What’s Fair: Ethics for Negotiators (Jossey-Bass, 2004), xvi. 
17
 There is some confusion over the meaning of the term ‘the law of lawyering’. Kutak uses the term to refer 
only to the body of regulatory law encompassed in the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Robert J Kutak, ‘The Law of Lawyering’ (1982-1983) 22 Washburn Law Journal 413, 413. Parker 
and Evans use the term more broadly as I have done: Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 3.  
18
 Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson, Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 11
th
 
revised ed, 2006) 1257. 
19
 Donald Nicolson, ‘Mapping Professional Legal Ethics: The Form and Focus of the Codes’ (1998) 1 Legal 
Ethics 51. This definition tracks pretty closely with the Concise Oxford English Dictionary which defines 
‘ethics’ as ‘the moral principles governing or influencing conduct’, where ‘moral’ is ‘concerned … with the 
principles of right and wrong behaviour’: see Soanes and Stevenson, above n 18, 490 and 927. Also see Preston 
who notes that ‘[i]n general, ethics is concerned about what is right, fair, just or good; about what we ought to 
do, not just about what is the case or what is most acceptable or expedient’: Noel Preston, Understanding Ethics 
(Federation Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2007) 16 and Parker and Evans who stress that ethics ‘is concerned with deciding what 
is the good or right thing to do’: above n 17, 2. 
20
 Roy J Lewicki, Bruce Barry and David M Saunders, Negotiation (McGraw-Hill, 6th ed, 2010) 254. 
21
 Felicity Nagorcka, Michael Stanton and Michael Wilson, ‘Stranded Between Partisanship and the Truth? A 
Comparative Analysis of Legal Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 448, 451. For a similar definition, see Bagaric and Dimopoulos, above n 12, 
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I recognise that, in focusing on the rules of professional conduct, I focus on a rule-based 
or duty-based approach
22
 to legal ethics which is only one of a number of overarching 
approaches to ethical reasoning
23
 which might be adopted by legal practitioners.
24
 Other 
approaches include end-result ethics (a lawyer might determine the rightness of an action by 
evaluating the consequences of the action eg he or she might consider lying to be justified if 
it serves the objectives of the client in the long run);
25
 social contract ethics (a lawyer might 
determine the rightness of an action by reference to the customs and social norms of the legal 
community and consider some lying to be standard practice in legal negotiations);
26
 and 
personalistic ethics (a lawyer may decide the rightness of an action on the basis of his or her 
own conscious and moral standards).
27
 While these approaches may have some influence on 
lawyers, there is evidence that lawyers identify strongly with a rule-based approach.
28
 
Whatever approach (or approaches) a lawyer adopts, he or she will be guided by the rules of 
professional conduct.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
369. A more comprehensive definition of ‘legal ethics’ (distinguishing macro and micro legal ethics) is provided 
by Richard O’Dair, Legal Ethics Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 5-6. This exegesis 
concerns micro legal ethics. For a discussion of the concepts of ethics, morality and professionalism, see 
Wolski, above n 15, 52-5.  
22
 Also referred to as a deontological approach: Parker and Evans, above n 17, 4; Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, 
above n 21, 450; Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, above n 20, 260-2. Also see G. Richard Shell, Bargaining for 
Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People (Penguin Books, 2006) who refers to this approach as 
the ‘Do the Right Thing Even If It Hurts’ school: 212. 
23
 See Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, above n 20, 256-64 for a discussion of four different approaches to ethical 
reasoning. 
24
 Wade refers to this as the ‘What Does the Code of Ethics Say?’ Approach: John Wade, ‘Persuasion in 
Negotiation and Mediation’ (2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 253, 277, 
footnote 26. Also see Fletcher who notes that when using this approach, ‘the moral agent asks, “What does the 
rule prescribe?”’: Joseph Fletcher, ‘Situation Ethics, Law and Watergate’ (1975-1976) 6 Cumberland Law 
Review 35, 37. 
25
 This is also referred to as a teleological or consequentialist approach: see Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, 
above n 21, 450. The best known theory in this category is utilitarianism which suggests that the action that 
maximises the public good or the greatest amount of favourable consequences should prevail: Parker and Evans, 
above n 17, 5 and Gino Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (Lawbook Co., 3rd ed, 2006) 3. 
26
 Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, above n 20, 262-3. 
27
 Ibid 263-4. 
28
 According to Kovach, ‘[l]awyers have demonstrated a need and custom of governance by a set of rules or 
standards’: Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above n 8, 620. Also see Kimberlee K Kovach, ‘Ethics for 
Whom? The Recognition of Diversity in Lawyering Calls for Plurality in Ethical Considerations and Rules of 
Representational Work’ in Bernard and Garth, above n 3, 57, 62 (‘Ethics for Whom?’). Also see Peppet who 
argues that ‘[t]he codes are of paramount importance in structuring attorneys’ behaviour’: Scott Peppet, 
‘Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning 
of Professional Pluralism’ (2004-2005) 90 Iowa Law Review 475, 506. Note however the different observations 
made by Wade who identifies a fifth ethics tradition of ‘pragmatism’ (or ‘don’t do this as you will get into 
trouble’) which he concludes appears to be the dominant conversation among lawyers: Wade, above n 24, 277, 
footnote 26. A similar approach is identified by Shell as the ‘What Goes Around Comes Around’ Pragmatist 
School: G Richard Shell, ‘Bargaining with the Devil Without Losing Your Soul: Ethics in Negotiation’ in 
Menkel-Meadow and Michael Wheeler, above n 16, 57, 68; and Shell, above n 22, 213. 
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In focusing on the rules, I do not mean to suggest that ethics should be conflated with the 
rules of conduct promulgated by lawyers’ professional bodies. It is widely agreed that these 
rules set only minimum standards or base levels of conduct rather than ceilings.
29
 Lawyers 
should strive to exceed these minimum standards of conduct. One of the aims of this research 
is to attempt to identify the minimum standards which apply in mediation. The research also 
explores some of the ‘grey areas’ which inevitably arise in the process of interpreting and 
applying the rules.
30
 It is in these grey areas that lawyers are most likely to be confronted 
with ethical dilemmas. 
 
An ethical dilemma arises when there is a ‘[c]hoice of competing values (ideas of 
goodness)’31 which suggests ‘a variety of alternative and contradictory courses of action’.32 
Fundamentally, ethics is all about values as Preston notes by observing that ‘in a preliminary 
way we may regard ethics as the study which arises from the human capacity to choose 
among values’.33  
 
Whether or not they are conscious of doing so, lawyers engage in an ethical evaluation 
process when confronted with ethical dilemmas. An ethical evaluation process has been 
described as ‘a process for working out in concrete and particular circumstances what is the 
ethically fitting course to be followed’.34 It ‘involves a balance of conflicting values and a 
search for the best solution to a specific set of circumstances’.35 This research identifies some 
of the factors which legal representatives might take into account in deciding which is the 
‘ethically fitting’ course to be followed when confronted with alternative and contradictory 
courses of action.  
                                                          
29
 Dal Pont, above n 25, 4; Carol Rice Andrews, ‘Highway 101: Lessons In Legal Ethics That We Can Learn On 
the Road’ (2001-2002) 15 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 95; Boon and Levin, above n 2, 7; Thomas W 
Giegerich, ‘The Lawyer’s Moral Paradox’ (1979) 6 Duke Law Journal 1335, 1336. 
30
 Parker and Evans, above n 17, 4; Ross, above n 11, 10-11; Dal Pont above n 25, 19; Boon and Levin, above n 
2, 7 (and references sited therein).  
31
 Fletcher, above n 24, 55. Also see Julie MacFarlane, ‘Mediating Ethically: The Limits of Codes of Conduct 
and the Potential of a Reflective Practice Model’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49, 57 and Omer 
Shapira, ‘Joining Forces in Search for Answers: The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Realm of 
Mediation Ethics’ (2008) 8 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 243, 255 for similar descriptions of an 
ethical dilemma.  
32
 Parker and Evans, above n 17, 10. Also see MacFarlane, above n 31, 57. For discussion about the nature of 
ethical dilemmas in mediation, see Pou, above n 2, 216; Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice, above n 2, 
3. 
33
 Preston, above n 19, 7. Also see Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, above n 21, 475.   
34
 Preston, above n 19, 65. 
35
 Shapira, above n 31, 255. Also see Parker and Evans who assert that ethics ‘asks us to examine the competing 
interests and principles at stake in each situation and have reasons as to why one should triumph over the other, 
or how they can be reconciled’: Parker and Evans, above n 17, 2. 
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Inevitably, different practitioners may choose different courses of action when confronted 
with the same or similar ethical dilemmas. According to the relevant literature, that does not 
matter.
36
 No model of ethical decision-making will 
 
guarantee the same response by different people in similar circumstances, but it should represent a 
guarantee that a comprehensive and responsive approach will be undertaken before deciding, and 
that consequently, a framework for consultation and collaborative dialogue about ethical matters is 
more possible.
37
 
 
Although legal practitioners may arrive at different conclusions, each practitioner should 
have good reasons for what they do and the action they take. They should be able to justify 
the consequences of their actions. 
 
This research is concerned with ethical dilemmas in mediation, and by implication, with 
those which arise in negotiation and litigation. 
  
The term ‘negotiation’ is defined as a process in which the parties confer with each other 
for the purpose of reaching an agreement.
38
 It generally takes one of two main forms, namely 
unassisted or assisted negotiation. Unassisted negotiation takes place when the parties (who 
may be legally represented) negotiate without the assistance of an independent third person. 
Assisted negotiation takes place when the parties negotiate with the assistance of a third 
person, who may be a non-professional such as a family member or friend, or a professional 
dispute resolver such as a mediator. 
  
                                                          
36
 Preston, above n 19, 77. 
37
 Ibid. Also see James E Elkins, ‘Lawyer Ethics: A Pedagogical Mosaic’ (2000) 14 Notre Dame Journal of 
Law, Ethics and Public Policy 117, 213; and Parker and Evans, above n 17, who emphasise the reasoning 
process involved in ethical decision making. 
38
 For further definitions of negotiation, see Nadja Alexander and Jill Howieson, Negotiation: Strategy, Style, 
Skills (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 2010) 3; Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, above n 20, 6.  
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There is no single definition of ‘mediation’ that would meet with universal acceptance.39 
‘The lack of definitional certainty reflects the fact that there is great diversity in mediation 
practice.’40 For the purpose of this exegesis, mediation is defined in broad terms as a process 
in which an acceptable third party, the mediator, undertakes a range of activities to assist the 
parties involved in a dispute or a potential deal to negotiate an agreement.
41
 The activities 
undertaken by the mediator fall short of imposing a decision upon the parties. This definition 
accords with modern definitions of mediation. As Weckstein notes ‘most modern definitions 
of mediation contain two common elements: (1) third-party facilitation of dispute settlement, 
and (2) lack of third-party power to determine the resolution of the dispute.’42 
 
As suggested above, mediation may be used for a range of purposes (eg to resolve 
disputes or to settle the terms of contracts and other transactions).
43
 This research is limited to 
mediation in dispute resolution although its analysis often will apply equally well to both 
dispute resolution and deal making. 
 
Mediation may take place pursuant to an agreement between the parties (an arrangement 
referred to here as ‘private mediation’) or pursuant to court or tribunal order or other 
legislative provision
44
 (referred to here as ‘mandatory mediation’).45 It may be necessary to 
                                                          
39
 For a range of definitions, see Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to 
Resolving Conflicts Without Giving In (Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988) 7; Christopher W Moore, The Mediation 
Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (Jossey-Bass, 3
rd
 ed, 2003) 15; Laurence Boulle, 
Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3
rd
 ed, 2011) 13, 26; NADRAC, Dispute 
Resolution Terms: The Use of Terms in (Alternative) Dispute Resolution (September 2003) available at 
http://www.nadrac.gov.au viewed 25 May 2011; Bush, Ethical Standards in Mediation, above n 2, 254. More 
recent definitions are shorter and broader – allowing many more forms of practice to fall within its parameters. 
40
 Wolski, above n 15, 585. Also see Burns, above n 2, 701; Spencer and Hardy, above n 1, 152; John Wade, 
‘Current Trends and Models in Dispute Resolution: Part 1’ (1998) 9 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 59, 
62-64. 
41
 Bobette Wolski, ‘Culture, Society and Mediation in China and the West’ (1996-97) 3 Commercial Dispute 
Resolution Journal 97, 98-9. Also see Wolski, above n 15, 585. 
42
 Donald T Weckstein, ‘In Praise of Party Empowerment – and of Mediator Activism’ (1997) 33 Willamette 
Law Review 501, 508 (citations omitted). Early writings on mediation emphasised ‘voluntarism’ and 
‘consensuality’ as essential components of mediation but offered little guidance as to the meaning of these terms 
within the context of mediation: Richard Ingleby, ‘Compulsion Is Not The Answer’ (1992) 27 Australian Law 
News 17, 18; Peter S Adler, ‘Resolving Public Policy Conflicts Through Mediation: The Water Code 
Roundtable’ (1990) 1 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 69, 78; and Hilary Astor and Christine M Chinkin, 
Dispute Resolution in Australia (Butterworths, 1992) 180. In an earlier work, I concluded that the defining 
characteristic of mediation in terms of ‘voluntariness’ and ‘consensuality’ is the parties’ ability to accept or 
reject particular outcomes and to refuse to settle: Bobette Wolski, ‘Voluntariness and Consensuality: Defining 
Characteristics of Mediation?’ (1997) 15 Australian Bar Review 213, 226-8.  
43
 See Boulle’s discussion of the uses of mediation: Boulle, above n 39, 30-4. 
44
 Such as the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) s 45 discussed in part 2. 
45
 In its Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, NADRAC classified all mediations 
which take place as a result of judicial or executive power, including those where the parties consent to exercise 
of that power, as mandatory. NADRAC reasoned that once a court or tribunal makes an order, ‘compliance with 
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make a distinction between private and mandatory mediations if consideration is given to 
increasing the standards of conduct for participants, for example, by imposing a good faith 
obligation upon them.
46
 The distinction is not vital in the context of this exegesis because 
regardless of how mediation comes about, legal representatives are bound by the rules of 
conduct promulgated by the professional bodies to which they belong. However, legal 
representatives may agree to abide by higher standards of conduct (as a result of an 
agreement to mediate) or higher standards may be imposed upon them (by legislative 
directive to mediate). Both of these possibilities are considered in this submission.  
 
Litigation is defined here as the process of adjudication of civil disputes by a court (or 
tribunal) within an adversary system of justice. I do not consider criminal trials in this 
exegesis. Nor do I examine arbitration, which is a process of private adjudication. 
 
Occasional reference will be made to the acronym ‘ADR’. Its most common usage is still 
‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ but there are many people and institutions who prefer to use 
the words ‘additional’, ‘appropriate’ or ‘amicable’ instead of ‘alternative’.47 My preference is 
simply to use the phrase ‘dispute resolution’ and I use it to encompass all processes that may 
bring about the peaceful resolution of a dispute.
48
 And although some authors make a 
distinction between a ‘conflict’ and a ‘dispute’,49 the terms are used interchangeably in this 
exegesis. I use the term ‘legal disputes’ to refer to disputes involving legal rights and 
obligations. The analysis in this exegesis is not restricted to the mediation of legal disputes 
but they are the kind of disputes for which legal representatives are most likely to be 
engaged. A distinction can also be drawn between the concepts of dispute ‘settlement’, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that order cannot properly be regarded as voluntary’: Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR 
Processes Report, above n 7, 34 [2.5]. The same reasoning applies to schemes such as that imposed on the 
parties under legislation such as the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld). 
46
 NADRAC approached the issue of conduct obligations for participants in ADR processes by reference to this 
classification making different recommendations with respect to mandatory and private processes: NADRAC, 
Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 34 [2.5]. 
47
 Even international organisations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) prefer the word 
“Amicable” to that of “Alternative”. The ICC has defined ADR to mean ‘amicable dispute resolution’ and it 
includes, by definition, those processes where ‘the decision reached by or in collaboration with the neutral is not 
binding upon the parties, unless they agree otherwise’: Introduction to the ICC ADR Dispute Resolution 
Services, available at <http://www.iccwbo.org/court/adr/> accessed 29 May 2011. 
48
 See Wolski, above n 15, 411 for discussion of relevant terminology. 
49
 See, eg, Gregory Tillett and Brendan French, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (Oxford University 
Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2006) 8-9. 
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‘resolution’ and ‘management’,50 but for simplicity sake, I use the term ‘resolution’ in its 
widest sense to encompass all of these concepts.
51
 
 
In common with mediation, collaborative law is a process of negotiation but the 
negotiations take place without the aid of a mediator. In collaborative law, the parties and 
their lawyers commit themselves, through formal contract, to good faith collaborative 
negotiation to be conducted by a series of four-way meetings between the parties and their 
respective lawyers. Collaborative law’s most distinctive feature is ‘the lawyer disqualification 
provision’ -  a provision whereby the parties agree that if settlement is not reached, their 
lawyers are to withdraw and be disqualified from representing them in that matter in litigation 
should either or both of the parties wish to take that course of action.
52
 The parties must 
engage new counsel in that event. 
 
The term ‘values’ (or ‘value’) is central to a discussion about ethics in mediation and yet 
rarely is the term defined by those who use it. Boulle notes that there is some confusion of 
terminology in the literature in this area.
53
 He finds that ‘there are interchangeable references 
to the “values”, “principles” and underlying “philosophy” of mediation.’54 Many authors also 
use the terms ‘values’ and ‘objectives’ (or ‘goals’) interchangeable or they make joint 
references to ‘values and objectives’ without distinguishing between them.55 These terms are 
defined below. 
 
Preston defines ‘values’ as ‘those principles or attitudes to which we attribute worth (that 
is, we cherish or prize them). They become for us guidelines for action with moral 
significance (such as, “respect for life” or “diligence in work practices”)’.56 Stuckey similarly 
defines values in the context of legal practice as the beliefs or principles that are important to 
                                                          
50
 For a discussion of these concepts, see Boulle, above n 39, 30-2. 
51
 For a discussion of relevant terminology, see Wolski, above n 15, 409.  
52
 On collaborative law generally, see Larry R Spain, ‘Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a 
Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law’ (2004) 56 Baylor Law Review 
141; and Fairman, above n 9. For further definitions of CL, see David A Hoffman, ‘Exploring the Boundaries 
and Terrain of ADR Practice: Mediation, Arbitration, and Collaborative Law’ (2007-2008) 14 Dispute 
Resolution Magazine 4-5. 
53
 Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2005) 60. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Mendel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 430, 450; Spain, above n 52, 156; 
Burns, above n 2, 701. 
56
 Preston, above n 19, 16. Also see the Concise Oxford English Dictionary which defines values as ‘principles 
or standards of behaviour’: Soanes and Stevenson, above n 18, 1597. 
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a group or to an individual and which are used as standards for evaluating ideas and 
behaviours.
57
 Values can be attributed to persons or to social processes.
58
 As regards the latter 
(social processes), one may talk for instance about the values of a process (such as 
mediation
59
 and litigation
60
) and the values of a lawyer’s representation in a particular 
process.
61
 I have found that some of the authors who call for new rules of conduct compare 
the values of a process with the values of representation in a process. If processes are to be 
accurately compared, it is important to compare like with like ie the values of mediation (a 
process) must be compared with the values of litigation (a process) not with the values of 
representation (so called, adversarial representation) in a process.   
   
Objectives or goals are the things we strive to achieve, for instance, through the use of 
mediation or litigation. There is a close correlation between objectives on the one hand and 
values on the other because normally, the objectives we seek to achieve would be considered 
‘worthy’ – why else aim to achieve those things?  
 
What is the purpose of these distinctions? Some over-claiming has been done in the case 
of mediation. Boulle notes that, in relation to the many claims made for mediation, not all 
‘values’ are values in the sense of being statements of fundamental principle. He makes a 
distinction between a number of aspects of mediation, ‘namely its features, such as its 
flexibility and informality, its values, such as self-determination and the consensuality of 
outcomes, and its objectives, such as efficiency and effectiveness’.62 In the context of dispute 
resolution, the features of a particular process may be considered as ‘the means by which we 
reach decisions’;63 or more generally, the means by which we attempt to achieve particular 
objectives. Many of the values claimed for mediation are in fact features of the process rather 
than values (albeit that they might promote certain values).
64
 Boulle notes further that ‘[i]t is 
                                                          
57
 Roy Stuckey et al, Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and A Road Map (Clinical Legal Education 
Association, 2007) 31. 
58
 Boulle, above n 39, 62. 
59
 Spencer and Hardy, above n 1, 620; Frank Blechman, ‘Ethics and Field Building: The Chicken and the Egg’ 
(2002) 19 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 373, 373-376; Robert A Baruch Bush and Joseph P Folger, The 
Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition (Jossey-Bass, 1994) 
230. 
60
 See, eg, Ellen E Sward, ‘Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System’ (1988-1989) 64 
Indiana Law Journal 301; Stephan Landsman, ‘A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System’ 
(1983) 44 Ohio State Law Journal 713.  
61
 Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 430. 
62
 Boulle, above n 53, 60 (emphasis in original). 
63
 Sward, above n 60, 303. 
64
 Boulle, above n 53, 60-1. 
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useful to differentiate among these aspects, though sometimes the same factor is both a value 
and an objective. For example, self-determination can be both a value of mediation and the 
objective behind two parties’ choice of the process.’65 In part 3 of the exegesis, I endeavour 
to make a distinction between these aspects of the various dispute resolution processes and I 
endeavour to compare like with like. 
 
This research does not examine ethical issues which may arise following the conclusion 
of a mediation – issues such as the implementation, follow-through and enforcement of any 
agreement that might be reached in mediation.
66
  
 
1.6 Explanatory Overview and Organisation of the Exegesis 
 
The exegesis is presented in seven parts. Part 2 examines the sources of legal ethical 
obligations for legal representatives in mediation in Australia and the United States. The 
discussion then centres on five ethical issues that arise in mediation from the perspective of 
legal representatives and suggests how those issues might be resolved using the current 
framework of law governing lawyers. The ethical issues considered are whether there are 
duties to make full and honest disclosure of relevant information, to act in good faith, to act 
cooperatively, to ensure fairness in process and/or outcome and, should these duties exist, 
which prevails in the event of conflict (and who decides which prevails, lawyer or client). 
 
In formulating this list of ethical issues I have drawn upon literature pertaining to 
negotiation ethics.
67
 For the most part, the authors of this material do not specify whether 
they are discussing unassisted and assisted negotiation (mediation) or just the former. 
Nonetheless, the literature is relevant given the widely adopted definition of mediation as a 
                                                          
65
 Ibid 60. 
66
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 16, xxvi. 
67
 There is an abundance of literature on ethics in negotiation although as Menkel-Meadow points out, ‘many 
treatments of the subject focus almost exclusively on questions of deception, truth telling, and candor in 
negotiation’: Menkel-Meadow, above n 16, xviii. For a list of some of the other ethical issues that arise in 
negotiation, see Menkel-Meadow, above n 16, xviii. Also see Jeffrey Z Rubin, ‘Negotiation’ (1983) 27 
American Behavioral Scientist 135, 136-7; Burns, above n 2, 697. Burns transposes some of this literature to the 
mediation context and identifies issues of candour and lawyer/client authority as ‘the most important ethics 
issues surrounding the mediations in which lawyers participate’: Burns, above n 2, 692. 
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process of assisted or facilitated negotiation.
68
 We can be confident that unassisted 
negotiation and mediation give rise to similar ethical dilemmas because both processes 
involve information exchange between two or more parties seeking to reach an agreement, 
with agreement being dependent on some degree of cooperation between the parties. A 
critical question though, is the extent to which mediation differs from unassisted negotiation, 
if at all, when it comes to resolving relevant ethical issues. Consideration must also be given 
to any ethical issues which may be unique to mediation. 
 
Much of this work revolves around comparisons of a number of dispute resolution 
processes. In arguing for new rules of professional conduct for mediation, commentators 
inevitably draw comparisons between mediation on the one hand and litigation and unassisted 
negotiation on the other. Part 3 of the exegesis compares and contrasts the features, objectives 
and values of these dispute resolution processes. I single out two particular features of 
mediation which distinguish it from both litigation and unassisted negotiation and which 
ultimately provide reasons for retaining existing rule systems for legal representatives in 
mediation. The features are: 
  
1. The wide diversity of mediation practice. Mediation is an extremely diverse process69 
which may take different forms and serve a range of different (and sometimes 
conflicting) objectives and values. It is more diverse than litigation which is heavily 
regulated by legislation, rules of court and practice directions. It is even more diverse 
than unassisted negotiation which tends, at least when lawyers are involved, to be 
highly ritualised. 
 
2. The capacity for influence, and the exercise of discretion, by mediators. Despite the 
development of mediator standards of conduct, mediators may adopt different 
approaches to mediation and use a wide range of interventions, many of which have a 
profound impact on the course and outcome of mediation.
70
 Mediator standards also 
allow mediators wide individual discretion in handling ethical matters that arise in the 
                                                          
68
 See, eg, Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (Jossey-Bass, 
1991) 14; Burns, above n 2, 691-2; Abramson, above n 6, 110. Also see Nolan-Haley who asserts that 
‘[m]ediation is best understood as an extension of the negotiation process’: Nolan-Haley, above n 6, 1371. 
69
 Nolan-Haley, above n 6, 1379; Burns, above n 2, 701. 
70
 Generally see Debra Shapiro, Rita Drieghe and Jeanne Brett, ‘Mediator Behavior and the Outcome of 
Mediation’ (1985) 41 Journal of Social Issues 101; Susan S Silbey and Sally E Merry, ‘Mediator Settlement 
Strategies’ (1986) 8 Law & Policy 7. 
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context of each mediation in which they participate.
71
 As a consequence, mediators 
may be more activist and influential than judges, even in today’s environment of the 
‘managerial’ judge.  
 
In part 4 of the exegesis, I critically analyze the reasons given for, and the content of, a 
number of proposals for new ‘non-adversarial’ rules of conduct for lawyers representing 
parties in mediation. Suggestions for new rules centre on the ethical issues discussed in part 
2: issues of disclosure, good faith, cooperation and fairness. It has also been suggested that 
legal representatives in mediation should adopt an interest-based approach to negotiation and 
act more like neutrals and less like adversarial advocates. Whilst I concede that lawyers in 
mediation may need to draw upon a different repertoire of skills than that needed in litigation, 
I reject the idea that their role in mediation is any different than it is in litigation: legal 
representatives in mediation still counsel, advise, negotiate and advocate for their clients. 
 
In part 5, I offer some more general arguments in favour of maintaining the status quo 
with the general rules of conduct that currently govern the profession. The arguments are 
that: 
1. The existing general rules of professional conduct are more appropriate than specific 
rules to govern conduct in highly contextual processes such as mediation. 
2. It is appropriate and desirable for legal representatives to have the capacity to exercise 
discretion in relation to certain ethical matters in mediation. The matters over which 
they should retain discretion are those matters which proponents for new rules seek to 
regulate (or more heavily regulate than is presently the case).  
 
In part 6, I critically examine collaborative law, the latest addition to the suite of dispute 
resolution procedures. Collaborative law provides a useful lens through which to examine 
some of the ethical dimensions of mediation - for participants in collaborative law explicitly 
agree to abide by many of the obligations which proponents for new rules seek to impose on 
legal representatives in mediation. I suggest that collaborative law has developed as a way to 
overcome problems inherent in concepts such as good faith participation. Arguably, all it has 
done is to create new ethical dilemmas. 
  
                                                          
71
 MacFarlane, above n 31, 62. 
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I conclude the exegesis in part 7 with recommendations for improvement of the current 
rules of professional conduct in Australia and with some suggestions for further research. 
 
In the remaining section of this part, I provide an overview of those of my published 
works on which I rely and a description of how they are connected to the research problem. 
 
1.7 Published Works of the Candidate Integrated into the Exegesis   
 
In this exegesis, I draw upon, integrate and extend a number of my published works, 
including the following articles and book: 
 
1. ‘The Role and Limitations of Fisher and Ury’s Model of Interest-based Negotiation in 
Mediation’ (1994) 5 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 210-221. This article is 
based on a paper which I submitted towards fulfilment of the requirements of the 
degree of Masters of Law at Bond University. The contents of the article are updated 
in this exegesis. As its title suggests, the article explores the limitations of interest-
based negotiation in mediation. Commentators who call for new non-adversarial rules 
of conduct for mediation assume that all mediations have the potential to be 
conducted, from beginning to end, on the basis of interest-based negotiation. 
However, as I demonstrate in this article, there are circumstances in which interest-
based negotiation is neither possible nor desirable. Most negotiations ultimately 
involve some degree of positional or distributive negotiation where one more dollar 
for one party means one less dollar for the other. Accordingly, as is argued in part 4 of 
this exegesis, it is unrealistic to require legal representatives to use interest-based 
negotiation in mediation. In any event, as is also argued in part 4, interest-based 
negotiation is not more ethical or more appropriate in mediation than its counterpart, 
positional negotiation.  
 
2. ‘Culture, Society and Mediation in China and the West’ (1996-97) 3 Commercial 
Dispute Resolution Journal 97-123. This article is also based on a paper which I 
submitted towards fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Law at 
Bond University. Some authors who call for new non-adversarial rules for lawyers in 
mediation assert that ethics and codes of conduct should be derived from the 
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objectives and values on which mediation is premised. They assert the primacy, in 
mediation, of values such as personal autonomy and self-determination. This article 
demonstrates that these values are culturally situated. They are values that are prized 
in Western cultures. We should not be surprised therefore to find that the same values 
are claimed for litigation. In part 3 of this exegesis, I examine the processes of 
litigation, mediation and unassisted negotiation and conclude that the processes have 
more in common than is often acknowledged. This casts doubt on the claim that we 
need new professional conduct rules for mediation because it rests on fundamentally 
different objectives and values than litigation. 
 
3. ‘Voluntariness and Consensuality: Defining Characteristics of Mediation?’ (1997) 15 
Australian Bar Review 213-228. Proponents for new rules often compare the ideal 
functioning of one process (usually mediation) with the actual functioning of another 
(usually litigation). This article explores the extent to which mediation in practice (as 
opposed to mediation rhetoric) is founded on espoused values of voluntariness and 
consensuality. Drawing on a cross-cultural and historical analysis of mediation, I 
conclude that consensuality does not mean that the parties have an unfettered right to 
determine the outcome of mediation; voluntariness does not mean that the parties are 
without pressure to settle. The only element of mediation which remains consistent 
across time and cultures is the ability of the parties to accept or reject a particular 
outcome. In this exegesis, I compare and contrast the actual functioning (as opposed 
to the ideal functioning) of the various processes of dispute resolution.      
 
4. ‘Mediator Settlement Strategies: Winning Friends and Influencing People’ (2001) 12 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 248-262. This article questions the concepts 
of mediator neutrality and impartiality. It is argued that mediators become a party to 
the negotiations into which they enter and that they influence the course and outcome 
of those negotiations. The article catalogues a range of strategies used by mediators to 
pressure parties to settle and to influence the course and outcome of mediations. It 
also identifies some of the contextual factors that influence mediator choice of 
strategies. There has been much debate in the literature about the use and 
appropriateness of evaluative strategies by mediators. In this exegesis, I argue that 
evaluative strategies are prevalent in mediation and that they may systematically 
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favour one party over the other. One of the tasks of legal representatives in mediation 
is to monitor and respond to this type of mediator intervention.  
 
5. ‘Reform of the Civil Justice System Two Decades Past – Implications for the Legal 
Profession and for Law Teachers’ (2009) 21 Bond Law Review 192-232; and ‘Reform 
of the Civil Justice System 25 Years Past – (In)Adequate Responses from Law 
Schools and Professional Associations? (and How Best to Change the Behaviour of 
Lawyers’ (2011) 40 Common Law World Review 40-93. When proponents for new 
rules of conduct for mediation compare and contrast mediation with litigation, they 
often refer to an outdated version of litigation. These articles provide an overview of 
the reforms which have taken place in the civil justice systems of several common law 
jurisdictions in the last three decades: reforms such as the development of pre-
litigation protocols, case management schemes and the institutionalization of 
mediation (and other forms of dispute resolution) within the court system. When I 
compare litigation and mediation in this exegesis, I take into account the reforms of 
the last several decades. Many of these reforms require responsive changes in the law 
school curriculum. The first of these articles canvasses the efforts made by law 
schools to integrate the teaching and learning of skills and values, including those 
associated with negotiation and mediation, into the curriculum. The second article 
questions whether law schools and professional associations have done enough to 
respond to the reforms. 
 
6. ‘Beyond Mooting: Designing an Advocacy, Ethics and Values Matrix for the Law 
School Curriculum’ (2009) 19 Legal Education Review, 41-82; and ‘Why, How and 
What to Practice: Integrating Skills Teaching and Learning in the Undergraduate Law 
Curriculum’ (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 287-302. These articles stress the 
importance of teaching a range of skills, values and ethics in the law school 
curriculum in an integrated, systematic and pervasive manner so that all students have 
an opportunity to develop skills incrementally and experientially in the safety of the 
law school environment. 
 
7. Skills, Ethics and Values for Legal Practice (LawBook Co., Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 
2009), chapters 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10. In this book, I examine a range of skills used by 
lawyers in performing their roles as advisers, counsellors, negotiators and advocates. I 
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also examine the ethical duties owed by lawyers to the court, clients and other parties 
under the law of lawyering with a specific focus on the duties owed in the contexts of 
negotiation, mediation, collaborative law and litigation. I discuss the core professional 
values imbued in the rules of professional conduct and examine a number of theories 
of legal ethics, some of which suggest that lawyers should be free to exercise 
discretion in ethical decision-making. All of these ‘themes’ are taken up in this 
exegesis. Most notably, in this exegesis, I identify and explore five central ethical 
issues for legal representatives in mediation and discuss how those issues might be 
resolved using the law of lawyering including existing rule systems for lawyers. I also 
argue the case for the exercise of discretion in ethical decision-making by drawing 
upon several theories of legal ethics discussed in the book.   
 
I conclude the exegesis by drawing on concepts developed in two of my publications on 
Dispute Systems Design (DSD), a process involving the design and implementation of a 
series of procedures for handling disputes, rather than an individual procedure such as 
mediation.
72
 The principles of DSD suggest that the parties and their legal representatives 
may be encouraged to participate more constructively in mediation (assuming that they do 
not do so already) with education programs at the court and community levels and with 
appropriate skills training programs integrated within the law school curriculum (and in CLE 
activities). Education and training offer a better alternative to modify behaviour than the 
imposition of rules of conduct which are arguably unrealistic, and also impossible to monitor 
and enforce. The publications to which I refer are: The Laws of Australia: Title 13, Dispute 
Resolution, Subtitle 13.6 Dispute Systems Design (Law Book Co., 1997) 3-56; and ‘The 
Model Dispute Resolution Procedure for Australian Workplace Agreements: A Dispute 
Systems Design Perspective’ (1998) 10 Bond Law Review 7-38. 
 
In the next part of the exegesis, I examine the legal ethical obligations of legal 
representatives in mediation. 
  
                                                          
72
 This is the most common conceptualisation of a dispute resolution system. Generally see William L Ury, 
Jeanne M Brett and Stephen Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of 
Conflict (Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, 1993) 21; Bobette Wolski, The Laws of Australia: Title 
13, Dispute Resolution: Subtitle 13.6 Dispute Systems Design (Law Book Co., 1997) 8 [2]. 
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PART 2: THE LAW GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN 
MEDIATION 
 
2.1 Sources of Legal Ethical Obligations for Lawyers  
 
While there has been some debate about whether or not mediators are engaged in the 
practice of the law,
73
 there is no doubt that a lawyer enters into a lawyer-client relationship
74
 
and practises law when he or she represents a client in mediation.
75
 Consequently, in 
Australia and elsewhere,
76
 the conduct of legal representatives in mediation is governed by 
the law of lawyering ie relevant portions of the law of contract, torts, equity, adjectival law,
77
 
general legislation,
78
 legislation governing the practice of the law (in Australia, the Legal 
                                                          
73
 Some authors argue that mediators are not engaged in the practice of the law since they do not represent a 
particular party to a dispute and have no client in the traditional sense. See James K L Lawrence, ‘Mediation 
Advocacy: Partnering with the Mediator’ (1999-2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 425, 438; 
Bruce Meyerson, ‘Lawyers Who Mediator Are Not Practicing Law’ (1996) 14 Alternatives to High Cost of 
Litigation 74, 75. Generally on this issue see Weckstein, above n 42, 528-9; Maureen E Laflin, ‘Preserving the 
Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators’ (2000) 14 Notre Dame 
Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 479, 499-505; Schuwerk, above n 2, 763; Joshua R Schwartz, 
‘Laymen Cannot Lawyer: But is Mediation the Practice of Law?’ (1998-1999) 20 Cardozo Law Review 1715, 
1746. However, while the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution took the view that mediating is not the practice of 
the law, it recognised that some activities eg offering legal opinions and drafting agreements clearly implicate 
the practice of the law and subject the lawyer’s performance as a mediator to the general provisions of the 
professional practice rules: see ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Mediation and the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law (adopted by the Section on 2 February 2002). Menkel-Meadow expressed the 
same view sometime earlier: see Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 422-4. 
Also see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering 
as Only Adversary Practice’ (1996-1997) 10 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 631, 653. Also, it appears 
that, in promulgating guidelines for the practice of mediation, some law societies and bar associations have 
treated ‘mediations conducted by lawyers as a form of legal service’: Laflin, 482. 
74
 As Lamb and Littrich note, ‘[t]he lawyer’s duty to a client only arises when the lawyer-client relationship has 
been established’: Ainslie Lamb and John Littrich, Lawyers in Australia (Federation Press, 2007) 207. 
75
 See Mark Richardson, ‘Defining Legal Work’ (2004) (June) Law Society Journal 63, 64. 
76
 For a discussion of the position in the US, see Cooley, above n 6, 270; Peters, above n 6, 121. For a discussion 
of the position in the UK, see Boon and Levin, above n 2, 421. 
77
 There are three main sources of adjectival law: legislation which establishes the court (and regulates its 
jurisdiction and procedure), its composition, administration and statutory powers (in Australia see, eg, the 
Supreme Court Acts in various states and territories); delegated legislation, that is, the Rules of Court devised by 
rules committees (which are composed of judicial officers and representatives of the government and the legal 
profession); and practice notes and directions made by the court pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction: Stephen 
Colbran et al, Civil Procedure: Commentary and Materials (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3
rd
 ed, 2005) 6. The court 
also has inherent jurisdiction to supervise and sanction lawyers. For discussion on the foundation of these 
powers, see Nicolson, above n 19, 52; Paul L Haines, ‘Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for 
Judicial Intervention’ (1989-1990) 65 Indiana Law Journal 445, 463; and Stephen Corones, Nigel Stobbs and 
Mark Thomas, Professional Responsibility and Legal Ethics in Queensland (Lawbook Co., 2008) 88-9. 
78
 Regard must be paid to legislation such as the Australian Consumer Law which is set out in Schedule 2 of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which is the new name for the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and 
similar state and territory Fair Trading legislation. 
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Profession legislation),
79
 together with the rules of conduct promulgated by the professional 
bodies to which lawyers belong (in Australia, the state and territory law societies and bar 
associations).
80
 Some uniformity has been achieved in the rules in Australia due to the efforts 
of the Law Council of Australia
81
 (hereafter the LCA) and the Australian Bar Association, 
each of which has published model rules that have been adopted in the majority of Australian 
jurisdictions.
82
 At the time of writing, new national conduct rules have been developed by the 
LCA and the Australian Bar Association as a result of the National Legal Profession Reform 
Project.
83
 These rules have yet to be finalised and adopted. Throughout this exegesis, 
reference is made to the existing rules (ie the LCA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
Practice (at 16 March 2002) [hereafter the LCA Model Rules or the Solicitors’ Rules] and 
the Australian Bar Association Model Rules (at 8 December 2002) [hereafter the Barristers’ 
Rules]) and to the draft new national rules for solicitors and barristers.
84
 In addition to the 
general law,
85
 the main source of regulation for lawyers in the US is the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2004) (hereafter the ABA Model Rules) 
which have been adopted in whole or in part by most US states.
86
 
                                                          
79
 At the time of writing, legal practice in Australia is still regulated by different state and territory legislation. 
Much of the legislation is modelled on the National Legal Professional Model Bill (now 2nd ed, 2006) and the 
National Legal Profession Model Regulations, at www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice/currentstatus.html, 
promulgated in April 2004 by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) of Model Provisions for 
the Legal Profession. 
80
 Since the rules have a statutory foundation, they are considered ‘a species of law’: Boon and Levin, above n 2, 
7. 
81
 The Law Council of Australia (hereafter LCA) is self described as Australia’s peak national representative 
body of the Australian legal profession: http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/about/about_home.cfm. 
82
 The LCA adopted a set of model rules, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice in March 2002 
(hereafter the LCA Model Rules or the Solicitors’ Rules). In 1993 the Australian Bar Association published a 
Code of Conduct as a framework for national uniformity. It was subsequently revised to form the Australian Bar 
Association Model Rules (hereafter the Barristers’ Rules). 
83
 A proposal for a new national legal profession Bill and Rules was put to the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) in April, 2010. Following a period of public consultation which ran from 14 May to 13 
August 2010, the Taskforce reported back to COAG in February 2011. The proposal will be reconsidered by 
COAG at a later date (yet to be determined) following resolution of governance and funding issues: see COAG 
National Legal Profession Reform, Report of Meeting Outcomes, available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/legalprofession (accessed 4/05/2011). 
84
 Legal Profession National Rules – Solicitors’ Rules 2010 under the Legal Profession National Law, 
Consultation Draft 14 May 2010 (hereafter draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010); and Legal Profession National Rules – 
Barristers’ Rules 2010 under the Legal Profession National Law, Consultation Draft 14 May 2010 (hereafter 
draft Barristers’ Rules 2010). 
85
 In the US, one needs to be cognisant of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers (1998) which ‘clarifies and synthesizes the common law applicable to the legal profession’ 
(including aspects of the law of contract, torts and agency): see introduction to the Restatement. Although it 
appears as part of the Restatement Third series, there is no previous Restatement of this subject. 
86
 As is the case with the model rules in Australia, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (2004) (hereafter the ABA Model Rules) are not in and of themselves binding but the rules adopted in a 
particular state are enforceable against practitioners practising in that state. (The ABA Model Rules were first 
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983. Before the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA model was 
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Generally, law societies and bar associations in Australia and the US have not 
promulgated additional or supplementary rules of conduct or guidelines to govern their 
members’ conduct when they are acting as legal representatives in mediation.87 There are two 
notable exceptions in Australia. The LCA published Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations in 
2007
88
 while the Law Society of New South Wales promulgated Professional Standards for 
Legal Representatives in a Mediation in 1993, which standards have recently been updated.
89
 
The LCA guidelines are non-binding in nature
90
 while the standards promulgated by the Law 
Society of New South Wales appear to establish a hybrid system. Non-binding guidelines and 
standards are not without influence on lawyers. In fact, most model rules contain some 
statements which are aspirational in nature. These statements may guide practitioners in 
selecting ‘best practices’ in conditions of uncertainty. They may also be taken into account by 
professional bodies and courts when they are assessing complaints against legal 
practitioners.
91
 
 
One other accommodation for mediation has been made in the professional conduct rules 
in Australia: ‘court’ has been defined to include ‘mediations’.92 The possible implications of 
this provision are discussed later in this part of the exegesis. No such accommodation has 
been made in the ABA Model Rules.
93
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The Model Code was preceded by the 1908 Canons of 
Professional Ethics). 
87
 The ABA Model Rules are also silent on the subject of lawyers representing parties in mediation: see 
Fairman, above n 9, 519; Nolan-Haley, above n 6, 1377. Some guidance is offered in the US with respect to 
unassisted negotiation: see the American Bar Association Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations (2002). 
For discussion about the Guidelines, see Brian C Haussmann, ‘The ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement 
Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic’ (2003-2004) 89 Cornell Law Review 1218. The 
guidelines are not intended to be binding. 
88
 LCA, Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediation (at March 2007).  
89
 The Law Society of New South Wales, Professional Standards for Legal Representatives in a Mediation (at 1 
January 2008). 
90
 The guidelines do not impose any additional obligations on legal representatives; nor do they derogate from 
the usual obligations imposed on them: Introduction Note, LCA, Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediation (at March 
2007). According to this Note, the guidelines were developed ‘to give assistance to lawyers representing clients 
in the mediation of civil and commercial disputes’. 
91
 Boulle, above n 39, 468. 
92
 The LCA Model Rules and the Barristers’ Rules define ‘court’ to mean any body described as such, a range of 
judicial and statutory tribunals, investigations and inquiries established by statute or a Parliament, Royal 
Commissions and ‘arbitrations and mediations’ (with the LCA Model Rules using the phrase ‘an arbitration or 
mediation or any other form of dispute resolution’): Definition Sections, LCA Model Rules and Barristers’ 
Rules. These definitions have been retained in the new draft National Rules.  
93
 The ABA Model Rules provide that “‘tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration 
proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity’: see 
Rule 1.0 Terminology. 
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There is presently no general national legislation in Australia governing the conduct of 
parties and their legal representatives in mediation. However, there is pressure at least at the 
federal level to impose statutory conduct obligations on participants in ADR processes as a 
result of recommendations recently made by NADRAC.
94
 In the US, there has been some 
general legislative attempt to regulate behaviour in mediation with the promulgation of the 
Uniform Mediation Act.
95
 However, the Act ‘does not purport to regulate the conduct of 
parties beyond confidentiality issues and enforcement of mediation agreements’. 96  In 
particular, it ‘does not attempt to regulate a party’s obligation to mediate in good faith, to act 
truthfully and with candor in the mediation process, or to maintain some minimal civility in 
dealing with the other participants in the mediation process.’97 In short, it does not address 
the ethical issues discussed in this exegesis. 
 
Additional conduct obligations may be accepted by the parties and their legal 
representatives by virtue of an agreement to mediate or other dispute resolution clause (in the 
case of private mediations) or imposed on them by specific statutory directives to mediate (in 
the case of mandatory mediations). 
 
From these various sources, a number of obligations are imposed on lawyers. Foremost, 
they owe duties to the administration of justice, to their clients, and to third parties (including 
their opponents).
98
 
 
2.2 The Duties Owed by Lawyers 
 
2.2.1 Duties Owed to the Administration of Justice 
 
Lawyers owe a duty to the administration of justice.
99
 This duty manifests itself in various 
ways. For instance, lawyers must not engage in conduct that is illegal or that is prejudicial to 
                                                          
94
 NADRAC recommended that ‘[w]here such a requirement does not already exist, legislation should be 
introduced which requires participants (disputants and their representatives) in mandatory ADR processes to 
participate in those processes in good faith’: Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, 
above n 7, 38 [2.6.1]. NADRAC’s recommendations are discussed in more detail in part 4. 
95
 Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by it approved and 
recommended for enactment in all US states in 2001.  
96
 Bowie, above n 6, 34. 
97
 Ibid. 
98
 Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, above n 21, 451, 466. For a more detailed examination of the duties owed by 
lawyers to their clients, see Wolski, above n 15, 71-87. 
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the administration of justice.
100
 They must obey and uphold the law and foster respect for the 
law and its administration. The most obvious aspect of the duty to the administration of 
justice is the duty that lawyers owe to the courts, tribunals and commissions of inquiry before 
whom they appear (hereafter, simply referred to as the ‘court’).101 It includes obligations to 
make responsible use of court process and privilege
102
  and to work to ensure the integrity of 
evidence.
103
 
 
Although the rules of professional conduct in Australia define ‘court’ to include 
‘mediations’,104 there is some difficulty in transposing relevant rules to the mediation context, 
a matter which will be discussed shortly.  
 
2.2.2 Duties Owed to Clients 
 
Lawyers owe their clients in mediation the same duties as they owe them in any other 
context,
105
 namely, a duty of representation;
106
 a duty to inform, advise and act on ‘lawful, 
proper and competent’ instructions;107  a duty of competence and diligence; 108  a duty of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
99
 See Re Foster (1950) 50 SR (NSW) 149, 151 discussed in Dal Pont, above n 25, 7-8. Generally, see Dal Pont, 
chs 17-19; Lamb and Littrich, above n 74, ch 15; Wolski, above n 15, 65-71. 
100
 Dal Pont, above n 25, 423. See Part (A) of the general principles of professional conduct section of the 
Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 of the Law Institute of Victoria Limited. The same wording 
appears in the objects clause of Queensland’s Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007. 
101
 See n 92. For a discussion of lawyers’ duties to the court, see David A Ipp, ‘Lawyers’ Duties to the Court’ 
(1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 63. 
102
 LCA Model Rules r 16; Barristers’ Rules rr 35-40; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 21; draft Barristers’ Rules 
2010 rr 59-67. 
103
 LCA Model Rules r 17; Barristers’ Rules rr 43-50; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 rr 24-25; draft Barristers’ 
Rules 2010 rr 68-74. 
104
 See above n 92.  
105
 These obligations are also founded in contract (see Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 22), tort 
(Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539) and equity. See the discussion by Stephen Walmsley, Alister Abadee 
and Ben Zipser, Professional Liability in Australia (Lawbook Co., 2nd ed, 2007) 16, 117-8; Lamb and Littrich, 
above n 74, 269; Geoff Monahan and David Hipsley, Essential Professional Conduct: Legal Ethics (Routledge-
Cavendish, 2
nd
 ed, 2007) 82-3. For a useful discussion of a lawyer’s duties to a client within the context of 
negotiation, see Robert J Condlin, ‘Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute 
Bargaining Role’ (1992) 51 Maryland Law Review 1, 71-8. 
106
 Barristers’ Rules r 85; draft Barristers’ Rules 2010 rr 21-24. Lawyers who practise solely as barristers are 
obliged to accept work in accordance with a rule known as ‘the cab-rank rule’. In practice, solicitors operate in 
much the same way as do barristers. As a general rule, they will not turn away clients unless there is good cause 
for doing so. See Wolski, above n 15, 71-2 for a discussion of the duty of representation and of the operation of 
the cab-rank rule.  
107
 LCA Model Rules r 12.2; Barristers’ Rules r 17; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 rr 7.1, 8.1, 13.1; draft 
Barristers’ Rules 2010 r 39. 
108
 See LCA Model Rules r 1.1; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 rr 4.1.3, 7.1. Also see Barristers’ Rules r 16 and 
draft Barristers’ Rules 2010 r 37(a) which speak of ‘skill and diligence’. In the US, the ABA Model Rules r 1.3 
provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence ... in representing a client’. The terms ‘competence’, 
‘skill’ and ‘diligence’ are not defined. However, ‘[a] “duty of competence” may be defined in a general way as a 
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loyalty (ie a duty to avoid a conflict of interest as between themselves and clients and as 
between clients and third parties);
109
 and a duty to maintain the confidence of a client’s 
affairs. The duty of confidentiality is subject to a number of exceptions eg disclosure is 
permitted when the client authorises it and when ‘the practitioner is permitted or compelled 
by law to disclose’ the information.110 
 
The rules of conduct in most Australian jurisdictions currently impose a specific 
obligation on legal practitioners to inform clients (and where the practitioner is a barrister, to 
inform the instructing solicitor and client) about ‘the reasonably available alternatives to fully 
contested adjudication’.111 Although the ABA Model Rules make no explicit provision to this 
effect, several authors are of the view that the responsibility to advise clients about mediation 
and other alternatives to litigation arises from a combination of several provisions of the 
Rules.
112
 Thus, lawyers should advise clients about the availability of mediation and other 
process options, and about the nature and purpose of mediation (and its potential advantages 
and disadvantages).
113
 They should assess cases for their suitability for mediation and if 
mediation is chosen by clients, they should discuss with clients and agree on the approach to 
be taken and the roles to be played at the mediation. They may need to encourage and prepare 
clients to play a central role in the mediation process. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
duty to apply and integrate knowledge, skills, values and attitudes in such a way as to effectively perform the 
tasks required to complete a client’s instructions’: Wolski, above n 15, 78-9. On the concept of ‘diligence’, see 
Wolski, above n 15, 78-80. In the context of legal practice, Tobin defines ‘competence’ as ‘the ability to 
perform a range of legal tasks and solve a range of legal problems according to measurable standards within the 
framework of the rules of conduct and ethics of the legal profession’: Anthony G V Tobin, ‘Criteria for the 
Design of Legal Training Programmes’ (1987) 5 Journal of Professional Legal Education 55, 59. 
109
 LCA Model Rules rr 4, 8-9; Barristers’ Rules rr 87-89; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 rr 10-11; draft Barristers’ 
Rules 2010 rr 112-114; ABA Model Rules rr 1.7-1.10. The situation becomes a little more complex when 
lawyers move between roles: from legal representative to mediator, and from mediator to legal representative. 
110
 For a discussion about the scope of the duty of confidentiality, which varies depending on the source of the 
duty, see Dal pont, above n 25, 228-30. Also see the LCA Model Rules r 3; Barristers’ Rules rr 103-106; draft 
Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 9.1; draft Barristers’ Rules rr 108-111; ABA Model Rules r 1.6. For exceptions to the 
duty see, eg, LCA Model Rules r 3.1.2; Barristers Rules r 103; ABA Model Rule r 1.6 (b)(6). For a general 
discussion on the limits of, and exceptions to, lawyer-client confidentiality, see Dal Pont, above n 25, 230-7; 
Ross, above n 11, 363-76. For an example of circumstances in which lawyers might be compelled by law to 
disclose information, see Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 270. 
111
 A practitioner is freed from this obligation in some circumstances. See, eg, LCA Model Rules r 12.3; 
Barristers’ Rules r 17A.  
112
 ABA Model Rules rr 1.2(a), 1.4(b), 3.2, 2.1. See, eg, Lawrence M Watson, ‘Initiating the Settlement Process 
– Ethical Considerations’ in  Bernard and Garth, above n 3, 13; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ethics in ADR: The 
Many “C”s of Professional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution’ (2000-2001) 28 Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 979, 981. 
113
 James H Stark, ‘The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, 
From an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 769, 788. 
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A lawyer should support his or her client in whatever way is necessary for the client to 
assume the role that the client chooses to take for participation in mediation.
114
 In most 
mediations, lawyers will relinquish their central role in presenting a client’s ‘case’ to the 
client
115
 and play more of a support and advisory role. However, if a client does not feel 
confident enough to take centre stage at the mediation, the client’s legal representative may 
speak on behalf of the client. 
 
At every stage of a mediation, lawyers should advise clients of their legal rights and 
obligations, of options for settlement, of the consequences (legal and non-legal) of proposals 
for settlement, of the pros and cons of settling now and of the risks of not settling. If an 
agreement is reached, lawyers may draft and finalise it on their client’s behalf.116 
 
2.2.3 Duties Owed to Opponents and Other Third Parties 
 
Lawyers also owe duties to their opponents and to others with whom they deal. The 
statement of general principle preceding the rules governing ‘relations with other 
practitioners’ in the LCA Model Rules captures the essential and ideal ingredients of relations 
between a lawyer and other persons: honesty, fairness and courtesy.
117
 It states: 
 
In all of their dealings with other practitioners, practitioners should act with honesty, fairness and 
courtesy, and adhere faithfully to their undertakings, in order to transact lawfully and competently 
the business which they undertake for their clients in a manner that is consistent with the public 
interest.
118
 
 
A similarly worded statement of general principle precedes the rules dealing with 
‘relations with third parties’.119 While these statements presently appear in preambles, the 
draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 contain a similar provision in the form of a rule. Rule 4.1.2 
provides that solicitors must ‘be honest and courteous in all dealings with clients, other 
                                                          
114
 Gary Griedman and Jack Himmelstein, ‘Deal Killer or Deal Saver: The Consulting Lawyer’s Dilemma, 
(1997-1998) 4 Dispute Resolution Magazine 7, 8. 
115
 Nolan-Haley, above n 6, 1375. See Wolski, above n 15, 613-8 for a discussion of the role and functions of 
legal advisers in mediation.   
116
 The Law Society of New South Wales, Professional Standards for Legal Representatives in a Mediation (at 
1 January 2008) s 2.2. 
117
 Wolski, above n 15, 87.  
118
 LCA Model Rules, statement of general principle preceding ‘relations with other practitioners’. Also see rr 2-
4 of the Barristers’ Rules. 
119
 LCA Model Rules, statement of general principle preceding ‘relations with third parties’. 
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solicitors, and third parties.’120  Neither the existing rules nor the draft new rules define 
pivotal terms such as ‘honesty’, ‘fairness’ and ‘courtesy’. However, courts in Australia have 
affirmed that these general concepts can and will be applied and given meaning.
121
 It should 
be noted that the rules emphasise honesty, not openness. There is a difference in these 
concepts, as illustrated in the discussion which follows. 
 
2.3 Common Ethical Issues 
 
There is potential for conflict to arise between the duties owed to the administration of 
justice, those owed to a client and those owed to other persons. For instance, a client might 
ask his or her lawyer to withhold vital information from the other side in a mediation (the 
duty of confidentiality owed to the client potentially conflicts with the duty to be honest with 
the opponent) which might ultimately lead to the formation of an unfair agreement (the duty 
of loyalty to the client potentially conflicts with duties owed to the opponent and to the 
administration of justice). 
 
In the discussion which follows, I identify five common ethical issues which arise in 
mediation from the perspective of legal representatives for the parties and suggest how those 
issues might be resolved using, in turn: the current rule systems which apply to lawyers (ie 
the various state and territory law society and bar association rules of professional conduct 
supplemented by guidelines such as the LCA Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations); other 
components of the law of lawyering; and specific provisions which might apply by virtue of 
an agreement to mediate (in the case of private mediations) or legislative directive to mediate 
(in the case of mandatory mediations).  
 
  
                                                          
120
 In the US, see r 8.4 of the ABA Model Rules which contains a general prohibition against conduct ‘involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation’. For a discussion of the position in the US, see Geoffrey C 
Hazard, Jr, ‘Lawyer for the Situation’ (2004-2005) 39 Valparaiso University Law Review 377, 377-379.  
121
 In Lander v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2009] ACTSC 117 (11
th
 
September 2009) (Higgins CJ, Gray and Refshauge JJ), the court applied the general principles prefacing the 
sections ‘relations with third parties’ and ‘relations with other practitioners’ contained in the Legal Profession 
(Solicitors) Rules of the ACT to find that ‘there is an obligation on a practitioner to deal with all persons, 
practitioners or not, opponents or not, with honesty and fairness’ [43]. The court also held that ‘the question of 
courtesy is more difficult to assess. Courtesy connotes politeness. That clearly varies depending on the 
circumstances’: [43]. Also see Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and Fleming [2006] WASAT 352 (7 
December 2006) [72]-[73]. 
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The issues are: 
 
1. Is there a duty to be honest and open in mediation (or, more specifically, what is the 
appropriate level of honesty and openness required) and if so, to whom is the duty 
owed? 
 
2. Is there a duty to participate in mediation in good faith and if so, what does good faith 
participation require? 
   
3. Is there a separate duty to cooperate and if so, what does cooperation require? 
 
4. Is there a duty to ensure a fair process and/or a fair outcome in mediation? 
 
5. If the above duties exist and there is a conflict between them and duties owed to a 
client, how is the conflict to be resolved (or, in other words, how is the question of 
client authority versus lawyer independence to be resolved)? 
 
I turn first to the issues of honesty and openness in mediation. For the purpose of the 
discussion which follows, unless stated otherwise, it is assumed that disclosure of the 
information in question cannot be compelled by operation of the law and that it does not fall 
within the scope of any of the usual exceptions to confidentiality provided under the rules. 
 
2.4 Requirements in Relation to Honesty and Openness 
 
2.4.1 The Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
The rules of professional conduct regulating disclosure of information (I use the term 
‘disclosure’ to encompass the concepts of honesty and openness) are relatively 
straightforward in the context of litigation. To begin with, a distinction is drawn in the rules 
between the duties of disclosure owed to the court and the duties of disclosure owed to one’s 
opponent. 
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In regard to the court, the rules provide a general prohibition against dishonesty.
122
 Legal 
practitioners must not knowingly make a misleading statement to the court on any matter 
(since advocates cannot express personal opinions on the merits of any material evidence or 
issue in a case before the court, this prohibition is aimed at assertions of law or fact)
123
 and 
they are obliged to correct a misleading statement as soon as possible after becoming aware 
that it is misleading.
124
 As for actual disclosure of information (ie openness or candour), a 
distinction is made between matters of law and matters of fact. A practitioner must inform the 
court (and as a consequence, the opposing party) of any relevant binding authorities and 
legislative provisions of which the practitioner is aware
125
 but there is no obligation to 
disclose adverse facts and no obligation to ‘correct an error in a statement made to the court 
by the opponent or any other person’.126 This is not to say that adverse facts should never be 
revealed to the court but that such disclosures cannot be made without client consent.
127
 
 
It is not clear how these rules apply in the context of mediation in Australia. The rules in 
Australian jurisdictions define ‘court’ to include ‘mediations’. 128  By this reference, the 
drafters of the rules might have meant mediators, the other parties to the mediation, or the 
mediation process. This uncertainty does not arise in the context of litigation because the 
‘court’ to whom legal practitioners owe duties is personified by the judge, tribunal member or 
other official person (such as a court registrar) before whom legal practitioners appear. It is 
doubtful that the same thing can be said of mediation and mediators for all definitions of 
mediation emphasise the fact that it is a process – not an official institution. 
                                                          
122
 In fact, the statement of general principle preceding the rules governing ‘advocacy and litigation’ in the LCA 
Model Rules provides that practitioners should act with ‘honesty and candour’ in all their dealing with the 
courts. However, the specific rules which follow are narrower in scope.  
123
 LCA Model Rules rr 13.3, 14.1; Barristers’ Rules rr 20-21; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.1; draft Barristers’ 
Rules r 26. Also see ABA Model Rules r 3.3(a)(1) which specifically prohibits lawyers from making a false statement 
of fact or law. For discussion of instances in which legal practitioners have knowingly misled the court, see Kyle 
v Legal Practitioners’ Complaints Committee [1999] WASCA 115 (the practitioner concerned misled the court, 
in pleadings and in his opening statement, into the belief that a witness had executed certain documents); 
Council of the Queensland Law Society v Wright [2001] QCA 58 (amongst other things, the practitioner falsely 
informed the court that she had been unable to contact a potential witness and attempted to suborn the witness to 
swear a false affidavit); and Legal Services Commission v Voll [2008] LPT 001 (where the practitioner falsely 
represented to the Queensland Building Tribunal that his client was unable to attend the hearing because the 
witness was ‘stranded in Sydney’). 
124
 LCA Model Rules r 14.2; Barristers’ Rules r 22; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.2; draft Barristers’ Rules r 
27; ABA Model Rules r 3.3(a)(1). 
125
 See, eg, LCA Model Rules r 14.6; Barristers’ Rules r 25; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.6; draft Barristers’ 
Rules 2010 r 31; ABA Model Rules r 3.3(a)(2). 
126
 LCA Model Rules r 14.3; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.3. Also see ABA Model Rules r 3.3(a)(1). 
127
 In this instance, the public interest in maintaining legal professional privilege outweighs the public interest in 
discovering the truth: Dal Pont, above n 25, 384, 386 (and 418-9 for the position of defence counsel). 
128
 See definitions discussed above n 92. 
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Nonetheless, I think that the reference to ‘mediations’ in the Australian rules is intended 
to mean ‘mediators’. I think that the drafters of the rules intended that legal practitioners in 
Australia should owe mediators the same duties as they owe to judges. This is the most 
obvious interpretation of the definition section of the rules because: 
1. It is difficult to conceive of practitioners owing duties to a process (although clearly, 
they may owe duties to certain persons, entities or even ‘the public’ involved in, or 
implicated by, a process). 
2. It makes no sense that the reference to mediations is taken to mean ‘opponents’ or 
‘counterparts’ since there are already rules in place governing relations with 
opponents and other third parties. 
 
Assuming that the reference to ‘mediations’ should be taken to mean ‘mediators’, then 
legal representatives in Australia would be prohibited from knowingly making misleading 
statements to a mediator eg by making false assertions of law or fact. Given that the rules in 
Australia prohibit misleading on any matter,
129
 it is possible that this prohibition even extends 
to the expression of opinions and to misrepresentations about matters such as a client’s 
settlement goals. As to openness or candour, legal representatives would have to inform a 
mediator of any relevant binding authorities and legislative provisions of which they are 
aware. As to whether disclosure has to be made in a joint session in the presence of the other 
party, as opposed to being made in a separate session in their absence, the rules are silent. 
This is not an issue which requires clarification in the context of litigation since ‘separate 
sessions’ are not a feature of litigation.130 When a practitioner discloses adverse authorities 
and legislative provisions to a judge, he or she also discloses them to the opponent. In other 
respects, the duty of candour in mediation is limited. As with a court, legal representatives 
would not have to disclose adverse facts to a mediator; they would have no obligation to 
correct inaccurate statements made to the mediator by the other side and no obligation to 
correct false assumptions made by the mediator. 
 
  
                                                          
129 This is the wording adopted in the Barristers’ Rules r 21. 
130
 Ex parte applications may be heard in a very limited number of circumstances eg, when the situation is 
urgent, but then practitioners are subject to more rigorous disclosure obligations: see LCA Model Rules r 14.4; 
Barristers’ Rules r 24; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.4; draft Barristers’ Rules 2010 r 29. 
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This uncertainty over the disclosure rules as they relate to mediators does not arise with 
the professional conduct rules in the US. The ABA Model Rules do not define ‘tribunal’ to 
include mediation or mediator (and commentators agree that mediation does not fall within 
the definition of tribunal as it presently stands).
131
 The definition refers only to institutions or 
bodies that are adjudicative in nature.
132
 The rule which governs candour to a tribunal (rule 
3.3 of the ABA Model Rules) also makes no reference to mediation and commentators agree 
that mediation would not qualify as a tribunal for the purpose of the rule ‘under even the most 
relaxed criteria’.133 Given that the American Bar Association has held that rule 4.1 (which 
regulates ‘truthfulness’ to third parties) continues to apply in mediation, it seems unlikely that 
legal practitioners in the US owe any special duties of disclosure to mediators. There, under 
the existing rules, legal practitioners owe mediators the same duties of honesty and candour 
as they owe to their opponents. The extent of these duties is discussed immediately below. 
 
As to the duties of disclosure owed to other practitioners and to third parties affected by 
the affairs of clients, the rules provide as follows:
134
 
 
1. In Australia, a legal practitioner must not knowingly, by some positive act, ‘make a 
false statement to the opponent in relation to the case (including its compromise)’.135  
The rule appears to prohibit all misrepresentations about any matter. However, it is 
suggested that this interpretation is too strict. Relevant case law suggests that legal 
practitioners will only fall foul of this rule if they misrepresent ‘material facts’.136 
Some ‘overstatement’ by lawyers on immaterial matters is envisaged by rule 28.1.2 of 
                                                          
131
 Burns, above n 2, 705; Lawrence Fox, ‘Mediation Values and Lawyer Ethics: For the Ethical Lawyer the 
Latter Trumps the Former’ in Bernard and Garth, above n 3, 39, 50. The Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers also gives no consideration to whether a mediation or a mediator would constitute a tribunal 
for the purpose of the rules. 
132
 See the definition of tribunal above n 92. In the UK, see Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2007, r 24 which also 
restricts the definition of ‘court’ to adjudicative bodies.  
133
 Alfini, above n 6, 269. The Uniform Mediation Act does not define court, but it does define ‘mediation’ as ‘a 
process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in 
reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute’ and it defines a ‘mediator’ as ‘an individual who 
conducts a mediation’ (s 2). 
134
 For discussion of these provisions, see Wolski, above n 15, 546.  
135
 See LCA Model Rules rr 18.1-18.3; Barristers’ Rules rr 51-53; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 rr 22.1-22.3; draft 
Barristers’ Rules 2010 rr 48-50. Also see LCA Model Rules r 28.1.1; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 34.1.1. 
136
 See, eg, the cases of Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and Fleming [2006] WASAT 352 (7 
December 2006) [87] where a legal practitioner implied the existence of a valid will and concealed from a third 
party the status of the will (which was informal) to procure a covenant from that third party and Legal Services 
Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012 where the practitioner misrepresented the state of his client’s health 
(concealing the fact that his client had been diagnosed with cancer) a matter which was ‘critical to important 
parts of [its] claim’ [17]. 
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the Solicitors’ Rules which appears to allow misstatements (such as misstatements 
about the amount a client is willing to accept by way of settlement) as long as such 
misstatements do not ‘grossly’ exceed ‘the legitimate assertion of the rights or 
entitlement of the practitioner’s client’ and by clause 6.2 of the LCA Guidelines for 
Lawyers in Mediations which warns practitioners to ‘be careful of puffing’ (but 
noticeably, does not prohibit puffing). 
 
2. In the US, rule 4.1 (and commentary) of the ABA Model Rules prohibits a 
practitioner from making a false statement of material fact or law,
137
 but specifically 
provides that statements about estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a 
transaction and about a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are 
not statements of material fact.
138
   
 
3. Additionally, the rules in both jurisdictions speak to actions, not omissions. While 
they prohibit certain misrepresentations, they require no affirmative disclosure.
139
 A 
practitioner has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts and 
law, subject to any requirements imposed by substantive and procedural law and 
relevant legislation.  
 
4. If a practitioner makes a statement about a client’s case which he or she subsequently 
learns to be false, the practitioner is under a duty to correct the statement.
140
 A 
practitioner is not under a duty to correct an opponent where the opponent is acting on 
the basis of a mistaken belief that something is true or false – that is, there is no duty 
to correct an opponent’s misunderstandings, misconceptions or false assumptions. 
This may be subject to exception if the draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 are adopted in 
                                                          
137
 The term ‘material’ in r 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules is not defined directly. Peters argues that the term 
would take its meaning from the law of contract and torts such that a representation will be material if it would 
induce reasonable persons to enter into an agreement: Peters, above n 6, 128. Determination of this issue will 
generally require a ‘case-specific inquiry’: Douglas R Richmond, ‘Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities and 
Liabilities in Negotiations (2009) 22 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 249, 297. 
138
 ABA Model Rules rr 1.6, 4.1. Also see Burns, above n 2, 695-6; Geoffrey C Hazard, Jr, ‘The Lawyer’s 
Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties’ (1981-1982) 33 South Carolina Law 
Review 181, 189; Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, Alternative Dispute Resolution (Thomson West, 2008, 3
rd
 ed) 115-
6. 
139
 Corones, Stobbs and Thomas, above n 77, 148-9; Hazard, above n 138, 189. Also see Beach Petroleum NL 
and Another v Johnson and Others (1993) 11 ACSR 103 [22.60] (Von Doussa J). 
140
 LCA Model Rules r 18.2; Barristers’ Rules r 52; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 22.2; draft Barristers’ Rules 
2010 r 49. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 36 - 15- Aug-11 
 
Australia. Rule 30.1 provides that ‘[a] solicitor must not take unfair advantage of 
another solicitor’s obvious error, if to do so would obtain for a client a benefit which 
has no supportable foundation in law or fact’. Ironically, it is only in cases of obvious 
error that this provision is activated.  
 
When set in the context of mediation, the thrust of the relevant rules is that legal 
representatives cannot knowingly make false statements about material facts or law to their 
opponents.
141
 If they make a statement to their opponent and subsequently discover the 
statement to be false, they must correct it. However, subject to any requirements imposed by 
substantive law and relevant legislation, they can exaggerate values and bottom lines and they 
can misrepresent their client’s negotiation strategy and willingness to settle.142 Again, subject 
to any requirements imposed by substantive law and relevant legislation, legal representatives 
do not owe their opponent a duty of candour or openness. The rules do not prohibit ‘silence’, 
unwillingness to present a client’s case or refusal to make an offer to settle. Legal 
representatives have no obligation to volunteer information to the other side; nor do they have 
to correct the other side’s misunderstandings or analytical errors. 143  They can take full 
advantage of the other side’s ignorance of the facts and law. Each party (and his or her 
representative) is expected to conduct their own legal research and factual investigations. 
These duties do not vary according to whether the other party has representation.
144
 
 
                                                          
141
 See Wolski, above n 15, 544-50, 634 for a discussion of the application of the relevant rules in mediation. 
There is little doubt that r 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules applies to mediation in the US. On 12 April 2006, the 
ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility reiterated its commitment to the puffing 
exception in r 4.1 and explicitly expanded it to apply to caucused mediation: see ABA Formal Opinion 06-439 
discussed in Christopher M Fairman, ‘Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative Law and the Challenge of 
Legal Ethics’ (2007-2008) 30 Campbell Law Review 237, 269; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Lawyer as 
Consensus Builder: Ethics for A New Practice’ (2002-2003) 70 Tennessee Law Review 63, 86; Cooley, above n 
6, 270; Peters, above n 6, 121. However, at least one author argues that the Committee’s conclusion in regard to 
the application of r 4.1 is debatable: Richmond, above n 137, 289. 
142
 Wolski, above n 15, 546-7.  
143
 See LCA Model Rules r 18.3; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 22.3. Also see Condlin, above n 105, 78. A 
lawyer cannot however take advantage of the other side’s misunderstanding or misconception when he or she 
‘was the moving force ... in the other side’s misconception’: see Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and 
Fleming [2006] WASAT 352 (7 December 2006) [66]. In this case, a legal practitioner induced potential 
beneficiaries under a deceased person’s estate to agree not to make claims on the estate by referring to an 
informal document as the deceased’s ‘will’ when no formal will had in fact been executed. Also see 
Chamberlain v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (1993) 43 FCR 148, where the practitioner 
deliberately took advantage of an obvious error (a misplaced decimal point) in a writ issued against him by the 
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation and ‘set in train the events and documents which ... led to the entry of the 
[erroneous] consent judgment’: [49] (Lockhart J).  
144
 Hazard, above n 138, 182. Also see Dal Pont’s discussion on professional duties to unrepresented parties: 
Dal Pont, above n 25, 496. As Dal Pont points out, legal practitioners must take special care to ensure that 
unrepresented litigants are not unfairly disadvantaged or subject to undue pressure. 
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Burns reaches the same conclusions about the rules governing this issue in the United 
States. He concludes that the following behaviour is permitted under the ABA Model 
Rules:
145
 
1. Refusing to answer specific questions of fact which might reveal the interests of one’s 
client; 
2. Failing to correct the opponent’s misunderstandings of fact or law that favour one’s 
position while being scrupulous about not endorsing the misunderstanding; 
3. Actively misleading the opponent as to one’s bottom line and one’s eagerness to settle 
through false statements of immaterial facts and other negotiation behaviours. 
 
The most notable recent cases in Australia involving ‘lack of appropriate disclosure’ by 
legal representatives in mediation are the cases of Mullins and Garrett.
146
 Mullins (a 
barrister) was briefed by Garrett (a solicitor) to represent the plaintiff in a claim for personal 
injuries caused as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Legislation (the Motor Accident 
Insurance Act 1994 (Qld)) mandates the exchange of extensive information and a compulsory 
settlement conference which, with the agreement of the parties, may be mediated.
147
 The 
parties had exchanged information (including, from the plaintiff, expert reports detailing 
assumptions about life expectancy and estimates of losses and future care needs based on 
those assumptions) and the matter had been scheduled for mediation. Just days before the 
mediation was due to commence, the plaintiff advised his lawyers that he had been diagnosed 
with cancer unrelated to the incident which gave rise to the claim. It was likely that the cancer 
would further reduce his life expectancy. Despite the change in circumstances, Mullins 
prepared a document entitled ‘Plaintiff’s Outline of Argument at Mediation’ that included a 
schedule of damages based on the earlier expert reports and assumptions and furnished the 
Outline to the defendant’s lawyers. The information about the plaintiff’s cancer diagnosis 
was not disclosed in telephone conversations between Mullins and the defendant’s lawyers or 
at the mediation and the insurer settled in ignorance of it. The insurer commenced action to 
recover the sum paid to the plaintiff after the plaintiff died. The insurer’s claim was settled 
without trial but disciplinary proceedings were brought against both practitioners (in separate 
proceedings) for knowingly misleading the insurer and its lawyers about the plaintiff’s life 
                                                          
145
 Burns, above n 2, 694.  Also see Wolski, above n 15, 546-7. 
146
 Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012; Legal Services Commissioner v Garrett [2009] LPT 
12. These cases arose out of the same facts: Mr Mullins was retained as counsel while Mr Garrett was the 
instructing solicitor. 
147
 Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) ss 45, 51A, 51B. 
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expectancy. Had the mediation been postponed or delayed for more than two weeks, the 
information would have had to have been disclosed in accordance with the legislative scheme 
- the legislation required that the insurer be informed of any significant change in the 
claimant’s medical condition within 1 month of the claimant becoming aware of the 
change.
148
 The mediation took place before the expiration of this period. Consequently the 
claimant was not in breach of the relevant provision of the legislation. Nonetheless both legal 
practitioners were found to have intentionally and fraudulently deceived the insurer and its 
lawyers about the accuracy of fundamental assumptions made in respect of life expectancy ie 
about a material fact, and fined for professional misconduct. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear where the practitioners went wrong. At the 
mediation (and in the telephone conversation leading up to the mediation), Mullins made 
statements such as ‘the claim for future care set out in [document] was very reasonable’; and 
‘the claim for economic loss was based upon the [report]’.149 Mullins continued to rely on, 
and refer to, the reports although the information they contained was no longer accurate.
150
 
The case against Mr Garrett was slightly different in that he remained silent at the mediation. 
It was held that he had independent responsibility throughout the mediation and that in 
remaining silent, he practised a fraudulent deception (analogous to that committed by Mr 
Mullins) on the insurer and its lawyers.
151
  
 
Unfortunately neither case gives a detailed account of the rules of disclosure governing 
legal representatives in mediation. In each case, the Tribunal was directly concerned with the 
duty of disclosure owed by a legal practitioner to an opponent. At the proceedings against 
Mullins, Byrne J (who together with two lay members, constituted the Legal Practice 
Tribunal) pointed to the existence of rules 51 and 52 of the Queensland Bar Rules
152
 and 
concluded that Mullins could not have approached the mediation on the basis that he was 
entering an ‘honesty-free zone’. 153  The Tribunal was clearly of the view that parties to 
negotiation – even in a negotiation ‘tinged with a commercial aspect’ – should be afforded ‘a 
                                                          
148
 Ibid s 45. 
149
 Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012, 4 [14]. 
150
 Ibid 8 [34]. 
151
 Legal Services Commissioner v Garrett [2009] LPT 12, 6 [25], 7 [34]. 
152
 These were in the same terms as rr 51 and 52 of the Australian Bar Association Model Rules (or Barristers’ 
Rules), prohibiting barristers from knowingly making a false statement to the opponent in relation to the case 
(including its compromise) and requiring them to take all necessary steps to correct any false statement as soon 
as possible after becoming aware that the statement was false. 
153
 Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012, 7 [29]. 
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measure of honesty from each other’.154 Also of significance is the fact that the Tribunal did 
not confine the application of the relevant professional rules (rules 51 and 52) to the context 
of advocacy and litigation although the rules in question only appear within that particular 
category of the rules. 
   
Pointedly, Byrne J observed that Mullins, who sought advice on the issue from senior 
counsel before the mediation commenced, posed the wrong questions when conducting his 
research. His Honour continued: 
 
Supposing that no more candour was to be expected of him at this mediation than of an advocate in 
court, the respondent inquired of a senior colleague whether, at a trial, a plaintiff’s barrister had to 
lead evidence of contingencies that adversely affect the client’s claim - missing the significance of 
his continuing reliance on the life expectancy assumption.
155
 
 
His Honour’s comment suggests that different rules of candour might apply in mediation than 
those that apply in court. Unfortunately, His Honour did not elaborate. He mentions the duty 
of disclosure owed to the court only in passing in a footnote.
156
 
 
In my opinion, there was no need for the Tribunal in Mullins’ case to distinguish between 
litigation and mediation. Mullins ought not to have continued to rely on the by-now 
inaccurate reports whether he was appearing in litigation or in mediation. A distinguishing 
fact in both cases is that the practitioners had made representations to the opponent prior to 
the mediation and that those representations, which were ‘critical to important parts of the 
claim’157 and relied upon by the defendant, had become false by the time the mediation was 
conducted, a fact known to both Mullins and Garrett. Garrett was in breach of the existing 
professional conduct rules because he failed to correct those statements. Mullins was in 
breach of the rules because he did not correct those statements and because he relied on those 
statements again at mediation.  
  
                                                          
154
 Ibid 6 [27]. 
155
 Ibid 8 [34]. 
156
 Ibid 7 [29], footnote 18. His Honour notes that the definition of ‘court’ in the rules includes ‘mediations’ but 
he did not elaborate on the meaning to be given to the term ‘mediations’. 
157
 Ibid 4 [17]. For further analysis of the case of Mullins, see Kay Lauchland, ‘Secrets, Half Truths and Deceit 
in Mediation and Negotiation – Lawyers Beware’ (2007) 9 ADR Bulletin 97; Reid Mortensen, ‘Ethics in 
Negotiations and ADR’ (2007) (February) Proctor 10-11; Gino Dal Pont, ‘To Disclose or Not to Disclose’ 
(2007) (April) Law Society Journal 28. 
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Despite the minimalist formulation of the law of disclosure in the rules of professional 
conduct, cases such as those of Mullins and Garrett demonstrate that it will not always be 
appropriate or justifiable to exploit an opponent’s ignorance of material facts. As the 
discussion later in this part of the exegesis illustrates, there may be other circumstances in 
which disclosure of information to one’s opponent in mediation is required in order to 
discharge one’s duty of fairness and the duty to the administration of justice. 
 
2.4.2 Other Components of the Law of Lawyering 
 
Lawyers also owe duties of ‘disclosure’ to the court and to third parties with whom they 
deal, by virtue of the general law. As regards the court, ‘[t]he general rule appears to be that a 
passive withholding of material is permissible, but the active concealment or misleading of 
the court is prohibited’.158 As regards one’s opponent or counterpart in negotiation, while 
lawyers must refrain from making false statements, they generally have no obligation to 
reveal relevant information to their opponent. Such information is considered to be 
confidential and should only be disclosed to an opponent with client consent. 
 
Parties in arms length commercial negotiations are assumed to have conflicting interests. 
Generally there is no obligation for one party to reveal to the other information of which they are 
aware, which, if known to the other might cause that party to take a different negotiation stance. 
Failure to do so would not, without more, ordinarily be regarded as dishonesty or even sharp 
practice.
159
 
 
  
                                                          
158 Ross, above n 11, 562. For a discussion of the relevant case law including the decisions in Myers v Elman 
[1940] AC 282, Tombling v Universal Bulb Co Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 289, Meek v Fleming [1961] 2 QB 366 and 
Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198, see Ross, above n 11, 563-4 and Ipp, above n 101, 67-9. 
159
 David Higgs, ‘Ethical Settlement Negotiation’ (2009) (Winter) Bar News, Journal of the NSW Bar 
Association 60, 60. Richmond asserts that this general rule is subject to 
four regular exceptions. First, a lawyer must reveal a client’s death. Second, a lawyer has a duty to disclose 
that a writing does not reflect the parties’ agreement. Third, a lawyer has a duty to disclose clearly applicable 
insurance coverage. Fourth, although a closer call, an attorney has a duty to disclose material facts (other 
than confidential client information) when he knows that an opponent is laboring under a clearly mistaken 
belief that, if uncorrected, will substantially deprive the opponent of the benefit of its bargain, or will 
materially lessen that benefit. 
Richmond, above n 137, 282 (citations omitted). 
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However, in some instances, an affirmative disclosure duty is imposed eg when a party 
makes a partial disclosure that is or becomes misleading in light of all the facts, and ‘when 
the nondisclosing party has vital information about the transaction not accessible to the other 
side’.160 
 
Additionally, some misrepresentations by lawyers (and others) are prohibited by the law 
of fraud, the law with respect to unconsionability, and the provisions of general legislation 
such as the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) dealing with misleading and deceptive conduct.  
 
A statement or bargaining move ‘is fraudulent when the speaker makes a knowing 
misrepresentation of a material fact on which the victim reasonably relies and which causes 
the victim damage’.161 The law of fraud distinguishes between representations of fact and 
representations of opinion. While factual misrepresentations are not permitted, statements of 
opinion are permissible in some circumstances. Carter, Peden and Tolhurst note that: 
 
[a] misrepresentation is a representation which does not accord with true facts (past or present). 
Therefore, promises or assurances for the future, statements of intention, expressions of opinion, 
advertising “puffs”, and representations of law have all, on occasions, been distinguished from the 
representation of fact essential to an operative misrepresentation.
162
 
  
                                                          
160
 Shell, above n 28, 60. As Carter, Peden and Tolhurst note, ‘a statement which is literally true may be a 
misrepresentation because it gives a false impression by not telling the whole truth’: J W Carter, Elisabeth 
Peden and G J Tolhurst, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5
th
 ed, 2007) 374. The position is 
the same under the rules of professional conduct: see Peters, above n 6, 122 and Legal Practitioners Complaints 
Committee and Fleming [2006] WASAT 352 (7 December 2006) [66].  
161
 Shell, above n 22, 201; Shell, above n 28, 58. Also see Eleanor Holmes Norton, ‘Bargaining and the Ethic of 
Process’ (1989) 64 New York University Law Review 493, 547; Russell Korobkin, Michael L Moffitt and Nancy 
A Welsh, ‘The Law of Bargaining’ in Andrea K Schneider and Christopher Honeyman (eds), The Negotiator’s 
Fieldbook (American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, 2006) 183, 183-4. On the elements of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, see Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 160, 367-80 and Peter Gillies and 
Niloufer Selvadurai, Law of Contract (Federation Press, 2009) 123-31. A party who suffers loss or damage might 
also have other remedies available at common law (eg, for negligent misstatement: Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above 
n 160, 382-8; Frances McGlone and Amanda Stickley, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 
400-16 or for the tort of deceit: see McGlone and Stickley: 417-23) and in equity (eg the equitable remedy of 
‘estoppel’). 
162
 Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 160, 369. On other occasions though, statements of intention and 
opinion have been held to be a fraudulent misrepresentation eg if the person does not hold the intention or 
opinion professed: see Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, 371. Also see the circumstances in which a statement of 
opinion may be treated as an implied statement of fact: Gillies and Selvadurai, above n 161, 125. 
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Additionally, statements about demands and bottom lines are not, as a matter of law, 
considered ‘material’ to a deal.163 It is also recognised that statements in relation to value and 
settlement intentions are common and that ‘no reasonable negotiator would rely upon 
them’.164 Thus, there is a wide range of matters with respect to which honesty is not required. 
  
Unconscionability occurs when there is a belief that there is no reasonable probability that 
one of the contracting parties will fully perform; when there is knowledge that one of the 
parties will not substantially benefit from the transaction or is unable to protect his or her own 
interests because of physical or mental infirmity or other disability; or when there is gross 
overpricing relative to ready availability elsewhere.
165
 As Norton notes, the doctrine of 
unconscionability ‘seeks extreme situations, not every-day bargaining unfairness between 
people who are roughly equal.’166 
 
While silence is generally not caught by the relevant professional conduct rules, it was 
caught by section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) [hereafter the TPA] and its state 
and territory Fair Trading Act equivalents.
167
 It would appear that it is also caught by section 
18 of the Australian Consumer Law which is in substantially the same terms ie prohibiting a 
person, in trade or commence, from engaging in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or 
likely to be so.
168
 In relation to section 52 of the TPA, Corones asserts that courts will look at 
the surrounding circumstances to ‘determine whether they give rise to a “reasonable 
expectation” of disclosure’.169 Such a determination will generally depend on case-specific 
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 Shell, above n 28, 61. 
164
 Scott R Peppet, ‘Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in Bargaining’ 
(2002) 7 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 83, 91. Also see Korobkin, Moffitt and Welsh, above n 161, 184. 
165
 Norton, above n 161, 552-3. 
166
 Norton, above n 161, 557. For a discussion of the modern case law in Australia and the variety of 
circumstances which might adversely affect a party, see Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 160, 519-25. 
167
 The term ‘conduct’ was defined expansively in s 4(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and similar 
provisions in the state/territory Fair Trading Acts to include refraining from acting (otherwise than 
inadvertently), so it included silence and half-truths: Stephen G Corones, ‘Solicitors’ Liability for Misleading 
Conduct’ (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 775, 776; Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 160, 417, 419-20. 
168
 The Australian Consumer Law forms part of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (see Schedule 2 of the 
Act) formerly known as the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52. It replaces previous Commonwealth, state and 
territory consumer protection legislation. Although the new legislation does not define ‘conduct’, the High 
Court ‘has found that the ambit of “conduct” is not limited to a positive action or representation, and that silence 
can be considered misleading or deceptive in certain circumstances’: Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 
FCR 31, taken from ‘Explanatory Memorandum, circulated in the House of Representatives, the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No.2) 2010. 
Also see Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 21 which subjects participants to an overarching obligation to refrain 
from conduct which is misleading or deceptive or likely to be so   
169
 Corones, above n 167, 776. Also see Warren Pengilley, ‘“But You Can’t Do That Any More!” – The Effect 
of Section 52 on Common Negotiation Techniques’ (1993) 1 Trade Practices Law Journal 113, 119, 121 for a 
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factors. Corones submits ‘that in settlement negotiations no reasonable expectation would 
arise on the part of the other party that the solicitor will reveal the maximum amount for 
which the client is prepared to settle.’170 In fact, section 52 seems to have allowed for many 
of the types of deceptive tactics common in negotiation: it ‘allows for certain levels of 
deception, such as opinions that might inadvertently turn out to be false and subjective 
assessments of products and services’.171 Presumably the same will be the case for section 18 
of the Australian Consumer Law.  
 
In addition to obligations imposed by substantive law, various obligations for disclosure 
exist by virtue of procedural law (and in some cases, specific statutory schemes).
172
 Perhaps 
the most well known examples are the obligations imposed by civil procedure rules. The 
relevant rules of court compel parties to litigation to disclose and provide for inspection 
copies of documents which are or have been in their possession or control and are relevant to 
an allegation in issue.
173
 There are also mechanisms via which one party to litigation can 
compulsorily acquire information from the other parties through ‘interrogatories’ requiring 
sworn written answers.
174
 
 
The obligation to disclose documents and answer interrogatories generally rests on the 
parties. However, lawyers are subject to a number of obligations in respect of these 
procedures eg they must explain the duty of disclosure of documents to clients, advise clients 
not to destroy relevant documents, make an independent assessment about whether full 
discovery has been made, and in some jurisdictions, certify before or at trial that the party has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
list of circumstances where silence may give rise to liability under former s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
For a discussion of recent developments in the law relating to matters such as misleading and deceptive conduct, 
negligent misstatement, equitable estoppels and unconscionable conduct, see Andrew Stewart and Leanne 
McClurg, ‘Playing Your Cards Right: Obligations of Disclosure in Commercial Negotiations’, (updated version, 
paper presented at the AMPLA Conference 2007).    
170
 Corones, above n 167, 784. 
171
 Pengally, above n 169, 114. 
172
 See, eg, the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) which mandates the exchange of extensive 
information. 
173
 The mechanisms by which discovery is initiated and the exact scope of the duty of discovery, varies between 
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, it is automatic, triggered at a certain stage in the proceedings (see, eg, the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 209-225). In other jurisdictions, parties have to apply to the court 
for an order for discovery (see, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 21.2) or obtain the leave of the 
Court to file and serve a notice for discovery (see the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 15 r 1). For an 
overview of ‘discovery laws’ pertaining to federal courts in Australia, see Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Managing Discovery: Discovery of Documents in Federal Courts, Report No 115 (2011) Chapter 4. More 
generally, for discussion on the obligations of lawyers in discovery, see Ross, above n 11, 559; David Bamford, 
Principles of Civil Litigation (Lawbook Co., Thomson Reuters, 2010) 180-5. 
174
 See, eg, the provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 228-232; Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 22.1-22.3. Generally, see Bamford, above n 173, 183-4. 
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been fully appraised of its obligations to provide discovery and that the practitioner is not 
aware of any documents which have not been disclosed as required.
175
  
 
This is not to say that all information held by one party is available to the other parties to 
litigation under these rules. The duty of disclosure does not apply to documents or 
information in relation to which there is a valid claim to privilege.
176
 A number of common 
law privileges protect confidential client information from disclosure. Many of these 
privileges have been codified, albeit that the scope of some of the privileges has been 
narrowed.
177
 Many, if not most, communications that take place between a lawyer and his or 
her client in preparation for mediation will be protected from disclosure by legal professional 
privilege (either the advice limb or the litigation limb)
178
 and would thus not be the subject of 
compulsory disclosure unless of course, the privilege has been ousted by statute, or is waived 
by the client. 
 
2.4.3 Agreements and Legislative Directives to Mediate 
 
Some agreements to mediate require the parties to exchange with each other and to 
provide to the mediator lists of issues in dispute, expert reports and other evaluations to 
support their claims.
179
 In these circumstances, there is a contractual obligation to disclose 
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 See, eg, Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) reg 177; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 13(2), 26. 
Also see the discussion by Bamford, above n 173, 180. 
176
 See, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 212(1) (in relation to documents) and r 233 (in relation 
to questions posed in interrogatories). Also see Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 22.2. 
Communications will generally be protected if they fall within the scope of legal professional privilege (or client 
legal privilege), settlement privilege, privilege against self-incrimination and public interest privilege or 
immunity.
 
Generally see Bamford, above n 173, 189-93; Gordon D Lewis, Emilios J Kyrou and Albert M 
Dinelli, Handy Hints on Legal Practice (Lawbook Co., 3
rd
 ed, 2004) 54-5; Lamb and Littrich, above n 74, 258-
62. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Privilege in Perspective: Client Legal Privilege in Federal 
Investigations, Report No 107 (2008) [3.1]. 
177
 See, eg, see Uniform Civil Procedure Rules Qld (1999) rr 212(2), 429 which removes the privilege from 
expert reports and makes their disclosure a precondition of their admissibility at trial. Also see Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 31.21, 31.28. 
178
 This privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and clients made for the dominant 
purpose of seeking or providing legal advice and communications made between lawyers, clients and third 
parties for the dominant purpose of use in, or in relation to, existing or reasonably anticipated legal proceedings: 
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. For discussion of the 
two limbs of client legal privilege, see Australian Law Reform Commission, Privilege in Perspective: Client 
Legal Privilege in Federal Investigations, Report No 107 (2007) [3.29]-[3.33]. The privilege is itself subject to 
exceptions, eg, it does not attach to communications ‘relating to advice sought or given in furtherance of, or to 
facilitate, criminal, fraudulent or other unlawful purpose’: Dal Pont, above n 25, 247-8.     
179
 See, eg, clause 14 of the Mediation Agreement of the Australian Energy Regulator and Resolve Advisors 
Agreement set out in Hardy and Rundle, above n 6, appendix 2, 382-408. Also see clause 16 of the Agreement 
to Mediate contained in the Queensland Law Society Mediation Kit which provides that the mediator may make 
directions for the exchange of information.  
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agreed upon material (it would be rare for disclosure obligations to exceed those imposed by 
relevant procedural law). Lawyers must act honestly in carrying out their obligations ie they 
cannot knowingly mislead their opponent about material facts. 
 
Some statutory schemes also require disclosure of specified information
180
 and parties 
(and their lawyers) should endeavour to comply with the letter and spirit of the provisions. 
These provisions may require the scope of information exchange that takes place pursuant to 
the procedural rules for civil litigation discussed above.
181
 However, beyond observance of 
these basic measures, parties are not obliged to disclose information or to be honest and open 
with each other.
182
 They are not required to disclose privileged information. They are not 
required to reveal interests, BATNAs,
183
 bottom lines and negotiation strategies.  
 
2.5 Requirements in Relation to Good faith 
 
2.5.1 The Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
The professional conduct rules are silent on the issue of good faith.
184
 The guidelines 
provided by some professional associations seek to impose on parties and their lawyers an 
‘obligation’ to participate in mediation in good faith. For example, guideline 2.2 of the LCA 
Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations provides that ‘[l]awyers and clients should act, at all 
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 See, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 326 which provides that the mediator may ‘gather 
information about the nature and facts of the dispute in any way the mediator decides’. 
181
 Wolski, above n 15, 547, 634. 
182
 In my opinion, the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) does not impose more stringent obligations on the parties 
and their representatives in civil proceedings conducted in Victoria. While the legislation imposes on 
participants an ‘overarching obligation’ to ‘act honestly at all times in relation to a civil proceeding’ and to 
refrain from engaging ‘in conduct which is misleading or deceiving’ or likely to be so (see ss 17, 21), the report 
of the Victorian Law Reform Commission which informed the legislation simply refers back to the obligations 
imposed on practitioners under relevant professional conduct rules and reiterates the requirements of section 52 
of the TPA. It is also noteworthy that the commission proposed no enlargement of the basic duty to disclose 
documents (or any narrowing of the claim for privilege). See the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC), 
Civil Justice Review, Report No 14 (March 2008) Chapter 3: ‘Improving the Standards of Conduct of 
Participants in Civil Litigation’ (‘Civil Justice Review Report’) 182-9. 
183
 This term is used by Fisher and Ury as an acronym for ‘Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement’: Roger 
Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Business Books Limited, 
2nd ed, 1991) 101. 
184
 There is a kind of good faith obligation imposed on a legal practitioner in court in as much as he or she 
cannot, for instance, make allegations of fact under privilege unless the practitioner believes ‘on reasonable 
grounds that the factual material already available’ to the practitioner provides a proper basis to do so: see the 
rules in relation to responsible use of court process and privilege, LCA Model Rules rr 16.2-16.4; Barristers 
Rules rr 35-38. 
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times, in good faith to attempt to achieve settlement of the dispute’.185 It further provides that 
‘[a] lawyer should not continue to represent clients who act in bad faith or give instructions 
which are inconsistent with good faith’.186 No definitions of the terms ‘good faith’ and ‘bad 
faith’ are provided. As discussed later, some common threads of what it means to act in good 
faith have been discerned from cases and commentaries concerning ‘good faith’ obligations 
in agreements to mediate and dispute resolution clauses but there remains great uncertainty 
about the meaning to be attributed to the term. 
 
2.5.2 Other Components of the Law of Lawyering 
 
There is some authority for the proposition that all parties who agree to mediate are 
subject, as a matter of contract law, to an implied obligation to participate in the mediation 
process in good faith.
187
 Weston goes so far as to claim that ‘parties to a private mediation 
who feel aggrieved by an opponent’s lack of good faith possess a common law cause of 
action in contract and possibly tort’.188 However, the law in this regard cannot be regarded as 
settled.
189
 
  
                                                          
185
 LCA, Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediation (at March 2007) s 2.2. 
186
 LCA, Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediation (at March 2007) s 2.2. Similar provision is made by the Law 
Society of New South Wales, Professional Standards for Legal Representatives in a Mediation (at 1 January 
2008) s 5.4. 
187
 See David Spencer, ‘Requiring Good Faith Negotiation’ (1998) 1 ADR Bulletin 37, 37 (‘Requiring Good 
Faith Negotiation’); David Spencer, ‘Drafting Good Faith Negotiation into Contracts’ (2001) 4 ADR Bulletin 
29, 30 (‘Drafting Good Faith Negotiation’); Robert McDougall, ‘The Implied Duty of Good Faith in Australian 
Contractual Law’ Paper available at Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court accessed 4/06/2010, 7. Also see the list of authorities 
given by NADRAC, The Resolve to Resolve Report, above n 7, 142, footnote 358. On the position in the US, see 
Maureen A Weston, ‘Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need 
for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality’ (2001) 76 Indiana Law Journal 591, 596, 618-9. 
This obligation should be distinguished from the implied obligation to act in good faith in the performance and 
enforcement of the duties (and exercise of the rights) imposed on the parties to a contract, a doctrine often 
sourced to the judgment of Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works 
(1992) 26 NSWLR 234 and canvassed by a number of Australian decisions since then (see William M Dixon, 
‘Common Law Obligations of Good Faith in Australian Commercial Contracts – A Relational Recipe’ (2005) 
33 Australian Business Law Review 87-98 accessed from http://eprints.qut.edu.au on 4/06/2010, 89, footnote 
17). 
188
 Weston, above n 187, 643-44; Roger L Carter, ‘Oh, Ye of Little [Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations’ [2002] Journal of Dispute Resolution 
367, 375-6.  
189
 McDougall, above n 187, 8; Matthew Harper, ‘The Implied Duty of “Good Faith” in Australian Contract 
Law’ (2004) 11 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law available at 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v11n3/harper113 [3]. Also see John Lande, ‘Using Dispute System 
Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs’ (2002-2003) 50 
University of California Los Angeles Law Review 69, 89. 
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2.5.3 Agreements and Legislative Directives to Mediate 
 
Some dispute resolution clauses and agreements to mediate
190
 seek to impose upon the 
parties an explicit obligation to participate in mediation in good faith. However, in Australia 
and elsewhere, judicial opinion on the meaning of ‘good faith’ and the issue of enforceability 
of contractual clauses containing ‘good faith’ provisions has been divided.191 
 
The court in Australia has on some occasions struck down dispute resolution clauses 
containing good faith provisions on the ground that such provisions are too vague as to the 
conduct required of the parties and hence, too uncertain to be enforceable.
192
 Other judges 
have considered the clauses too vague because of a ‘necessary tension between negotiation, 
in which a party is free to, and may be expected to, have regard to self-interest rather than the 
interests of the other party, and the maintenance of good faith’.193 However, the same court 
(the Supreme Court of New South Wales) constituted by a different judge later arrived at a 
different conclusion. Einstein J in Aiton v Transfield
194
 was of the view that the words ‘good 
faith’ had meaning of sufficient certainty to be enforceable.195 His Honour said that when a 
party agreed to negotiate in good faith, he or she was committing: 
 
                                                          
190
 In the case of private or non-institutional mediations, the parties may have entered into a contract containing 
a dispute resolution clause or mediation clause (whereby the parties agreed to refer any future disputes to 
mediation). In addition, the parties and a nominated mediator may have entered into an Agreement to Mediate 
(whereby the parties agreed to submit a particular dispute to mediation conducted by a nominated mediator). See 
eg clause 11 of the Agreement to Mediate contained in the Queensland Law Society’s Mediation Kit (the clause 
requires each party to ‘use its best endeavours to comply with reasonable requests made by the Mediator to 
promote the efficient and expeditious resolution of the’ dispute. 
191
 Wolski, above n 15, 539-41. For this reason, Spencer recommends against inclusion of a ‘good faith’ 
participation requirement in dispute resolution clauses: see Spencer and Brogan, above n 1, 419. It is better to 
stipulate exactly what is expected of the parties in objective and concrete terms.  
192
 Wolski, above n 15, 540. See, eg, Handley JA in a dissenting judgment in Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v 
Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1, 41-2. 
193
 Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 709, 716 (Giles 
J). This appears to be the view adopted by the House of Lords in England, see Walford v Miles [1992] 1 All ER 
453, 460. Also see Spencer’s discussion of relevant cases: Spencer, Requiring Good Faith Negotiation, above n 
187, 37-8, 40.  
194
 [1999] NSWSC 996 (1 October 1999). Also see State Bank v Freeman; Freeman v NSW Rural Assistance 
Authority (Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, Badgery-Parker J, 31 January 1996) 35 where his Honour said 
that ‘it does not appear to me that an inference of lack of good faith can be drawn from the adoption of a strong 
position at the outset and a reluctance to move very far in the direction of compromise without more’. 
195
 [1999] NSWSC 996 (1 October 1999). The Court ultimately held that the mediation clause in that case was 
void for uncertainly as it did not apportion the mediator’s costs between the parties and, since the mediation 
clause was not severable from the negotiation clause, both clauses fell. See the discussion of relevant cases by 
Einstein J in Aiton v Transfield [1999] NSWSC 996 (1 October 1999) [87]-[98]. His Honour concedes that the 
law in this area has not settled, see [100]. 
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1) to undertake to subject oneself to the process of negotiation or mediation (which must be 
sufficiently precisely defined by the agreement to be certain and hence enforceable). 
2) to undertake in subjecting oneself to that process, to have an open mind in the sense of: 
a) a willingness to consider such options for the resolution of the dispute as may be 
propounded by the opposing party or by the mediator, as appropriate. 
b) a willingness to give consideration to putting forward options for the resolution of the 
dispute. 
Subject only to these undertakings, the obligations of a party who contracts to negotiate or 
mediate in good faith, do not oblige nor require the party: 
a) to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of the other party; 
b) to act otherwise than by having regard to self-interest. 196 
 
More recently, the New South Wales Court of Appeal expressed the view that ‘[w]hat the 
phrase “good faith” signifies in any particular context and contract will depend on that 
context and that contract.’197 Still, other commentators point to common threads of what it 
means to act in good faith: they include attendance at the mediation, some preparation, 
having someone in attendance with authority to settle, acting cooperatively and unwillingness 
to mislead.
198
  
 
Some judges and commentators define good faith not by what it constitutes but by what it 
is not ie by identifying bad faith.
199
 Bad faith behaviour is said to include: failing to attend to 
pre-mediation activities including failing to submit necessary documents, failing to attend the 
mediation, repeatedly cancelling or delaying the mediation, coming to the mediation without 
authority to settle, failing to bring experts as ordered, failing to explain positions or to listen 
or respond to the other party, withholding information or repeatedly refusing reasonable 
                                                          
196
 [1999] NSWSC 996 (1 October 1999) [156] (Einstein J). Also see Wolski, above n 15, 540.  
197
 United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177 (3 July 2009) 
[70] (Allsop P with whom Ipp JA and Macfarlan JA agreed). The court was dealing with ‘a clearly worded 
dispute resolution clause’ in an engineering contract [70]. NADRAC also concludes that ‘assessing whether 
good faith or genuine effort have been exhibited depends, at least in part, on the context’: The Resolve to 
Resolve Report, above n 7, 145.  
198
 Weston, above n 187, 628; Spencer, Drafting Good Faith Negotiation, above n 187, 33.  
199
 See Ulrich Boettger, ‘Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment – Against A Good-Faith Requirement In 
Mandatory Mediation’ (2004) 23 Review of Litigation 1, 17; McDougall, above n 187, 4; Harper, above n 189, 
[4]. Also see Hilary Astor, ‘Making a ‘Genuine Effort’ in Family Dispute Resolution: What Does it Mean?’ 
(2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 102.  
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requests for information, unilaterally withdrawing from the mediation, failing to sign a 
mediated agreement
200
 and engaging in unspecified bad-faith behaviour.
201
  
 
But, as discussed further in part 4 of this exegesis, despite these attempts to define good 
faith (or its absence), most commentators agree that there is no uniformly recognized and 
clear definition of the duty of good faith.
202
 They also agree that the cases, both in Australia 
and in the US, are difficult to reconcile.
203
 
 
It is not uncommon for legislation which makes provision for referral of cases to 
mediation to seek to impose on the parties an obligation to participate in ‘good faith’ or to act 
‘genuinely’ in the mediation.204 Unfortunately, the legislation tends not to define what it 
means by these terms
205
 and judicial comment on the concept, while helpful, is not 
definitive.
206
  
 
There does appear to be wide agreement that some behaviour is not inconsistent with 
good faith. Good faith does not preclude use of positional negotiation or use of advocacy. 
Good faith does not require parties to make any or any particular settlement offers.
207
 Carter 
opines that ‘[i]f a party does not have an absolute right to offer as little as it chooses during 
                                                          
200
 Weston, above n 187, 605, 630; Boettger, above n 199, 17. Also see Lande who analyses 27 reported cases 
dealing with bad faith in mediation (all arise in court-connected programs) and groups behaviours alleged to 
constitute bad faith into 5 separate categories: Lande, above n 189, 82-3. 
201
 Lande, above n 189, 82-3. 
202
 Anne M Burr, ‘Ethics in Negotiation: Does Getting To Yes Require Candor?’ (2001) (May/July) Dispute 
Resolution Journal 10, 12; Weston, above n 187, 626. 
203
 Carter, above n 188, 383-6; Spencer, Requiring Good Faith Negotiation, above n 187, 37-8, 40. 
204
 See, eg, s 27 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) which requires that parties referred to mediation 
participate in good faith. The term ‘good faith’ is not defined. Also see r 325 of the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 1999 (Qld) which states that: ‘[t]he parties must act reasonably and genuinely in the mediation and help 
the mediator to start and finish the mediation within the time estimated or set in the referring order’. The 
Queensland rules do not define the terms ‘reasonably’ and ‘genuinely’. Some legislation also imposes an 
obligation on the parties to ‘make a genuine effort to resolve’ a dispute before commencing court proceedings: 
see, eg, Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60I(1) and s 10F. See generally the pre-litigation requirements discussed 
in part 3. The legislation does not define the concept of ‘genuine’ effort. See NADRAC’s Maintaining and 
Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, Appendix 2.1, 117 for a list of federal legislation 
prescribing conduct obligations in ADR.  
205
 The position appears to be similar in the US with several authors noting that none of the statutes or court 
rules containing requirements of good faith in mediation provide a clear definition of what it means. See 
Boettger, above n 199, 17; Carter, above n 188, 372. Lande finds one exception, a statute which applies to 
farmer-lender disputes: Lande, above n 189, 80. 
206
 The most well known judicial interpretation of good faith in Australia can be found in the case of Western 
Australia v Taylor (Njamal People) (1996) 134 FLR 211 heard by the National Native Title Tribunal. Member 
Sumner set out a list of 18 indicia which defined good faith negotiation under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) 
discussed by Spencer: Spencer, Requiring Good Faith Negotiation, above n 187, 43. 
207
 Carter, above n 188, 384, 395. 
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mediation, then an important element of party autonomy will be lost’.208 Good faith does not 
preclude a party from refusing to accept a settlement offer
209
 or from failing to give reasons 
for refusing an offer.
210
 Good faith does not require the parties to reach an agreement
211
 or 
even to possess a sincere desire to settle.
212
 Nor need the parties engage in total disclosure.
213
 
Good faith does not preclude the parties from having regard to self-interest.
214
 As Spencer 
asserts, ‘it is not a course of conduct which requires the forfeiture of a person’s self-
interest’.215 A person may try to get the best outcome for him or herself and ‘let self-interest 
dictate the acceptance or rejection of a settlement offer at mediation, perfectly consistent with 
having acted in good faith’.216  
 
2.6 Requirements in Relation to Cooperation 
 
2.6.1 The Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
Although some non-binding guidelines issued by lawyers’ professional associations 
provide that legal representatives should cooperate with mediators,
217
 the professional 
conduct rules do not require cooperation with mediators or between opponents in mediation. 
As Peppet summed up in relation to negotiation, there is no professional requirement ‘to 
cooperate rather than compete’.218  
  
                                                          
208
 Ibid 384.    
209
 Weston, above n 187, 626-7; Boettger, above n 199, 18. 
210
 Boettger, above n 199, 18. 
211
 Charles J McPheeters, ‘Leading Horses to Water: May Courts Which Have the Power to Order Attendance at 
Mediation Also Require Good-Faith Negotiation?’ [1992] Journal of Dispute Resolution 377, 385, 391; Burr, 
above n 202, 13; Boettger, above n 199, 18. 
212
 Boettger, above n 199, 18. 
213
 Burr, above n 202, 13. 
214
 See Spencer and authorities cited therein: Spencer, Requiring Good Faith Negotiation, above n 187, 44. As 
the court noted in United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 
177 (3 July 2009) [76] (Allsop P): ‘the obligation to undertake genuine and good faith negotiations does not 
require any step to advance the interests of the other party’.  
215
 Spencer, Requiring Good Faith Negotiation, above n 187, 44. 
216
 Spencer and Brogan, above n 1, 423. Generally see David Spencer and Tom Altobelli, Dispute Resolution in 
Australia: Cases, Commentary and Materials (Lawbook Co., 2005) 306-11 and Boulle, above n 39, 627-32. 
217
 See the Law Society of New South Wales, Professional Standards for Legal Representatives in a Mediation 
(at 1 January 2008) s 5.1 which provides that ‘[a] legal representative should: cooperate with the mediator’. No 
definition of cooperation is provided. 
218
 Peppet, above n 13, 72. Also see Lamb and Littrich who confirm that ‘there is no duty to assist one’s 
opponent’: Lamb and Littrich, above n 74, 298. 
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2.6.2 Other Components of the Law of Lawyering 
 
Some of the case law and commentary concerning an obligation of good faith suggests 
that cooperation might be a required element.
219
 If a party is required to attend the mediation 
with an open mind and to consider offers and proposals for settlement, as Einstein J 
suggested in Aiton v Transfield,
220
 then he or she must cooperate to this limited extent. But 
cooperation in the context of negotiation and mediation could be taken to include all of the 
characteristics that negotiation theorists such as Lewicki, Barry and Saunders attribute to 
cooperative negotiators such as trust and openness, and a willingness to convey one’s own 
needs and to respond to those of the other parties.
221
 It is suggested that this concept (or set of 
concepts) is too broad and vague. There is no requirement in general contract law (nor in 
torts, equity or adjectival law), absent a specific provision, to cooperate with one’s 
counterpart in this full sense of the term.
222
 
 
2.6.3 Agreements and Legislative Directives to Mediate 
 
Some agreements to mediate require the parties to cooperate with the mediator and with 
each other.
223
 It is usual for the parties to agree to comply with ‘reasonable’ mediator requests 
such as requests to provide to the mediator and to each other lists of disputed issues and 
copies of relevant documents. But parties are not required to cooperate beyond observance of 
these minimum steps. 
 
  
                                                          
219
 Weston, above n 187, 628; Spencer, Drafting Good Faith Negotiation, above n 187, 33. This suggestion is 
also found in cases and commentary on an implied obligation of good faith in contractual performance and 
enforcement, see, eg, Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’ 
(2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 66 discussed in McDougall, above n 187, 5. McDougall agreed that ‘co-
operation is an incident of the duty of good faith’: above n 187, 5. Also see Harper who asserts that concepts or 
values such as cooperation, reasonableness, proper purpose and legitimate interest are often linked to the 
implied duty of good faith: Harper, above n 189, [3].  
220
 [1999] NSWSC 996 (1 October 1999).  
221
 Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, above n 20, 115. 
222
 Peppet, above n 13, 72. 
223
 See, eg, clause 9 of the Agreement to Mediate, contained in the Law Society of New South Wales’ Mediation 
and Evaluation Information Kit, updated 1 January 2008; clauses 10 and 11 of the Agreement to Mediate 
contained in the Queensland Law Society’s Mediation Kit. Also see Hardy and Rundle, above n 6, sample 
agreements to mediate, appendix 2, 382-408. 
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Some statutory mandates to mediate also impose obligations in relation to cooperation.
224
 
For example, rule 325 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) requires the parties 
‘to act reasonably ... and help the mediator to start and finish the mediation within the time 
estimated or set in the referring order’. However, the rules do not elaborate on what is 
required by way of ‘help’.225 
 
The Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) provides that ‘a person to whom the overarching 
obligations apply must cooperate with the parties to a civil proceeding and the court in 
connection with the conduct of that proceedings’.226 The term ‘cooperate’ is not defined in 
the legislation and the VLRC, whose Civil Justice Review Report lead to the passage of the 
legislation, did not elaborate on what ‘cooperation’ involved. Interestingly, the VLRC 
originally proposed that there should be an obligation to act in good faith. Following public 
consultation, the commission ‘conceded that it had a concern about the vagueness of [a good 
faith] obligation’ 227  and resolved to replace the obligation to act in good faith with an 
obligation to ‘cooperate’.228 In commenting on this legislative development, NADRAC notes 
that ‘the duty to “cooperate” may be subject to some of the same difficulties of definition as 
the duty to participate in good faith or to make a genuine effort.’229  
 
2.7 Requirements in Relation to Fairness 
 
2.7.1 The Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
Fairness is a concept which can be applied both to the process and outcome of mediation. 
It overlaps with the concepts already discussed above. One may be unfair procedurally and at 
the same time, bring about an unfair outcome by eg not disclosing vital information. The 
obligation to disclose information is governed by the ‘rules of disclosure’ discussed above 
and will not be discussed again here. 
 
                                                          
224
 See, eg, Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) s 45. 
225
 See, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 325. 
226
 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 20. 
227
 VLRC, Civil Justice Review Report, above n 7, 183. 
228
 Ibid. 
229
 NADRAC, The Resolve to Resolve Report, above n 7, 148. 
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A legal representative may also act unfairly in the mediation process by being uncivil or 
discourteous, by making threats, by attempting to cross-examine or interrogate the other party 
and by not allowing him or her to speak freely.
230
 There is a general duty of fairness owed by 
lawyers to those with whom they deal. As mentioned previously, there are statements of 
general principle in the existing LCA Model Rules which require practitioners to act with 
honesty, fairness and courtesy in their dealings with other persons.
231
 These statements of 
general principle are not followed up by specific rules dealing with fairness (and no definition 
of fairness or other associated terms is offered in the rules). It is argued in part 4 of this 
exegesis that this general approach is appropriate in mediation for mediators are responsible 
for ensuring process fairness and arguably, what is fair will vary with the circumstances of 
each mediation. It is also consistent with the court’s approach, with terms such as civility and 
courtesy taking their meaning from the context in which specific behaviour occurs.
232
 
 
There is no obligation on legal representatives to ensure a fair outcome for their own 
clients in mediation although they must ensure that their clients understand their legal rights 
and obligations and the significance and consequences of any agreement reached.
233
 Legal 
representatives have no specific obligation to ensure that the outcome is fair to other parties 
to the mediation (or other affected third parties) except where special obligations are imposed 
by legislation as is the case in family law matters.
234
 That said, lawyers must keep in mind 
their duty to the administration of justice. They are subject to a general duty to refrain from 
conduct which is discreditable to a practitioner, prejudicial to the administration of justice or 
                                                          
230
 White notes that the concept of fairness ‘speaks to a variety of acts in addition to truthfulness and also 
different from it’: James J White, ‘Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation’ (1980) 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 926, 928. It has something to say about the threats a negotiator 
may use, about the favours he may offer, and extraneous factors that may be used in negotiation: White, 928. 
Also see Hazard, above n 138, 182. 
231
 LCA Model Rules, statements of general principle for ‘relations with other practitioners’ and ‘relations with 
third parties’. Also see Dal Pont who claims that ‘[i]n their dealings with other members of the profession, and 
with persons other than clients, lawyers’ conduct must be characterised with the same principles of good faith, 
honesty and fairness required in their relations with clients and the court’: Dal Pont, above n 25, 469. 
232
 See Lander v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2009] ACTSC 117 (11
th
 
September 2009) (Higgins CJ, Gray and Refshauge JJ) discussed n 121. In commenting on this decision, Hardy 
and Rundle note that ‘standards of courtesy vary according to culture, context and values’: Hardy and Rundle, 
above n 6, 228. Also see Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and Fleming [2006] WASAT 352 (7 
December 2006) [73]. 
233
 LCA Model Rules r 12.2; Barristers’ Rules r 17.  
234
 See for instance Family Law legislation which seems in all jurisdictions to make the interests of the children 
paramount. 
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which might otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute.
235
 This duty is recognised 
under the professional conduct rules and at common law. 
 
2.7.2 Other Components of the Law of Lawyering 
 
Occasionally cases have arisen where the court has held that a lawyer’s actions in 
securing an agreement and in failing to disclose information to an opponent were so unfair 
that the agreement in question should be set aside. The grounds relied on by the court in 
setting aside these agreements have varied – ranging from breach of principles of contract 
law,
236
 to breach of the practitioner’s common law obligations to the administration of justice 
and to the court.
237
 Some of the most interesting and well known cases have occurred in the 
US. In Virzi v Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold Storage Co
238
 the plaintiff’s lawyer failed 
to advise the defendant that the plaintiff in a personal injuries action had died from unrelated 
factors prior to completion of settlement discussions. The defendant entered into a settlement 
agreement in ignorance of this fact. The court held that the plaintiff’s legal representative was 
under a duty to disclose the death of his client to opposing counsel prior to negotiating the 
final settlement agreement. The case analysis was based on principles of contract law (the 
executor of the plaintiff’s estate should have been substituted for the deceased plaintiff as 
party to the agreement) rather than principles of ethics. 
 
In Spaulding v Zimmerman,
239
 another personal injuries case, the plaintiff’s own doctors 
concluded that the plaintiff’s injuries had healed completely. However, the doctor who 
examined the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant discovered a life-threatening aneurysm on 
the plaintiff’s aorta which had been caused by the accident. The plaintiff’s lawyer never 
asked about the results of the examination conducted by the defendant’s doctor and the 
defendant’s lawyer did not volunteer the information. The Supreme Court of Minnesota 
determined that the defendant’s lawyer was under no legal ethical duty to volunteer the new 
                                                          
235
 See Part (A) of the general principles of professional conduct section of the Professional Conduct and 
Practice Rules 2005 of the Law Institute of Victoria Limited; the objects clause of the Queensland Legal 
Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007.  
236
 See, eg, Virzi v Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold Storage Co, 571 F Supp 507, 512 (ED Mich 1983) 
discussed in Charles B Craver, ‘Negotiation Ethics: How to Be Deceptive Without Being Dishonest/How to be 
Assertive Without Being Offensive’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 713, 721; Barry R Temkin, 
‘Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: Should There Be a Silent Safe Harbor?’ (2004-
2005) 18 Geogetown Journal of Legal Ethics 179, 202. 
237
 Spaulding v Zimmerman 116 NW 2d 704 (Minn 1962) discussed in Craver, above n 236, 722.  
238
 571 F Supp 507, 512 (ED Mich 1983). 
239
 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). 
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medical information to the plaintiff’s lawyer. Craver argues that, as a matter of strict legal 
ethics, this decision is correct.
240
 However, the court held that, as an officer of the court, 
defence counsel had an affirmative duty to disclose the existence of the plaintiff’s medical 
condition to the court prior to its approval of the settlement agreement.
241
 
 
In light of these cases (from which it is difficult to derive general principles), Temkin 
argues that:
242
  
1. In cases like Spaulding v Zimmerman, where one party withholds from the other, 
knowledge about the existence in the other of a life-threatening medical condition, the 
court might hold that ‘a general duty of fairness ... trumps the adversary system of 
justice in general and the attorney’s duty of zealous advocacy to clients in 
particular’.243 
2. There may be circumstances in which ‘the duty to not bring the legal profession into 
disrepute and fairness to an opponent may require that the practitioner draw attention 
to a particular matter, even where the opponent’s misapprehension is not induced by 
that practitioner’.244 
 
2.7.3 Agreements and Legislative Directives to Mediate 
 
I have been unable to find any agreements to mediate or legislative directives to mediate 
which require the parties or their lawyers to act fairly to the other party in mediation or to 
ensure a fair mediated outcome.
245
 
 
  
                                                          
240
 Spaulding v Zimmerman 116 NW 2d 704 (Minn 1962) discussed in Craver, above n 236, 722. 
241
 The result may have been different had the court not been required to approve the settlement (court approval 
was required because the plaintiff was a minor). 
242
 Wolski, above n 15, 634. 
243
 Temkin, above n 236, 202. 
244
 Ibid 181.  
245
 See agreements set out in Hardy and Rundle, above n 6, appendix 2, 382-408. Also see agreements to 
mediate contained in the mediation kits provided by the Queensland Law Society and the Law Society of New 
South Wales. Other agreements perused include the Agreement to Mediate provided by the NSW Rural 
Assistance Authority for use under the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 (NSW); Agreement to Mediate, U.S. 
District Court of Oregon (Revised 18 February 2011); Sample Agreement to Mediate, United States Arbitration 
& Mediation, available at http://www.usam.com/services/med_agreement.shtml; Sample Agreement to Mediate, 
Dispute Resolution Office, Ministry of Attorney General for British Columbia, Canada available at 
http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/mediation-in-bc/sample-agreement.htm. 
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2.8 Resolution of Conflicting Duties 
 
In any lawyer-client representational context, there is potential for conflict to arise 
between the various duties owed by lawyers. Some guidance on the issue of priority to be 
given to particular duties is given, if not in the rules, then in the general law. 
 
2.8.1 The Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
When a conflict occurs, a lawyer’s paramount duty is to the court and the administration 
of justice. Currently, the professional conduct rules do not contain explicit statements to this 
effect.
246
 References to ‘the duty to the administration of justice’ only appear in object 
sections and preambles.
247
 Nonetheless, any doubt in this matter is resolved by the general 
law. That is not to say that it is always easy to discern ‘at what point the duty to the court 
overrides the duty to the client’.248 
 
Duties owed to clients will normally take precedence over those owed to third parties
249
 
except where action (or inaction) taken on the client’s behalf also impinges on duties owed to 
the administration of justice. Once again, there are no explicit statements to this effect in the 
rules.
250
 In fact, different lawyers may do (or refrain from doing) different things when 
confronted with conflicting duties depending on which of a number of different approaches to 
ethical reasoning they adopt.
251
  
                                                          
246
 There is no separate category of rules, either in the Solicitors’ Rules or the Barristers’ Rules dealing with 
duties to the administration of justice. 
247
 See the object section, Victorian and Queensland Solicitors’ Rules and the preamble of the Barristers’ Rules 
rr 1 and 3. The preamble to the Barristers’ Rules provides that ‘[t]he administration of justice is best served by 
reserving the practice of law to those who owe their paramount duty to the administration of justice’: preamble, 
clause 1 (r 10 provides that the rules ‘should be read and applied so as most effectively to attain the objects and 
uphold the values expressed in their Preamble’.) Also see the preamble of the ABA Model Rules, [1], [6].  
248
 Parker and Evans, above n 17, 169. 
249
 No special duties arise in the case of unrepresented parties although Dal Pont cautions that practitioners 
should take ‘care’ to ‘avoid any allegation of undue pressure’: Dal Pont, above n 25, 496. See the discussion by 
Dal Pont who observes that ‘to take account of the opponent or other party’s interests could be detrimental to the 
client’s interests, and thus a breach of duty’: Dal Pont, above n 25, 496. 
250
 The rules contain strong unequivocal statements of obligation to ‘advance and protect the client’s interests to 
the best of the [practitioner’s] skill and diligence’. See, eg, ABA Model Rules r 16; LCA Model Rules rr 1.1, 
12.1-12.4. 
251
 Parker and Evans suggest that it is only the ‘responsible lawyer’ who sees loyalty to the client to be ‘confined 
and constrained by the lawyer’s loyalty to the court and the legal system’: Parker and Evans, above n 17, 168. 
They compare the responsible lawyer’s perspective with that of the zealous adversarial advocate who shows 
‘unadulterated loyalty to client’: 167. According to Parker and Evans, lawyers motivated by an ethic of care 
might give more emphasis to the duties owed to third parties, see Parker and Evans, above n 17, 170-2, while 
those who favour  a moral activist approach might be motivated by the public interest: 169.  
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The rules provide only limited guidance as to the actual circumstances in which a 
lawyer’s duties may conflict.252 For the purpose of this analysis, I consider two possible 
situations of conflict below.  
 
A conflict between duties owed to the administration of justice, duties owed to third 
parties, and duties owed to clients might arise in mediation:
253
 
1. When a client wants his or her lawyer to use mediation for an ‘improper purpose’ 
such as to delay commencement of legal proceedings or to fish for information.
254
 
2. When a client instructs his or her lawyer to withhold confidential information from an 
opponent and/or from the mediator.
255
 
 
Each of these situations ultimately involves the question of client authority versus lawyer 
independence. There is some guidance available on this issue in the rules (and the general 
law). 
 
Conventional wisdom is that lawyers should abide by their client’s decisions in respect of 
objectives to be achieved from a representation providing those objectives are lawful (it is 
beyond contention that a lawyer must comply with a client’s instructions to grant or not to 
grant a particular concession, and abide by the client’s decision as to whether or not to make 
or accept a particular offer of settlement)
256
 and consult with their client in respect of the 
means used to achieve objectives where means includes styles, approaches and tactics to be 
                                                          
252
 ALRC 89, above n 10, [3.85]. 
253
 This is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which a conflict might arise. 
254
 I recognise that whether or not these circumstances constitute an improper purpose is itself a threshold 
question of ethical judgment. 
255
 A legal representative owes a duty of confidence, not just to his or her client, but also to the other participants 
in the mediation process. There are at least three (and possibly four) legal foundations for the claim of 
confidentiality: the common law ‘without prejudice’ privilege; the terms of the Agreement to Mediate (or a 
separate Confidentiality Agreement) if there is one; and statutory provisions where mediation takes place 
pursuant to legislative provision (see, eg, Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 112 and Civil 
Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 31) and some professional practice guidelines (see, eg, LCA, Guidelines for 
Lawyers in Mediations (at March 2007) s 2.1). However, information and admissions revealed at mediation are 
not shielded from disclosure if they can be proven via other means: AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/as Deloitte Haskins & 
Sells) (1992) 7 ASCR 463. This proposition was adopted by the court in Williamson v Schmidt [1998] 2 Qd R 
317. See the discussion of these cases by Colbran et al, above n 77, 86-91. 
256
 Lewis, Kyrou and Dinelli, above n 176, 151; Condlin, above n 105, 72. See Boulle’s discussion of the 
‘Studer saga’ (in which three courts commented on a lawyer’s conduct in the same mediation) which emphasise 
that it is the client’s decision to compromise or not in mediation: Boulle, above n 39, 299-301. 
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used in the mediation.
257
 This convention has been formalised into a rule in the ABA Model 
Rules
258
 and in both sets of professional conduct rules in Australia.
259
 In Australia, the 
relevant provision only appears in the context of the rules dealing with litigation and 
advocacy.
260
 However, as was observed in the discussion of Mullins’ case, the court is 
prepared to apply the principles contained in these rules to other contexts. Indeed, in the case 
of Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and Fleming
261
 the Tribunal found that: 
 
both in respect of litigation and in providing legal advice and assistance generally, a practitioner is 
not a mere agent and mouthpiece for his client, but a professional exercising independent judgment 
(exclusively in many forensic areas) and providing independent advice ... [t]he lesson from a case 
such as this, is that where the client’s instructions may run counter to normal ethical principles and 
a practitioner’s own personal standards, he or she should think seriously before proceeding in 
accordance with those instructions.
262
  
 
Consequently, lawyers need not do everything asked of them by clients. They may make 
tactical and technical decisions about how best to advance a client’s objectives and they may 
choose their own preferred negotiation style.
263
 
 
The first situation posited above ie using mediation for an improper purpose, appears to 
concern an objective of mediation and on the face of it, a lawyer would be bound to follow 
the client’s instructions. However, a lawyer is entitled to, and should, refuse to act if a client 
asks him or her to take part in some illegal activity or to take some action which would 
                                                          
257
 Categorisation of instructions into means or objectives is not always easy. For instance, Burns argues that 
instructions to negotiate in a cooperative manner could be either a choice of means or a choice of the goals of 
the representation: Burns, above n 2, 699. 
258
 See r 1.2(a) of the ABA Model Rules which provides that, with some limitations, a lawyer shall abide by a 
client’s decision concerning the objectives of the representation and consult with the client as to the means by 
which the objectives are to be pursued. Cf Gifford, who asserts that the choice of negotiation strategy ‘is a 
decision to be made jointly by the attorney and the client’: Donald G Gifford, ‘A Context-Based Theory of 
Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation’ (1985) 46 Ohio State Law Journal 40, 59, 66. 
259
 See r 18 of the Barristers’ Rules (and for solicitor advocates, r 13.1 of the LCA Model Rules; r 17.1 of the 
draft Solicitors Rules 2010) which requires barristers to exercise forensic judgments called for during a case 
independently of the wishes of the client and instructing solicitor and prohibits a barrister from acting as ‘the 
mere mouthpiece of the client’. 
260
 But see Preamble, clause 5 which is stated in more general terms. It provides that barristers ‘should exercise 
their forensic judgments and give their advice independently and for the proper administration of justice, 
notwithstanding any contrary desires of their clients’.  
261
 [2006] WASAT 352 (7 December 2006). 
262
 [2006] WASAT 352 (7 December 2006) [70]-[71]. In the cases of Mullins (and Garrett) and Fleming, the 
practitioners followed the instructions of their clients although, in the case of Mullins at least, it was done with 
some reluctance on the part of the practitioner concerned. For discussion of the facts in the case of Fleming, see 
above n 143.   
263
 As Condlin notes, lawyers owe clients only substantive competitiveness: Condlin, above n 105, 76-7. 
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amount to a breach of the lawyer’s overriding duty to the court and the administration of 
justice. A lawyer who wanted to decline the brief in this situation (or to cease to act if the 
brief had already been accepted) might argue that it was a breach of his or her duty to the 
administration of justice to act or to continue to act for a client who wished to use mediation 
for an improper purpose (it is difficult to conceive of this as an illegal activity). Of course, 
many clients will not ‘own up’ that this is their objective and indeed it may not be their sole 
objective.
264
 
 
The decision to withhold (or to disclose) confidential information does not usually fall 
within either category of means or objectives because it is the subject of specific provision: as 
a general rule, a lawyer must follow a client’s instruction to withhold information.265 But it is 
impossible to suggest an appropriate course of action for a lawyer who finds himself or 
herself in this situation without knowing the specifics of the information which the client 
wants to withhold. There will be no problem withholding information about bottom lines and 
willingness to settle. But the cases discussed above are sufficient to illustrate that in some 
circumstances, failure to disclose information (such as information about the existence of a 
life-threatening medical condition) will constitute a breach of a lawyer’s paramount duty to 
the administration of justice. This is not to say that the practitioner should actually disclose 
the information for he or she is still bound by the duty of confidentiality and loyalty owed to 
the client. The practitioner’s first course of action should be to seek to obtain the client’s 
instructions to reveal the information. If the practitioner considers the information in question 
to be material and the client does not agree to disclose it, it is submitted that the lawyer has 
‘good cause’ for refusing to continue to act for the client (providing always that a lawyer can 
only cease to act on the giving of reasonable notice to the client of this intention).
266
 This 
course of action is supported by the guidelines of the LCA mentioned previously. 
 
2.8.2 Other Components of the Law of Lawyering 
 
It has long been recognised at general law that a legal practitioner is an officer of the 
court. This status is now given a statutory foundation.
267
 The courts have repeatedly held that, 
as officers of the court, practitioners owe an ‘overriding’ or ‘paramount’ duty to the court 
                                                          
264
 Some lawyers might suggest this course of action. 
265
 Condlin, above n 105, 74. 
266
 LCA Model Rules r 6.1.3; Barristers’ Rules r 97. 
267
 See, eg, Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 33; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 38. 
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rather than to the client.
268
 The independence of lawyers has also long been recognised at 
general law. Dal Pont asserts that ‘[t]he proper administration of justice depends, and the 
court relies, on the faithful exercise by lawyers of an independent judgment in the conduct 
and management of the case’.269  
 
But, as is the case with the professional conduct rules, there is little specific guidance 
offered in the general law as to the circumstances in which a conflict exists between the 
various duties owed by lawyers. 
 
2.8.3 Agreements and Legislative Directives to Mediate 
 
It is unusual for agreements to mediate and legislative directives to mediate to impose a 
specific obligation on participants in mediation to further the administration of justice. 
However the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) now provides that lawyers and parties have a 
paramount duty to the court to further the administration of justice in relation to any civil 
proceedings in which that person is involved including any ‘appropriate dispute resolution’ 
undertaken in relation to that proceedings.
270
 It is unlikely that this provision would augment 
the general law or the duties imposed on lawyers by the professional conduct rules. It appears 
to have been introduced as a way to ensure that unrepresented litigants, who do not owe a 
direct duty to the court and are not subject to the same influences and constraints as lawyers, 
comply with the new objectives of the civil litigation system (discussed in part 3).
271
   
 
2.9 Other Constraints on Lawyers’ Behaviour 
  
In addition to those constraints found in the current rule systems governing lawyers and in 
the general law, certain other constraints may operate on lawyers in negotiation and 
                                                          
268
 On the primacy of the duty to the court, see Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) HCA 52, [12]; Rondel v Worsley 
[1969] 1 AC 191, 227. For a discussion of the position in Australia, see Corones, Stobbs and Thomas, above n 
77, 88; Dal Pont, above n 25, 373. Also see Hopeshore Pty Limited v Melroad Equipment Pty Limited [2004] 
FCA 1445 (9 November 2004) in which the court held that a legal representative had acted inconsistently with 
his duty to assist the Court in the management of proceedings involving his client by failing to proceed with 
mediation as ordered by the court [34]. In fact, the referral to mediation was made by consent at a directions 
hearing. The court concluded that the practitioner had taken the view that early mediation was not in his client’s 
best interests and had acted in a way calculated to defer the mediation: [34]-[35]. The court took the conduct of 
the legal practitioner into account in determining whether or not to exercise discretion in favour of that 
practitioner’s client in an application for security for payment of costs (the court dismissed the motion) [39]. 
269
 See Dal Pont, above n 25, 375 and cases cited therein. 
270
 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 16. 
271
 VLRC, Civil Justice Review Report, above n 7, 165-6. 
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mediation. One such constraint derives from the fear of developing a bad reputation (coupled 
with the sanction of peer criticism).
272
 It is considered by some authors to be a potent 
deterrent to trust abuse.
273
 The reputation effect has impact at two levels: in repeat dealings 
(negotiators who believe that their trust has been abused will be reluctant to trust an 
offending negotiator again) and in the general marketplace (future opponents will look warily 
at a negotiator who has a reputation for being dishonest).
274
  However, the power of 
reputation should not be overstated. The reputation effect is more profound in a small 
community than a large heterogeneous one,
275
 a factor which operates to make collaborative 
law groups effective. In order for this constraint to be effective, lawyers must operate in an 
environment in which they can establish a reputation for trustworthiness ‘that is powerful 
enough to register with prospective clients and other lawyers and is therefore valuable 
enough to protect’.276 Many lawyers do not practise in this type of setting. 
 
2.10 Summary and Review 
 
At the beginning of this part of the exegesis, I posed five ethical questions which legal 
representatives might expect to have to answer while representing clients in mediation. 
 
As to the question of what is the appropriate level of honesty and openness required in 
mediation, there is some lack of clarity in Australia. While the professional conduct rules 
currently define ‘court’ to include ‘mediations’, it is not clear whether the ‘court standard’ of 
disclosure or the standard that is normally owed to opponents, is meant to apply to mediators. 
For reasons given earlier, I think that the reference to ‘mediations’ in the definition section of 
the rules was intended to mean ‘mediators’ and that legal practitioners in Australia owe to 
mediators the same duties as they owe to judges. If this is the case, then legal representatives 
in Australia cannot knowingly make misleading statements about matters of law or fact
277
 to 
mediators and they may even be prohibited from expressing certain opinions to mediators. 
                                                          
272
 Nancy J Moore, ‘Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century’ (2002) 30 Hofstra Law Review 
923, 924. 
273
 Burr, above n 202, 14; Paul Rosenberger, ‘Laissez-“Fair”: An Argument for the Status Quo Ethical 
Constraints on Lawyers as Negotiators’ (1997-1998) 13 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 611, 629-30; 
Norton, above n 161, 501. 
274
 Burr, above n 202, 14; Rosenberger, above n 273, 630-33; Norton, above n 161, 526. 
275
 White, above n 230, 930. 
276
 Ted Schneyer, ‘The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in Professional Change’ 
(2008) 50 Arizona Law Review 289, 329. 
277
 LCA Model Rules r 14.1; Barristers’ Rules r 21; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.1; draft Barristers’ Rules 
2010 r 26. 
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They must inform mediators of any relevant binding authorities and legislative provisions of 
which they are aware.
278
 Currently, the rules offer no guidance on whether the disclosures 
need to be made in joint or separate sessions. Some suggestions for clarification of the rules 
are made in part 7. No such uncertainty exists in the professional conduct rules in the US. 
There, under the existing rules, legal practitioners owe mediators the same standard of 
disclosure as they owe to their opponents. 
 
Neither the rules in Australia, nor those in the US, impose on legal practitioners 
obligations to disclose adverse facts to a mediator
279
 or to correct errors in statements made to 
the mediator by the other party.
280
 
 
With respect to opponents, lawyers both in Australia and the US are prohibited (under the 
professional conduct rules and the general law) from making certain misrepresentations but 
they are not prohibited from posturing, bluffing, and even misrepresenting some matters such 
as bottom lines and settlement intentions. As a general rule, there is no obligation of candour 
owed to opponents.
 281
 
 
The professional conduct rules do not impose on legal representatives, duties to 
participate in good faith or to cooperate with an opponent or with a mediator. Nor do such 
duties exist in general law absent an agreement between the parties or statutory provision to 
this effect. 
 
The professional conduct rules require practitioners to act fairly, but in the context of 
mediation, that duty extends to compliance with guidelines set by the mediator. There is no 
general duty to ensure fair outcomes or to protect the interests of third parties although some 
areas of substantive law impose specific obligations in this regard (eg family law).  However, 
in rare cases a lawyer’s actions in securing an agreement might be considered so unfair as to 
amount to a breach of the practitioner’s obligations to the administration of justice and to the 
court. Such an agreement might also be contrary to the principles of contract law and the law 
dealing with unconscionability. 
                                                          
278
 See, eg, LCA Model Rules r 14.6; Barristers’ Rules r 25; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.6; draft Barristers’ 
Rules 2010 r 31. A similar obligation is imposed by ABA Model Rules r 3.3. 
279
 Dal Pont, above n 25, 384, 386. 
280
 LCA Model Rules r 14.3. Also see draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 19.3. 
281
 Peppet, above n 28, 478; Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 160, 373; Gillies and Selvadurai, above n 161, 
who note that ‘there is no general duty of disclosure in the common law’: 123-31.   
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But despite the minimal requirements of the professional conduct rules, candour and 
cooperation are not prohibited by the rules. ‘[L]awyers are not ethically required to press for 
every advantage, take every permissible step, react to every point raised, or to otherwise play 
hardball’.282 ‘Nothing in the rules imposes an obligation to act in a win-lose manner designed 
to deprive opposing parties of fair terms’.283 The existing rules enable lawyers to cooperate, 
collaborate and use joint problem-solving methods, in the appropriate circumstances. This is 
perfectly consistent with the discharge of duties owed to a client for it will sometimes be in 
the best interests of the client for a lawyer to act cooperatively. 
 
For the most part, legal representatives can decide for themselves the manner in which 
they conduct themselves in mediation (in the sense of choosing their preferred style and 
approach to negotiation) but they are bound to follow their clients’ instructions with respect 
to some matters, including whether or not to disclose confidential information. However, 
when a lawyer feels that disclosure of information is required, there is room under the rules 
for the lawyer to press a client for permission to reveal the information or to withdraw, if that 
permission is not forthcoming. Case law supports this interpretation of the rules. Likewise, if 
the lawyer feels that a client is using mediation for an improper purpose, there is scope within 
the context of the existing rules for the lawyer to refuse to act for the client on the ground that 
to do so would involve a breach of the lawyer’s duty to the administration of justice.   
 
Some commentators are satisfied that current ethical and legal constraints are an adequate 
check on unethical behaviour in negotiation and mediation.
284
 However, other commentators 
assert that the standards of conduct set in the rules are too low for mediation. 
 
As has been noted in this part, some efforts have been made to impose higher standards of 
conduct upon parties and their lawyers in mediation through contract (in the case of private 
mediations) or legislative directive (in the case of mandatory mediations). Many such 
agreements and directives require participants to act in good faith in the mediation and to 
cooperate with the mediator and with each other. However, there is little agreement on what 
                                                          
282
 Gary L Voegele, Linda K Wray and Ronald D Ousky, ‘Collaborative Law: A Useful Tool for the Family 
Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes’ (2006-2007) 33 William Mitchell Law Review 971, 1018. 
283
 Charles B Craver, ‘Negotiation Ethics for Real World Interactions’ (2010) 25 Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 299, 311. 
284
 Rosenberger, above n 273, 628-9, 638; Norton, above n 161, 501.   
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terms such as ‘good faith’ and ‘cooperation’ require from the parties. Ultimately the 
imposition of these requirements might raise more problems than they solve.  
 
Even more far-reaching proposals have been made for the promulgation of new rules of 
professional conduct for legal representatives in mediation. Most proposals for new rules rest 
on supposed differences (or similarities) between the processes of litigation, mediation and 
negotiation. It is appropriate therefore to examine these processes before considering 
proposals for reform of the rules of conduct. The processes are examined in the next part of 
the exegesis. 
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PART 3: A COMPARISON OF LITIGATION, MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION 
 
Mediation is often compared with litigation.
285
 This is not surprising since mediation 
emerged in Western cultures largely as a product of dissatisfaction with the traditional court 
system and, initially at least, it was conceived as an alternative to litigation.
286
 
 
Mediation is also compared with unassisted negotiation (again, this is not surprising if 
one accepts that mediation is essentially facilitated negotiation). In the discussion below, I 
examine the features, objectives and values of these three processes beginning with litigation.  
 
3.1 Litigation 
 
3.1.1 The Features of Litigation 
 
Litigation is a public process in which an impartial decision-maker (such as a judge) 
appointed by the state
287
 imposes a binding decision
288
 upon the parties to a legal dispute.
289
 
Judges must determine the legal rights and obligations of the parties on the basis of ‘legal 
rules, principles and policies’.290 They make their decisions on a rational basis after hearing 
evidence from, and reasoned arguments by, the contending parties.
291
 Judges are confined to 
awarding a limited and standardised range of remedies that has developed alongside 
recognised ‘causes of action’. A party may have a right to appeal against a decision. The 
outcomes of litigation can create legal precedents. 
 
There are rules of procedure (such as the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) and 
the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2010) which govern the manner and form in which 
proceedings are instituted, the steps taken to progress a matter to trial, and the trial (and 
                                                          
285
 Boulle, above n 39, 140-2. 
286
 I R Scott, ‘The Courts and Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (1990) 56 Arbitration 176, 178. 
287
 Sward, above n 60, 308; Landsman, above n 60, 713-4; Stephan Landsman, ‘The Decline of the Adversary 
System and the Changing Role of the Advocate in that System’ (1980-1981) 18 San Diego Law Review 251, 
252. 
288
 Whilst there are mechanisms available for enforcement of a judgment of the court, such as a warrant of 
execution against assets owned by the judgment debtor, there is no guarantee that a judgment can be satisfied. 
289
 Courts only deal with disputes which fall within a legally recognised cause of action. 
290
 Boulle, above n 39, 140. 
291
 Landsman, above n 60, 713; Sward, above n 60, 309; Jerold H Israel, ‘Cornerstones of the Judicial Process’ 
(1992-1993) 2 Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 5, 12; Lon L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication’ (1978-1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 353, 386. 
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subsequent appeal, if there is one). These procedures came under intense scrutiny
292
 in the 
mid-1980s with many commentators and official bodies asserting that the civil justice system 
in many common law jurisdictions was ‘in crisis’,293 crippled by excessive delay, cost and 
complexity in proceedings
294
 and out of reach of ordinary people.
295
 Procedures were 
considered to be too formal, inflexible and complex and too heavily reliant on inter-party 
regulation. At least until trial, the parties controlled the conduct, pace and extent of litigation 
without judicial intervention or oversight.
296
 The system was thought by some commentators 
to encourage a strongly adversarial approach.
297
 It was also criticized for being too heavily 
dependent on an ‘all-embracing trial’. 298  Little time or effort was devoted to pre-trial 
activities including fact investigation, case preparation and exploration of settlement 
opportunities.  
 
In the last three decades, substantial reforms have taken place in the civil litigation 
systems of many common law jurisdictions with the aim of making litigation quicker, more 
cost effective, less complex and overall, more accessible.
299
  
 
  
                                                          
292
 For details of the law reform commissions, parliamentary committees, government-appointed bodies and 
independent agencies involved in review of the civil justice systems in common law jurisdictions, see the 
citations provided by the Australian Law Reform Commission in ALRC 89, above n 10, [1.77]. In fact, work of 
this nature is ongoing: see VLRC, Civil Justice Review Report, above n 7; and Australian Government Attorney-
General’s Department, ‘A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System’, 
Report by the Access to Justice Taskforce, Attorney-General’s Department (2009) ‘A Strategic Framework for 
Access to Justice Report’.   
293
 See, eg, Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘Key Issues in Judicial Administration’ (1997) 6 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 138, 139. 
294
 Lord Harry Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales (1995) [1] (‘Access to Justice, Interim Report’). 
295
 See, eg, Brennan, above n 293, 139. For a more detailed discussion of perceived problems, see Bobette 
Wolski, ‘Reform of the Civil Justice System Two Decades Past – Implications for the Legal Profession and for 
Law Teachers’ (2009) 21 Bond Law Review 192, 192. 
296
 Access to Justice, Interim Report, above n 294, [5]. 
297
 Geoffrey L Davies, ‘The Reality of Civil Justice Reform: Why We Must Abandon the Essential Elements of 
Our System’ (Paper presented at the 20th Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Annual Conference, 
Brisbane, 12-14 July 2002) 7. 
298
 A Justice Report, Going to Law: A Critique of English Civil Procedure, Council of Justice, British Section of 
the International Commission of Jurists (1974) [76] (‘ICJ Justice Report’).  
299
 For a discussion of these reforms, see Wolski, above n 295. The various reform bodies published extensive 
lists of recommendations. See Wolski, above n 295, 198-199 for a discussion of the main recommendations 
made by reform agencies. For a complete list of the particular goals sought to be achieved by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission in formulating its recommendations for reform, see ALRC 89, above n 10, [1.154]. 
The Commission made 138 recommendations relating to a range of matters including practice, procedure and 
case management, legal costs and education, training and accountability. In particular, see ALRC 89, above n 
10, [1.155]. 
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Today many courts have implemented pre-litigation protocols aimed at putting the parties 
in a position where they may be able to settle cases early without litigation or at least, to 
clarify and narrow the issues in dispute.
300
 Typically, ‘protocols’ encourage more pre-
litigation contact between the parties, better and earlier exchange of information, better pre-
litigation investigation by the parties and negotiation with a view to settling the claim without 
court proceedings.
301
 The trend to implement pre-litigation protocols seems likely to 
continue. In 2009, the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (hereafter 
NADRAC) recommended that legislation governing federal courts and tribunals require 
prospective parties to take ‘genuine steps’ to resolve a dispute before proceedings could be 
commenced.
302
 In line with this recommendation, the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) 
requires prospective litigants to lodge a ‘genuine steps statement’ with the court when 
commencing certain civil proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia or in the Federal 
Magistrates Court.
303
 The statement must detail what ‘genuine steps’ the parties have taken to 
resolve the dispute, or the reasons why no such steps were taken. The legislation does not 
mandate particular action but allows the parties involved to decide what steps are most 
appropriate in their circumstances.  
 
A range of case management schemes have also been implemented by rules of court and 
practice directions in all of the major trial courts in relation to all cases.
304
 These schemes 
give courts more responsibility for ensuring efficient management and progression of cases 
through the pre-trial and trial phases. Although judges in common law systems were 
                                                          
300
 For early examples of pre-litigation protocols, see those implemented in the Family Court of Australia (see 
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 1.05 and Sch. 1, Pt. 1 for financial cases and Pt 2 for parenting cases) and those 
implemented for personal injuries actions in Queensland (the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 
4(2), ss 20, 22-30, 36). Other examples of state initiatives include the pre-litigation requirements inserted into 
the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) by the Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 
(NSW) which will commence on a date to be proclaimed. Under this scheme, the parties are required, when 
filing initiating proceedings, to file a dispute resolution statement which specifies the steps taken to try to 
resolve the dispute or to narrow the issues in dispute or to outline the reasons why no steps were taken. The 
Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), which commenced operation on 1 January 2011, also imposed pre-litigation 
requirements on persons involved in a civil dispute (see ss 22, 33, 34 which required the parties to take 
‘reasonable steps’ to resolve their disputes before commencing litigation) but the provisions were repealed by 
the Civil Procedure and Legal Profession Amendment Act 2011 (Vic) which came into operation on 30 March 
2011 and which instead permits the Victorian courts to impose specific protocols for specified civil proceedings. 
301
 See, eg, requirements in relation to compulsory settlement conferences under the Personal Injuries 
Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 36. 
302
 NADRAC, The Resolve to Resolve Report, above n 7, Recommendation 2.1, 35. 
303
 Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 6. The substantive provisions of this legislation commenced on 1 
August 2011. 
304
 These procedural changes have been ongoing since the early 1970’s. The importance of active case 
management as a ‘central judicial function’ was recently emphasised by the Access to Justice Taskforce in its 
Strategic Framework for Access to Justice Report, above n 292, 106-10 and 166. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 68 - 15- Aug-11 
 
historically passive, case management schemes have given rise to the ‘managerial judge’ who 
plays a role in overseeing a case from the time of its inception to its conclusion. Common 
features of case management schemes include the stipulation of a timetable of events for 
proceedings, enforcement of these timelines, procedures requiring early exchange of 
documents and information between the parties and a narrowing of the issues in dispute, and 
mandatory pre-trial hearings and settlement conferences at which further efforts are made to 
settle the dispute and/or to give directions for the continued conduct of the action.
305
  
  
Courts now have some capacity to ‘individualize’ cases especially when an ‘individual 
list’ case management system is used.306 As part of its case management regime, the court has 
tailored procedures to the types of matters involved (for example, there are special procedures 
for personal injury cases and for commercial cases); and it has created different tracks for 
different kinds of cases (assignment of cases usually depends on the amount of the claim 
and/or the complexity of the issues involved).
307
 
 
A predominate feature of all case management schemes is the consideration given to the 
use of ADR procedures. In Australia, matters can be diverted to ADR before proceedings are 
commenced (as evidenced by the pre-litigation protocols of the Family Court);
308
 after 
commencement of proceedings;
309
 and even after trial and before an appeal, if an appeal is 
likely.
310
 In Australia and the United States, the majority of courts have the power to refer 
parties to mediation with or without their consent.
311
 
                                                          
305
 For discussion of the aims and key features of case management schemes, see Wolski, above n 295, 200-201. 
For a list of the court’s supervisory powers, see, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 367 and 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 2.3. 
306
 Case management may take one of two main forms, namely, continuous control by a judge who personally 
monitors a case on an individual basis (referred to as an individual list) and control exercised by requiring the 
parties to report to the court (to a court registrar or master) at fixed milestones (referred to as a master list): 
Colbran et al, above n 77, 31; Wolski, above n 295, 208, footnote 105. 
307
 See, eg, Practice Direction No 6 of 2000 establishing a supervised case list and Practice Direction No 3 of 
2002 (as amended by Practice Direction No 2 of 2008) establishing a commercial list. 
308
 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 1.05 and Sch. 1, Pt. 1 for financial cases and Pt 2 for parenting cases. 
309
 See legislative provisions mentioned below n 311. 
310
 See Supreme Court of Queensland Practice Direction 1 of 2005, Court of Appeal, Part C. Mediation at the 
appellate level ‘appears to be institutionalised’ in some overseas jurisdictions such as the US and Canada. See 
Wolski (and references cited therein), above n 295, 211, footnote 116. 
311
 See, eg, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 53A; Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) s 34; Civil 
Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 195(1); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 26; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
1999 (Qld) rr 320, 323; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2001 (Tas) s 5. In the case of the Family Court of 
Australia, the parties can only be referred to mediation with their consent: see the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 
19B. Similarly, parties in family law or child support proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court can only be 
referred to mediation with their consent. For an account of the legislative position in each jurisdiction in 
Australia, see Spencer and Brogan, above n 1, 272-304. 
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The behaviour of litigants and of their lawyers is now heavily regulated by legislation, 
rules of court and practice directions.
312
 In the absence of specific provisions, parties may 
apply to the court for directions and procedural orders. Courts have the power to sanction 
parties and lawyers for non-compliance with the rules and directions (such sanctions include 
adverse costs orders, removal of a case from the active list and even, the forced hearing of a 
case when a party is not ready to proceed).
313
 
 
Judges in Australia must discharge their official duties in accordance with the Guide to 
Judicial Conduct (2007), a document which ‘assumes a high level of common understanding 
on the part of judges of basic principles of judicial conduct, many of which are the subject of 
settled legal rules’.314 One such principle prohibits judges from seeing litigants and their 
representatives separately.
315
 (There is a ‘reciprocal’ obligation on legal practitioners to 
                                                          
312
 See sources and references, above n 77. On the position in the US, see John Leubsdorf, ‘Legal Ethics Falls 
Apart’ (2009) 57 Buffalo Law Review 959. 
313
 For a more detailed discussion of the court’s power, see Wolski, above n 295, 202-9. 
314
 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, Preface, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2
nd
 ed, 2007), published by the Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA) for the Council of Chief Justices of Australia (hereafter ‘Guide to 
Judicial Conduct’). In the US, see the ABA Model Code of Judicial Code (February 2007) r 2.9. 
315
 Judges do not communicate privately with the parties ‘save in the most exceptional circumstances’: Guide to 
Judicial Conduct, Chapter 4, Clause 4.3. Also see the ABA Model Code of Judicial Code r 2.9. Some judges 
may see the parties separately in some models of judicial mediation (when arguably, they are acting as 
mediators, rather than as judges). This model of judicial mediation seems to be the exception, rather than the 
rule. There is considerable debate on the question of whether or not judges can see the parties separately during 
the conduct of judicial mediations. Justice Marilyn Warren is firmly of the view that ‘[j]udges cannot caucus or 
confer with individual parties on a separate or private basis – mediators ordinarily do that’: see Marilyn Warren, 
‘ADR and a Different Approach to Litigation’ (Paper presented at the Law Institute of Victoria, Melbourne, 18 
March 2009) 3; and Marilyn Warren, ‘Should Judges be Mediators?’ (Paper presented at the Supreme & Federal 
Court Judges’ Conference, Canberra, 27 January 2010) 17. NADRAC has also raised concerns that judicial 
mediation which involves separate sessions with the parties may be incompatible with the constitutional role of 
judges exercising federal jurisdiction (see The Resolve to Resolve Report, above n 7, [7.42]). However, different 
practices appear to be adopted in various jurisdictions in Australia, the US and Canada. On this topic generally, 
see Louise Otis and Eric H Reiter, ‘Mediation by Judges: a New Phenomenon in the Transformation of Justice’ 
(2006) 6 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 351. In his research on the topic of Judicial Mediation, 
Iain Field found some evidence that judge-mediators in the South Australian Supreme Court have engaged in 
separate meetings (although he notes that it is unclear what techniques were employed during the mediations): 
Iain Field, Judicial Mediation and Ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution (PhD Thesis, Bond University, 
2009) 432. However, it seems that when this model is adopted, the judge is precluded from hearing any 
subsequent trial of the matter: see Field, 464; Warren, 2009, 4. 
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refrain from communicating in the opponent’s absence with the court concerning any matter 
of substance in connection with current proceedings).
316
  
 
3.1.2 The Objectives of Litigation 
 
The objectives claimed for litigation include:
317
 
 Resolution of legal disputes according to law318 using procedures considered to be fair 
and ‘acceptable both to the parties and to society’.319  
 Enforcement of legal rights and obligations. In this regard, Saltzburg observes that 
‘[t]he goal of the adversary system is to apply the substantive legal principles so that 
those who have rights may claim them and those who have liabilities must face 
them’.320 
 Behaviour modification. 321  The courts determine right and wrong and penalize 
wrongdoers with the aim of deterring socially unacceptable behaviour.
322
 
 The determination of the truth of the events out of which disputes arise.323  
 The quest for justice in accordance with various social values.324 
 Interpretation and development of the law.325 Courts articulate principles which are 
relevant to the resolution of future legal disputes.
326
 
                                                          
316
 This prohibition is subject to some exceptions. Generally see LCA Model Rules r 18.6; Barristers’ Rules r 
56; draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010 r 22.5; draft Barristers’ Rules 2010 r 53. 
317
 Sward, above n 60, 303. Also see John A Jolowicz, ‘On the Nature and Purposes of Civil Procedural Law’ 
(1990) 9 Civil Justice Quarterly 262, 271. These objectives can be whittled down and divided into primary and 
secondary objectives. Sward claims that the primary objectives of the litigation system are dispute resolution, 
rule-making and behaviour modification: Sward, above n 60, 303. The primary objectives are then ‘tempered’ 
by secondary objectives such as determination of the truth.  
318
 Robert A Hughes, Geoff Leane and Andrew Clarke, Australian Legal Institutions: Principles, Structure and 
Organisation (Thomson Lawbook Co., 2
nd
 ed, 2003) 152; Sward, above n 60, 305; Landsman, above n 60, 713; 
Landsman, above n 287, 492; Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, above n 21, 475; Jolowicz, above n 317, 271. At 
an even more basic and abstract level, Fuller notes that ‘adjudication should be viewed as a form of social 
ordering, as a way in which the relations of men to one another are governed and regulated’: Fuller, above n 
291, 357. 
319
 Landsman, above n 60, 714; Landsman, above n 287, 252; Sward, above n 60, 306; Jolowicz, above n 317, 
271; Israel, above n 291, 6. 
320
 Stephen A Saltzburg, ‘Lawyers, Clients and the Adversary System’ (1986) 37 Mercer Law Review 647, 654. 
Also see Landsman, above n 287, 261. 
321
 Sward, above n 60, 307. 
322
 Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins, above n 6, 952. 
323
 Sward, above n 60, 305; Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins, above n 6, 948, 952; Israel, above n 
291, 6. Also see Menkel-Meadow who refers to the ‘truth-finding’ goal: Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Trouble 
with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World’ (1996-1997) 38 William and Mary Law 
Review 5, 30. 
324
 Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins, above n 6, 948; Sward, above n 60, 305; Menkel-Meadow, 
above n 323, 30; Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, above n 21, 475. Also see Geoffrey C Hazard Jr and Dana A 
Remus, ‘Advocacy Revalued’ (2010-2011) 159 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 751, 756. 
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 The articulation of public values.327 Courts also demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
law.
328
 
 
Today, the courts endeavour to perform their functions using a process which is ‘just, 
accessible, efficient, timely and effective’.329 Hence, to the list of objectives mentioned above 
can be added ‘expeditious’, ‘efficient’, and even ‘accessible’ dispute resolution.330   
 
3.1.3 The Values of Litigation 
 
Important social values are reflected in the objectives mentioned in the last section. 
Litigation is said to promote the values of:  
 Access to the law.331 
 Substantive or social justice332 (through the application of substantive norms which 
recognize values such as human dignity, personal autonomy, protection of individual 
liberties and civil rights).
333
 
 Individualism.334 
 Self-determination, party participation and control.335 
 The truth.336 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
325
 Sward, above n 60, 306; Jolowicz, above n 317, 271. 
326
 Hughes, Leane and Clarke, above n 318, 152. 
327
 Robert A Baruch Bush, ‘Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary 
Conversation’ (1989-1990) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 1, 4. 
328
 Jolowicz, above n 317, 271. 
329
 In its review of the Australian federal civil justice system, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
articulated these five key objectives of the federal system of civil litigation ‘in performing the roles of rule 
making, determination and dispute resolution’: Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Adversarial 
System of Litigation: Rethinking the Federal Civil Litigation System, Issues Paper No 20 (1997) [3.9]-[3.17] 
(hereafter ALRC IP 20). Objectives such as these are now captured in an ‘overriding objective clause’ which 
appears at the beginning of newly introduced civil procedure rules. See, eg, the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
1999 (Qld) which proclaims that the objective of the rules is to ‘facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of 
the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense’: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r. 
5(1). Also see Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 4. 
330
 Maurice Rosenberg, ‘Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?’ (1987-1988) 21 
Creighton Law Review 801, 808-9. 
331
 Peppet, above n 28, 501. 
332
 Sharon Dolovich, ‘Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity’ (2002) 70 Fordham Law Review 1629, 
1634; Jonathan M Hyman, ‘Swimming in the Deep End: Dealing with Justice in Mediation’ (2004-2005) 6 
Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 19, 43; Bush, above n 327, 4. 
333
 See Sward, above n 60, 317-9; Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins, above n 6, 951-2; Israel, above 
n 291, 6; Monroe Freedman, ‘Our Constitutionalized Adversary System’ (1998) 1 Chapman Law Review 57, 57, 
73; Bush, above n 327, 4; Leonard L Riskin, ‘Mediation and Lawyers’ (1982) 43 Ohio State Law Journal 29, 
30. 
334
 Sward, above n 60, 306, 310; Landsman, above n 60, 738. 
335
 Dolovich, above n 332, 1634. 
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 Fair, thorough, predictable and dignified procedures.337 ‘[P]rocedural norms reflect 
values such as community participation, a prescribed procedure, regularity, integrity, 
and promptness in application, and equality of treatment of like cases’.338 
 
Litigation is considered to be a fair means of dispute resolution for two primary reasons 
(these reasons are commonly given for attachment to the adversary system).
339
 First, it 
provides a neutral ground for resolution of disputes by an impartial decision-maker
340
 
(adversary presentation is thought most likely to combat decision-maker bias ie ‘that natural 
human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully 
known’).341 Second, it is believed to promote accurate results (ie to discover the truth) by 
permitting each side to gather and present evidence of relevant facts to the decision-maker.
342
  
 
It is also argued that the adversary process reflects concern for ‘individualized justice’343 
(and that it is a highly individualistic system)
344
 in that it allows each litigant maximum 
control over the kinds of claims that he or she can assert (the court only hears disputes which 
the parties choose to submit to it)
345
 and the way in which those claims will be asserted. 
Litigants exercise control by defining the issues in dispute;
346
 preparing their cases;
347
 and 
presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a favourable decision.
348
 According to Fuller, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
336
 In relation to the significance of truth seeking, Chief Justice Spigelman asserts that ‘[t]he search for truth is a 
fundamental cultural value which, at least in Western civilisation, is a necessary component of social cohesion 
and of progress. The law must reflect that fundamental value and do so at the core of its processes’: James J 
Spigelman, ‘Truth and the Law’ (2011) 85 Australian Law Journal 746, 750. Also see Michael Bayles, 
‘Principles for Legal Procedure’ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 33, 39; Sward, above n 60, 304; Israel, above n 
291, 6; Stephan Landsman, ‘The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain 
Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts’ (1980) 29 Buffalo Law Review 487, 492. 
337
 Landsman, above n 287, 260; Deborah R Hensler, ‘Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology’ 
[2002] Journal of Dispute Resolution 81, 95. 
338
 Israel, above n 291, 6 (citations omitted). 
339
 For discussion of the evolution of the adversary system, see Sward, above n 60, 319-26; Landsman, above n 
60, 717-33. 
340
 Leonard S Rubenstein, ‘Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary System’ (1976) 11 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 48, 48 (citations omitted). 
341
 Fuller, above n 291, 383; Freedman, above n 333, 76. 
342
 Rubenstein, above n 340, 48 (citations omitted); Landsman, above n 60, 714. 
343
 Freedman, above n 333, 87.  
344
 Landsman, above n 60, 738; Sward, above n 60, 353. 
345
 Jolowicz, above n 317, 271. It has to be conceded that this argument only holds true for plaintiffs/applicants.  
Litigation is coercive in the sense that a party against whom proceedings have been instituted must respond or 
risk judgment in default of appearance. 
346
 John A Jolowicz, ‘Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of Civil Procedure’ (2003) 52 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 281, 289. 
347
 Sward, above n 60, 354; Boulle, above n 39, 140. 
348
 Fuller, above n 291, 364. 
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is this last feature which is ‘the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication’.349 Jolowicz also 
points out that it is an idea central to the adversary system that ‘it is for the parties and them 
alone to determine the information on which the judge may base his decision’.350 In this 
sense, the parties have a voice and the power of choice in the adjudication process.
351
 ‘The 
choices made by the parties help focus the litigation upon the issues of greatest importance to 
them and facilitate decisions tailored to their needs’. 352  The litigation process protects 
individual autonomy by giving litigants ‘the greatest possible involvement in, if not control 
over, those decisions that affect our lives in significant ways’.353 
 
3.1.4 Evaluation of the Claims Made for Litigation 
 
Many of the objectives and values claimed for litigation are overstated eg it is 
acknowledged that the adversary system does not discover objective truth but the best 
possible approximation to the truth of the events out of which a particular dispute arose.
354
 
There is no doubt that many people still find court procedures to be complicated and 
expensive.
355
 For those litigants represented by lawyers, their role in litigation may seem non-
participatory at times.
356
 Some authors also doubt that the system preserves individual 
dignity.
357
  
  
                                                          
349
 Ibid. 
350
 Jolowicz, above n 346, 289. 
351
 Sward, above n 60, 310; Landsman, above n 60, 713-4, 738; Jolowicz, above n 317, 278. 
352
 Landsman, above n 287, 495, 525; Landsman, above n 60, 715. 
353
 Freedman, above n 333, 87. Also see Rubenstein, above n 340, 48. 
354
 We recognise that truth is not knowable in an absolute sense. Hazard and Remus note that litigation is 
‘capable of constructing authoritatively-accepted truth’ (not of discovering objective truth): Hazard and Remus, 
above n 324, 780. Also see Freedman, above n 333, 80; John A Jolowicz, ‘The Woolf Report and the Adversary 
System’ (1996) 15 Civil Justice Quarterly 198, 200-201; Sward, above n 60, 304; Landsman, above n 287, 492. 
More recently, see Spigelman, above n 336, 750-1 who discusses the restrictions on truth finding that arise by 
reason of application of a variety of legal rules (including rules of practice and procedure and exclusionary rules 
of evidence). 
355
 The problems may be exacerbated for self-represented litigants. As to continuing concerns about costs, see, 
for instance, the discussion concerning the ‘contemporary concerns about costs in civil litigation’ in Peter 
Cashman, ‘The Cost of Access to Courts’ (Paper presented at the Confidence in the Courts Conference, 
Canberra, 9-11 February 2007) 3-4. 
356
 Nolan-Haley, above n 138, 115. 
357
 Sward, above n 60, 317-9. 
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It may be necessary to give priority to some objectives over others but there is no 
agreement amongst judges and scholars on the order of priority. Some authors assert that 
dispute resolution is the most important objective of the litigation system;
358
 other authors put 
more emphasis on the public functions of the courts eg functions such as articulating public 
values and maintaining the rule of law.
359
 The perspective of individual litigants may also 
differ. While some litigants might be seeking affordable, fair and expeditious dispute 
resolution,
360
 other litigants may be looking for vindication and retribution.
361
 
 
Some of the claims made for litigation may actually conflict eg the objectives of speedy 
and efficient resolution of disputes may conflict with the objectives of individualised justice 
and the search for the truth.
362
 The relative weight to be given to these objectives will depend 
on whether one looks at the system from a societal or individual perspective.
363
 On several 
occasions the courts in Australia have considered the relative weight to be given to overall 
court efficiency on the one hand and the interests of the parties in an individual case on the 
other. In Queensland v JL Holding Pty Ltd,
364
 the High Court of Australia, in a joint 
judgment by Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, stated that ‘the ultimate aim of a court is the 
attainment of justice and no principle of case management can be allowed to supplant that 
aim’.365 According to Bamford, the effect of this case was to significantly undermine case 
management schemes.
366
 Bamford’s view was shared by all members of the High Court of 
Australia in Aon Risk Services Ltd v Australian National University.
367
 In a joint judgment, 
the majority of the court was critical of the views expressed in JL Holdings. The court 
observed: ‘[w]hat may be just, when amendment is sought, requires account to be taken of 
                                                          
358
 Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, above n 21, 475; Jolowicz, above n 317, 270-1; Sward, above n 60, 303; 
Freedman, above n 333, 63; Landsman, above n 287, 492. 
359
 Jolowicz points out that the dispute resolution function is for the benefit of society rather than for private 
citizens. He observes that ‘[c]ourts serve the public but they do not provide services to litigants’: Jolowicz, 
above n 346, 285. Also see Owen Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073, 1076; Fuller, 
above n 291, 357. 
360
 Rosenberg, above n 330, 808-9. 
361
 Craig A McEwen and Thomas W Milburn, ‘Explaining a Paradox of Mediation’ (1993) 9 Negotiation 
Journal 23, 26. 
362
 See eg Landsman who asserts that, historically, the American adversary system (with its passive decision-
maker) has favoured the goal of dispute resolution over the goal of searching for material truth: Landsman, 
above n 287, 492. 
363
 Saltzburg, above n 320, 656. 
364
 (1997) 189 CLR 146. 
365
 (1997) 189 CLR 146. The court overturned a decision of the trial judge not to grant leave to amend pleadings 
on case management grounds. 
366
 David Bamford, Principles of Civil Litigation (Lawbook Co., Thomson Reuters, 2010) 85. 
367
 [2009] HCA 27. See Bamford’s discussion of this case: ibid 86. 
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other litigants, not just the parties to the proceedings in question’.368 The court urged that 
more consideration be given to matters such as the effect of delay (especially in its effect 
upon other litigants) and costs. Bamford concludes that ‘[t]he practical effect of Aon Risk 
Services is yet to be seen but the High Court has reversed the return to the more laissez faire 
approach to litigation that JL Holdings was thought to facilitate.’369  In the future, more 
emphasis may be given to the need to avoid undue delay and waste of public resources and 
less to the interests of the parties in a particular case.  
 
3.2 Mediation 
 
3.2.1 The Features of Mediation 
 
Mediation is a process of negotiation in which an acceptable third party (who need not be 
a lawyer) assists parties in dispute to reach an agreement. The subject matter of mediation 
need not give rise to a legally recognised cause of action. Parties are generally free to select 
the mediator (or mediators, if they choose a co-mediation model).
370
 In mediation, ultimate 
authority for decision-making rests with the parties.  
 
The parties generally participate in mediation on a voluntary basis pursuant to an 
agreement between them. However, increasingly mediation is taking place, with or without 
the parties’ consent, by court referral and pursuant to legislation.371  
 
Mediation takes place in a private forum and the parties may, and generally do, agree that 
the proceedings and the outcome are to remain confidential.
372
 As a consequence, public 
scrutiny of the process and the outcome may be avoided, and no legal precedent is 
established.  
 
                                                          
368
 Aon Risk Services Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27, [95]. Both cases took place in the 
context of requests to amend pleadings late in the proceedings. In Aon’s case, French CJ observed that it was ‘a 
late and deliberate tactical change’: [24]. 
369
 Bamford, above n 366, 87. Also see NADRAC’s discussion of these two cases: The Resolve to Resolve 
Report, above n 7, [7.4]-[7.5]. 
370
 This is not the case in all court and tribunal-annexed mediation schemes or in quasi-government schemes 
such as those run by the state legal aid offices.  
371
 See above n 312. 
372
 There are limits to confidentiality in negotiation and mediation if the matter proceeds to litigation. See the 
discussion above n 255.  
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In most models of mediation, mediators control the process. While there are no fixed 
rules as to the process used, a sequence of stages
373
 can generally be discerned including: an 
opening statement by the mediator; party statements in which the parties, in turn, tell the 
mediator about their concerns and interests (the parties may raise all matters that they 
consider important including their emotional needs); identification by the mediator of areas of 
agreement and also of issues that need to be addressed; a stage in which the parties confer 
with each other for the purpose of generating and exploring multiple options and alternatives 
for settlement; a negotiation stage in which the parties may share information and ideas for 
resolution of the dispute, and a stage in which any agreements reached are fine-tuned and 
finalised. Parties in mediation usually engage in direct communication with each other for at 
least part of the time. But there are also multiple process variables in mediation eg a mediator 
may or may not meet with the parties and their representatives for a preliminary conference; 
may or may not meet the parties jointly (some mediations take place entirely by the mediator 
shuttling back and forth between the parties who are in separate locations); and may or may 
not see the parties with their legal representatives.
374
 Mediators may hold separate meetings 
with each of the parties at intervals throughout the process, a feature which is unique to 
mediation. 
 
Although mediators may ask the parties to prepare documents for use in mediation, there 
is no necessity to prepare and file pleadings as is the case in litigation. Mediators do not have 
the coercive power of judges ie they cannot officially sanction parties for failure to comply 
with a request. Many of the procedural safeguards that exist in litigation, such as mechanisms 
for discovery of documents, are absent in mediation. 
 
A variety of possible solutions may be considered in mediation (this is often considered 
one of the most advantageous features of the process). Parties can reach an agreement that 
reflects common sense or commercial sense rather than strict legal rights. This does not mean 
                                                          
373
 It is common to conceptualise the mediation process as a series of stages. Taylor asserts: [t]he mediation 
process ... has universal process stages despite contextual differences’: Alison Taylor, ‘Concepts of Neutrality in 
Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence, and Transformative Process’ (1997) 14 Mediation Quarterly 
215, 219. Also see Elizabeth F Beyer, ‘A Pragmatic Look at Mediation and Collaborative Law as Alternatives to 
Family Law Litigation’ (2008-2009) 40 St. Mary’s Law Journal 303, 312. However, the number and purpose of 
each stage and the terminology used to describe the stages varies between authors. For example, Moore 
describes mediation as a 12-stage process: Moore, above n 39, 68-9. Boulle describes it in 10 stages (with each 
stage having various sub-stages): Boulle, above n 39, 235-250.  
374
 Some of the possible variable features of mediation are represented in the concept of ‘the mediation abacus’, 
depicted in Boulle, above n 53, 17-8. Also see Boulle, above n 39, 29-30 for a discussion of some of the variable 
features of mediation. 
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that mediation takes place in a legal vacuum. It is said that all negotiations take place in ‘the 
shadow of the law’. 375  Parties in mediation are generally aware of their other dispute 
resolution options and of their legal rights and obligations and they tend to negotiate with 
these in mind. 
 
Agreements reached in mediation are usually not automatically binding but the parties 
may enter into a legally binding contract (if the subject matter involves the formation of legal 
rights and obligations) and some mediated settlements are made the subject of consent orders 
or decrees.
376
 There is generally no provision for appeal or review of a mediated outcome.  
 
Some standards and guidelines for the conduct of mediators have emerged. They are 
discussed later in this part of the exegesis. 
  
3.2.2 The Objectives of Mediation  
 
The following objectives are claimed for mediation:
377
   
 Dispute resolution according to standards agreed by the parties (they may defer to 
legal standards or to any other standards they consider fair and appropriate) using a 
process considered by the parties to be fair.
378
 
 Satisfaction of individual interests or needs.379 
 Self-determination380 and empowerment. Mediation may enhance the parties’ ability 
to resolve future disputes.  
 Recognition (ie a greater openness to, and acceptance of, the other party to the 
dispute).
381
  
                                                          
375
 This phrase is attributed to Robert H Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950. 
376
 Wolski, above n 15, 523. 
377
 Boulle, above n 39, 91-7; Tania Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (Lawbook Co., Thomson Reuters, 
3
rd
 ed, 2008) 18-24; Folberg and Taylor, above n 39, 7-10, 35-6; Peter Adler, Karen Lovaas and Neal Milner, 
‘The Ideologies of Mediation: The Movement’s Own Story’ (1988) 10 Law & Policy 317, 331; and Christine B 
Harrington and Sally E Merry, ‘Ideological Production: The Making of Community Mediation’ (1988) 22 Law 
& Society Review 709, 715; Burns, above n 2, 701. 
378
 NADRAC, A Framework for ADR Standards, Report to the Commonwealth Attorney-General (April 2001) 
13 (‘A Framework for ADR Standards Report’); Boulle, above n 39, 91. 
379
 Bush and Folger, above n 59, 250 (the authors were referring to a problem-solving approach to mediation); 
Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins, above n 6, 942.  
380
 Lande, above n 1, 892. Self-determination may be recognised as a separate value or as part of the 
empowerment value. 
381
 Bush and Folger, above n 59, 89-91.  
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 ‘“[P]roblem-solving,” rather than “adversarial” orientation to legal disputes and 
transactions’.382 
 ‘[A]n orientation to joint, not individualized, problem-solving’.383 
 ‘Responsive and particularized solutions’.384  
 Mutually acceptable outcomes which are also fair and stable.385 
 Outcomes which represent the best alternatives available (or Pareto optimal 
solutions)
386
 and maximization of joint gains.
387
 
 Enhanced relationships (or at least, minimisation of damage to relationships).388  
 Increased access to a ‘higher quality justice’ 389  (ie justice that is responsive to 
individual needs and reflective of the preferences of the parties).
390
 
 Efficiency and effectiveness.391 
 
3.2.3 The Values of Mediation 
 
Mediation is said to be premised on the following values: 
 Party participation and autonomy.392 
                                                          
382
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383
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384
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385
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making the other party worse off’: Gay G Cox and Robert J Matlock, ‘The Case for Collaborative Law’ (2004-
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(1991-1992) 19 Florida State University Law Review 1, 7. 
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 Bush and Folger, above n 59, 250 (the authors were referring to a problem-solving approach to mediation); 
Burns, above n 2, 701. 
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 Burns, above n 2, 701; Shapira, above n 31, 249; Nolan-Haley, above n 6, 1371. 
389
 Bush, Ethical Standards in Mediation, above n 2, 257; Boulle, above n 39, 92; Sourdin, above n 377, 21-2. 
390
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 386, 6; Burns, above n 2, 701. 
391
 See Boulle, above n 39, 92-5 for a discussion of the meaning of these two terms. He describes effectiveness 
primarily in terms of the parties reaching agreement, but notes that there are several dimensions to this 
objective. It also relates to the durability of the agreement over time and the quality of the settlement outcome 
(which itself has several dimensions): Boulle, above n 39, 94-5. 
392
 Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 453; Nolan-Haley, above n 6, 1371; 
Welsh, Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation, above n 385, 16. 
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 Process fairness.393  
 Satisfaction of individual needs. 
 Self-determination394 (promoting ‘subsidiary values of responsibility for choices and 
dignity of individuals’)395 and empowerment ie giving the parties an increased sense 
of their own personal efficacy.
396
  
 Individualism397 which ‘assumes that the parties directly affected by disputes are the 
persons alone, independently of broader social networks, who should be involved in 
their resolution’.398 
 A rational approach to decision-making, which ‘assumes that where the parties can be 
persuaded through argument, reality testing and risk analysis they will assess their 
options objectively and come to a decision which serves their interests’.399 
 Consensuality of outcome.400  
 Efficiency. 
 
Some authors maintain that the ‘values’ of good faith participation, collaboration, and 
openness and honesty are essential at least in interest-based or collaborative negotiation.
401
 
Boulle mentions that non-adversarialism is also an often-cited value of mediation
402
 but he 
correctly notes that ‘mediation provides “non-adversarial values” only in relation to its 
structures, procedures and outcomes, and this may, but does not necessarily, modify 
participants’ attitudes and behaviours.’ 403  Some mediations ‘frequently are quite 
                                                          
393
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394
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395
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396
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adversarial’,404 a fact that does not destroy the nature of mediation. While settlement through 
collaboration is an objective of some mediations, ‘the essential nature of the process is not 
lost if the parties remain adversarial but agree to compromise their differences to avoid a 
strike or to save the expense and uncertainty of litigation.’405 
 
3.2.4 Evaluation of the Claims Made for Mediation 
 
As is the case with litigation, some of the claims made for mediation are overstated.
406
 
For instance, given that many mediations involve no more than a single session of a few 
hours duration, it is unlikely that there is time to modify the parties’ underlying behaviour 
and to improve their capacity to resolve future disputes.
407
 Additionally, the parties do not 
have an unfettered right to determine their own dispute ie they ‘are not entitled to have it 
anyway they want it.’408 This is recognised by the fact that ‘[m]ediated agreements that are 
illegal or against public policy in terms of statute or common law norms will not be 
enforceable.’409 
 
Some of the objectives and values claimed for mediation may conflict.
410
 When 
mediation first emerged in the community environment in the 1970s (giving rise to the phrase 
‘contemporary mediation movement’) 411  it offered an opportunity to minimise state 
intervention in interpersonal disputes. However, the courts and administrative agencies are 
                                                          
404
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now the biggest users of mediation and ADR (as part of their case management initiatives).
412
 
Mediation offers a way to alleviate congestion and delay in the court system. The courts 
emphasise the objectives and values of settlement, speed, efficiency of the judicial system, 
rational allocation of judicial resources and greater access ‘to justice’ at lower costs.413 These 
objectives and values are not necessarily compatible with those of self-determination, 
empowerment, recognition and satisfaction of individual interests. Many commentators 
accuse the courts (and lawyers ‘seeking to maximise client gain’)414 of coopting the process 
of mediation.
415
 However, there has never been consensus regarding the objectives of 
mediation.
416
 And as this discussion highlights, the objectives and values of mediation have 
changed over time.
417
 
 
The priority afforded to various objectives and values differs depending on whether one is 
looking at the issue from the perspective of society, individual disputants, the service 
provider, and the individual mediator – all of whom may select some objectives and values 
over others.
418
 In fact, the very meaning of the objectives changes depending on one’s 
perspective.
419
  
 
In the end, the objectives and values of mediation may depend on the choices made by 
individual mediators. The choice of intervention made by a mediator reflects his or her 
‘conception of the values and goals of the mediation process itself’.420 For this reason, Boulle 
concludes that ‘[u]ltimately ... the values of mediation are to be found in its application by 
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individual practitioners in particular cases.’421 As a result, it is difficult to make generalised 
statements about the objectives and values of mediation.  
 
3.3 Unassisted Negotiation 
 
3.3.1 The Features of Negotiation 
 
Unassisted or direct negotiation takes place whenever two or more parties confer with 
each other for the purpose of reaching an agreement on some issue, without the assistance of 
a third party facilitator such as a mediator. It can take place in a private forum and the parties 
may agree that the proceedings and the outcome are to remain confidential. As is the case 
with mediation, many of the procedural safeguards which exist in litigation, such as rules 
regulating disclosure of information, are absent from negotiation. 
 
Unassisted negotiation has the potential to be the most flexible of all the dispute 
resolution processes (and possibly as a result, it is the most commonly used of all the 
processes).
422
 It affords the parties the greatest control over the process by which their dispute 
is resolved. There are no formal rules or procedures except those agreed to by the parties. In 
reality, most negotiations follow a similar pattern or sequence of steps (described in detail in 
many texts on negotiation).
423
 In particular, it appears that unassisted negotiations involving 
lawyers are fairly predictable in pattern. As MacFarlane points out, unlike mediation, lawyer-
to-lawyer negotiations tend to be highly ritualized in format (with lawyers formulating and 
rebutting substantive arguments based on the application of ‘the law’) often giving rise to a 
predictable and narrow band of ethical dilemmas.
424
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In legal disputes, many parties negotiate with their legal rights in mind. However, there is 
potential to take into account non-legal interests and to fashion ‘creative’ solutions. 
Negotiated outcomes are not automatically binding but there are a number of options 
available to the parties to formalise the agreement and to make it binding.  
 
3.3.2 The Objectives of Negotiation 
 
Negotiation may be used for a number of purposes. For the purpose of this research, the 
primary objective of negotiation is taken to be dispute resolution. In addition, the parties may 
have secondary objectives. They may wish a negotiated agreement to meet certain criteria of 
success such as those articulated by Fisher and Ury, who define a successful agreement as 
one that:
425
 
 meets the legitimate interests of all the parties to the extent possible; 
 represents the best of the alternatives available (that is, it maximises the benefits and 
minimises the costs to all the parties); 
 defines future cooperative interaction between the parties; 
 is durable; and 
 is reached through a fair process (without tactics such as threats) that promotes a good 
relationship between the parties or, at least, does not adversely affect their 
relationship. 
 
According to Fisher and Ury, a successful agreement also takes community interests into 
account. 
 
Alternatively, a party might simply want to reach an agreement, by whatever means are 
necessary (short of those that are illegal) that maximises his or her interests (limited only by 
the requirements of substantive law). 
 
The objectives of most negotiations involving lawyers probably lie somewhere in 
between these two extremes: to reach a settlement that maximises the client’s interests, takes 
the other party’s interests into account tolerably well (at least to the extent needed to achieve 
                                                          
425
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an agreement), is mindful of the interests of third parties and stays within the parameters of 
substantive law requirements.  
 
3.3.3 The Values of Negotiation 
 
Negotiation shares many of the same values as mediation, such as those of party 
participation, party autonomy and self-determination, satisfaction of individual needs and 
interests, and consensuality of outcomes. 
 
3.4 Mediation: A Study in Diversity 
 
3.4.1 Emerging Models of Mediation 
 
Over time different styles of mediation have developed and received recognition. These styles of 
mediation differ from each other in the way they describe the purpose of mediation (and in the 
values to which priority is given) and the role of the mediators.
426
 
 
A number of different styles or models of mediation have been identified. Boulle 
identifies four paradigm models – the settlement, facilitative, therapeutic and evaluative 
models.
427
 The four models highlight the diversity of mediation practice and the fact that the 
objectives and values of mediation ultimately depend on the model favoured by the 
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mediator
428
 (and where the parties have a choice in the mediator, upon the model preferred by 
the parties). The fact that different models have been identified also highlights the lack of 
consensus by mediation practitioners and academics over the ‘proper’ objectives, values and 
practice of mediation. The models are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Mediators in the settlement model of mediation tend to favour positional negotiation. 
Their interventions are aimed at moving the parties from fixed positions to a point of 
compromise. The main objective of settlement mediation is ‘[t]o encourage incremental 
bargaining towards compromise, at a “mid” point between parties’ original positional 
demands’. 429  Mediators and parties using this model are concerned with the values of 
‘compromise, effectiveness and efficiency’. 430  Values such as party participation and 
empowerment are not a priority or even necessary elements of the process used.  
 
In the facilitative model, mediator interventions are aimed at improving the processes of 
communication and negotiation between the parties. The objective of facilitative mediation is 
‘[t]o avoid positions and negotiate in terms of parties’ personal and commercial needs and 
interests instead of legal rights and duties’.431 In this model, participants will favour interest-
based or integrative negotiation,
432
 party participation and active listening to search for 
solutions which satisfy the parties’ legal and non-legal interests.433 As for values, Boulle 
notes that this model ‘is based on values of self-determination, the relative priority of 
interests over rights and the need to acknowledge and validate views and emotions’.434 It 
stresses the value of satisfaction of the individual’s needs and desires.435  
 
As suggested by its label, mediators in the therapeutic model use professional therapeutic 
techniques and focus on relationship issues.
436
 In this model, reaching agreement is not the 
primary concern. The therapeutic model of mediation is aimed at dealing ‘with underlying 
                                                          
428
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causes of parties’ problems, with a view to improving their relationship, through recognition 
and empowerment, as a basis for resolution of the dispute’.437 Its values are empowerment for 
self ie giving the parties an increased sense of their own personal efficacy with respect to 
process, goals, options, skills, resources and decision-making,
438
 and recognition of the 
other
439
 ie creating a greater openness to and acceptance of the person seated on the other side 
of the table
440
 by improving the pattern of interaction and communication between them.
441
 
 
In the evaluative model, mediators play a highly interventionist role. They may give the 
parties legal advice and offer them an opinion as to the range of outcomes likely to be handed 
down by a court. The objective in this model of mediation is ‘[t]o reach a settlement 
according to the legal (or other) rights and entitlements of the parties and within the 
anticipated range of court, tribunal or industry outcomes.’442 Evaluative mediation tends to be 
the province of high profile lawyers and substantive experts who develop their own opinion 
about preferable settlement options and may try to influence the parties to accept them.
443
 
Boulle observes that evaluative mediation ‘assumes the value of the mediator’s experience 
and expertise in guiding parties to accept normative or standard outcomes’.444 It honours the 
values of efficiency and protection of rights.
445
 
 
These styles or paradigm models are not distinct alternatives to one another.
446
 They may 
operate in tandem eg a mediator might commence in the facilitative mode, but later move into 
the settlement or evaluative modes
447
 or they may operate simultaneously eg a mediator 
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might use techniques associated with two, three or four models in a single mediation. This 
type of behaviour ie the use of a variety of styles by mediators during a single mediation (or 
even a single meeting with the parties) is the norm ‘rather than the exception in the mediation 
of civil legal disputes’.448 
 
3.4.2 Self-determination: A Central Value of Mediation 
  
Despite the diversity of mediation practice, there is wide agreement that party self-
determination is central to all models of mediation. It has been called ‘[t]he controlling 
principle of mediation’;449  the driving value behind mediation;450  ‘the most fundamental 
principle of mediation’;451 and the value that ‘grounds every model of mediation’.452 Alfini 
claims that self-determination is ‘the one value that distinguishes mediation from other 
dispute resolution processes’. 453  Standards of conduct for mediators also emphasise the 
importance of party self-determination.
454
 The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators in 
the US define self-determination as ‘the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in 
which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome’.455  
 
Informed consent on the part of the parties is essential to self-determination.
456
 The 
parties must have sufficient information (including information as to the available 
alternatives to an offered settlement) to make an informed decision. 
 
According to relevant literature, the parties must also be able to make a decision 
voluntarily, absent coercion.
457
 I have argued previously that the parties in mediation are 
always subject to some degree of pressure to settle, much of it coming from the mediator, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and he has replaced the grid with a series of grids differentiating between types of decision-making to make it 
more dynamic rather than static: Riskin, above n 427, 30, 34-50. 
448
 Dwight Golann, ‘Variations in Mediation: How - and Why – Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of 
a Case’ (2000) Journal of Dispute Resolution 41, 42; Riskin, above n 427, 14; Stempel, above n 472, 263. 
449
 Nolan-Haley, above n 6, 1374. 
450
  Lela Porter Love, ‘Mediation: The Romantic Days Continue’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 735, 739.   
451
 Alfini, above n 393, 830; John D Feerick, ‘Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators’ (1997) 38 
South Texas Law Review 455, 460; Laflin, above n 73, 496.   
452
 Field, above n 3, 181. 
453
 Alfini, above n 393, 831. 
454
 See Australian National Mediator Standards, Practice Standards for Mediators Operating Under the National 
Mediator Accreditation System, September 2007, s 2.4.  
455
 Discussed in Laura E Weidner, ‘Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators’ (2005-2006) 21 Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution 547, 556; Imperati, above n 433, 714. 
456
 Weckstein, above n 42, 530. 
457
 Ibid 560. 
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that they always have the ability to accept or reject any particular outcome.
458
 This is the one 
constant feature of all definitions and models of mediation. Nolan-Haley agrees with this 
view, maintaining that it is the parties’ retention of decision-making responsibility that 
distinguishes mediation from litigation.
459
 With this in mind, Weckstein observes that ‘[t]he 
challenge is to construct and conduct a mediation that maximizes disputant determination and 
avoids mediator coercion and uninformed disputants.’460 
 
3.4.3 The Debate Concerning Evaluative Mediation 
 
While all stakeholders in the mediation community agree that parties need to make an 
informed decision, there is some disagreement regarding the appropriate methods of 
informing them. This is an especially sensitive matter when there is an imbalance in 
knowledge between the parties as might be the case if only one party is (competently) 
represented. The argument might be made that the parties should inform each other – an 
argument which would support commentators who call for complete candour and honesty in 
mediation. I deal with this argument in part 4 of the exegesis. In particular, disagreement in 
the mediation community centres on what role the mediator should play in informing the 
parties. This disagreement lies at the heart of the debate about the appropriateness of 
evaluative mediation.
461
 
 
Some authors oppose the concept (and practice) of evaluative mediation.
462
 They 
maintain that mediation should be solely facilitative in nature.
463
 Other authors are in favour 
of evaluative mediation
464
 principally on the grounds that it can further the objective and 
                                                          
458
 See generally Bobette Wolski, ‘Mediator Settlement Strategies: Winning Friends and Influencing People’ 
(2001) 12 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 248. 
459
 Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, ‘Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated 
Decisionmaking’ (1999) 74 Notre Dame Law Review 775, 790-1. Also see the definition of mediation offered 
by Weckstein, above n 42, 508. Even mandatory mediation still allows the parties self-determination.  As 
Boettger observes in relation to mandatory mediation, ‘the right to decline settlement preserves the fundamental 
fairness and voluntariness of mediation’: Boettger, above n 199, 12, footnote 52. 
460
 Weckstein, above n 42, 502. 
461
 See, eg, Moberly, above n 2, 669; Stark, above n 113.  
462
 See, eg, Lela Love, ‘The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate’ (1997) 24 Florida State 
University Law Review 937. 
463
 Kimberlee K Kovach and Lela P Love, ‘“Evaluative” Mediation is an Oxymoron’ (1996) 14 Alternatives to 
High Cost of Litigation 31. Kimberlee K Kovach and Lela P Love, ‘Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s 
Grid’ (1998) 3 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 71, 79-80 (“Mapping Mediation”). These authors criticise 
Riskin’s grid for tending to legitimate evaluative activities: Kovach and Love, Mapping Mediation, 73. 
Generally see James J Alfini, ‘Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion’ (1997) 24 Florida State 
University Law Review 919.  
464
 Weckstein, above n 42, 552. 
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value of self-determination
465
 and that it ‘may be necessary in some cases to serve other 
acknowledged values, such as fairness, balance of power, needs and interests, and full 
disclosure’.466 
 
Beneath the surface of this debate, there is disagreement on what is, and what is not, an 
evaluative intervention. Some of the authors who argue that mediation should be solely 
facilitative actually approve of the use of interventions which could fall into the evaluative 
category eg challenging proposals that seem unrealistic or suboptimal and ‘making 
suggestions about possibilities for resolution in order to stimulate the parties to generate 
options’.467 Stark would label these interventions as evaluative. He observes that evaluative 
mediation is not one behaviour: 
 
but a continuum of behaviours, ranging from asking parties questions about case strengths and 
weaknesses, to providing information, to giving procedural and substantive advice, to making 
predictions of possible or probably court outcomes, to suggesting possible bases for resolving a 
dispute.
468
 
 
Although much of the literature, discussion and training in mediation gravitates towards 
the facilitative model, so much so that it is sometimes referred to as the ‘standard’ model469 
(it is ‘the style most frequently acknowledged publically by mediators’),470 there is evidence 
that evaluative mediation is extensively used and accepted.
471
 The most highly sought after 
mediators are those who provide evaluative feedback.
472
 Research also shows that the use of 
                                                          
465
 Ibid 503. Even Welsh concedes that ‘mediator evaluation has the potential to aid party self-determination’: 
Welsh, Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation, above n 385, 57. 
466
 Moberly, above n 2, 678 (citations omitted). 
467
 Kovach and Love, Mapping Mediation, above n 463, 79-80. Stempel observes that many so-called 
‘facilitative’ interventions also have an evaluative dimension: Jeffrey W Stempel, ‘Beyond Formalism and False 
Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator’s Role’ (1997) Florida State 
University Law Review 949, 960. 
468
 Stark, above n 113, 774 (citations omitted). 
469
 Boulle, above 39, 43. Also see Field, above n 2, 8 (who claims that facilitative mediation is the ‘dominant 
model of mediation practised in Australia’ although no evidence is given to support this claim). 
470
 Imperati, above n 433, 711. 
471
 Weckstein, above n 42, 525; Welsh, Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation, above n 385, 26. 
Some models predominate in specific types of disputes (eg personal injury disputes tend to be evaluative in 
nature) or in mediations administered by certain types of institutions (eg community dispute resolution centres 
are more likely to use a facilitative model): Weckstein, above n 42, 507. 
472
 Jeffrey W Stempel, ‘The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology’ [2000] Journal of 
Dispute Resolution 247, 264; Stempel, above n 467, 973; Lande, above n 1, 851. 
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evaluative techniques is frequent in the mediation of civil legal disputes
473
 ‘even among 
mediators who favour a broad, facilitative approach’.474 
 
Evaluative mediation is recognised by the Australian National Mediator Standards. The 
standards acknowledge that some mediators may use a ‘blended process’ model such as 
evaluative mediation or advisory mediation which may involve the provision of expert 
information and advice (including an opinion as to the range of outcomes likely to be handed 
down by a court) provided it is requested by the parties and is the subject of clear consent 
(normally ‘given through the use of a mediation or similar agreement’).475 
 
Whatever one’s view on this debate, it has to be acknowledged that there are at least three 
potential problems with evaluative mediation: too much intervention by the mediator can 
impair self determination;
476
 intervention can take place without the parties knowing about it 
(because mediators can be subtle); and research shows that evaluative mediation ‘may 
incorporate practices that systematically favour the participation of one party over 
another’.477  As Stulberg notes, ‘the decision to be “evaluative” rather than “facilitative” in 
one’s orientation has serious repercussions with respect to the fairness of the process and the 
justice of the ensuring results’.478 
 
Evaluative mediation certainly seems to be inconsistent with common conceptions about 
mediators and mediation ie that mediators are neutral and impartial and only facilitate 
negotiations (leaving the content and outcome of mediation to the parties). 
 
In fact, a substantial body of research has provided evidence that mediators do not share common 
motives and orientations, are not ‘neutral’ in any absolute sense, and in fact actively influence 
what the parties can and cannot do in a mediation session in various ways, often coercively.
479
 
 
The themes captured in this quotation are explored in more detail in the next section.  
                                                          
473
 Golann, above n 448, 42. 
474
 Ibid. 
475
 Australian National Mediator Standards, Practice Standards for Mediators Operating Under the National 
Mediator Accreditation System, September 2007, ss 2.7, 10.5. See below n 494 for an explanation of this 
system. 
476
 Riskin, above n 427, 19. 
477
 Joseph B Stulberg, ‘Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock’ (1996-
1997) 24 Florida State University Law Review 985, 993. 
478
 Ibid 994. 
479
 Noce, Bush and Folger, above n 411, 43 (citations omitted). 
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3.4.4 Factors Affecting Mediator Interventions 
 
There is no consensus among mediation practitioners and scholars regarding the general 
approach to mediation which should be adopted by mediators
480
 and as to ‘mediator skills and 
behaviours that should characterize the mediation process’.481  Mediators undertake a range 
of roles and functions (notwithstanding that these functions may be grouped broadly into 
categories for the purpose of analysis).
482
  
 
Mediations will differ between mediators; they will even differ between mediations 
conducted by the same mediator. Important determinants of the strategies chosen by 
mediators include:
483
 
 The mediator’s own personality and style. 
 The training received by the mediator and the original professional orientation of the 
mediator.
484
 
 The model of mediation (or combination of models)485 preferred and used by the 
mediator.  
 The interests of the mediator. 
 The cultural background of the mediator and of the parties for ‘[c]ultural precepts bar 
or hinder some strategies and enjoin others’.486 
 The context in which the mediation takes place eg whether it takes place within the 
context of public policy, commerce, employment or the family. 
                                                          
480
 Bush, Ethical Standards in Mediation, above n 2, 257. On the continuing debate over the role of mediators, 
see Brad Honoroff and Susan Opotow, ‘Mediation Ethics: A Grounded Approach’ (2007) 23 Negotiation 
Journal 155, 157; Moore, above n 39, 43-56; Boulle, above n 39, 43.   
481
 Welsh, above n 1, 575-6. This can make the question of mediator immunity tricky. Many schemes grant 
mediator’s immunity for actions undertaken in their role as mediator. 
482
 Boulle categorises mediator roles and functions into four general categories: creating favourable conditions 
for the parties’ decision-making; assisting the parties to communicate; facilitating the parties’ negotiations; and 
encouraging the parties to settle: see Boulle, above n 39, 268-76. He notes that each category ‘encompasses a 
range of specific interventions in carrying out the general function’: 268.  
483
 Boulle, above n 39, 267-8; Wolski, above n 458, 256-7. 
484
 Mediators tend to have a primary profession of origin (eg law) that generally includes ethical codes. They 
may continue to be subject to these codes when they mediate. They may also be strongly influenced by the 
norms and practices of their original profession. 
485
 Boulle, above n 39, 267-8. 
486
 P H Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-cultural Perspective (Academic Press, 1979) 220. On the 
effect of culture on choice of strategy, see Wall and Lynn, above n 406, 169; Wolski, above n 41. Since many of 
the values of mediation are culturally based, they may not be shared by mediators or parties from non-Western 
societies: Harold Abramson, ‘Crossing Borders into New Ethical Territory: Ethical Challenges When Mediating 
Cross-Culturally’ (2007-2008) 49 South Texas Law Review 921. 
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 The characteristics of the parties eg whether they are sophisticated professionals or 
relatively unsophisticated ‘first-timers’ in a family law matter.487 
 The nature of the relationship between the parties and in particular, whether or not 
they are relatively equal in power. 
 The nature of the dispute eg whether it is high or low conflict. 
 The terms of any formal agreement to mediate and of any applicable professional 
standards. 
 The institutional or agency setting in which the mediation takes place. Mediation will 
differ depending on whether it is private or court-based; and it will differ between 
service providers. 
 ‘[T]he proximity of the dispute to the law’488 and the existence (or nonexistence) of a 
judicial alternative if mediation fails to resolve the dispute.
489
 
 The time pressure operating on the parties. 
 The likely outcomes of the mediation and the effect on the parties themselves and 
other affected parties.
490
 
 
It is beyond the scope of this research to examine all of the factors listed above. In the 
discussion which follows, reference is made to two factors, mediator interests and the 
emerging standards of conduct for mediators. I am particularly interested in examining the 
motivation for, and scope afforded, mediators to influence the course and outcome of 
mediation. 
 
3.4.5 Standards of Conduct for Mediators 
 
In all respects for the purpose of this research, it is assumed that mediators adhere to 
currently established ethical guidelines for mediators. Ethical standards and guidelines have 
been developed for lawyer mediators in most jurisdictions by peak national bodies (in 
Australia, the Law Council of Australia and the Australian Bar Association)
491
 and by the 
                                                          
487
 Shapiro, Drieghe and Brett, above note 70, 113. 
488
 Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (Butterworths, 1996) 25. 
489
 Wolski, above n 72, 43-4 [67]. 
490
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 16, xiv. 
491
 See LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) which are separate from the LCA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice (at 16 March 2002). Also see the Australian Bar Association Model 
Rules (8 December 2002) rr 117-118 (‘Rules Regulating Barristers as Mediators’) which have been 
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state and territory law societies and bar associations to which lawyers belong.
492
 Additionally, 
relevant mediator standards have been developed by a number of other ADR practitioner 
accreditation organisations whose membership is not restricted to lawyers.
493
 Most recently, 
standards have been promulgated in connection with the National Mediator Accreditation 
System (hereafter NMAS) which commenced operation in Australia on 1 January 2008.
494
 
While the NMAS Practice Standards are not classed as ethical standards, they provide some 
instruction on areas of practice likely to have ethical implications.
495
 Some standards have 
also been developed to govern the practice of mediation in particular subject-matter areas 
with family law being the best example
496
 and others have been developed to cover mediators 
in court-connected programs (regardless of the subject-matter).
497
 
 
Most standards define the mediator’s role in general terms as one in which he or she 
‘facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting uncoerced agreement by the parties to the 
dispute’.498 Mediators are tasked with facilitating communication, promoting understanding, 
and assisting the parties to negotiate an agreement.
499
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
incorporated into the existing general professional practice rules for barristers (these have not been retained in 
the draft Barristers’ Rules 2010). For the position in the US, see below n 493. 
492
 See, eg, Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 
January 2008); Queensland Law Society, Standards of Conduct for Solicitor Mediators (at 23 September 1998). 
Also see the Mediation Rule in the Law Society of Western Australia’s Professional Conduct Rules (December 
2005 Revision) r 8. 
493
 See, eg, the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia, Principles of Conduct for Mediators (2003). In 
the US, see the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association (Section of Dispute 
Resolution) and the Association for Conflict Resolution (formerly the Society of Professionals in Dispute 
Resolution), Joint Standards, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005).  
494
 The National Mediator Accreditation System (hereafter NMAS) is not restricted to lawyers. It is described as 
‘an industry based system which relies on voluntary compliance by mediator organisations that agree to accredit 
mediators in accordance with the requisite standards’. Such organisations are referred to as Recognised 
Mediator Accreditation Bodies (RMABs). Some existing mediator organisations, such as the state and territory 
law societies, have opted into the NMAS ie, they have become RMABs. In order to be approved (and to 
maintain ongoing approval) by a RMAB under the NMAS, mediators must meet the Approval Standards and 
they must commit to observe a set of thirteen practice standard for the conduct of mediation. See the Australian 
National Mediator Standards, Practice Standards For Mediators Operating Under the National Mediator 
Accreditation System (at September 2007) (‘NMAS Practice Standards’). 
495
 They are also tied into other ethical guidelines for standard 5.7 of the NMAS Practice Standards specifically 
provides that ‘Mediators should adhere to, and be familiar with, the code of conduct or ethical standards 
prescribed by the organisation or association with which they have membership’. 
496
 See, eg, the ‘obligations’ imposed on Family Dispute Resolution Practitioners by the Family Law (Family 
Dispute Resolution Practitioners) Regulations 2008 (Cth). In the US, see the Model Standards of Practice for 
Family and Divorce Mediation (2001). 
497
 Also see the National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs and the Florida Rules for Certified 
and Court-Appointed Mediators (the latter being considered the most developed state standards in the US): 
Weckstein, above n 42, 527; Welsh, Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation, above n 385, 33. 
498
 LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) s 1. Also see the Law Society of New South 
Wales, Revised Guidelines for Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 2008) s 2.1; and the Mediation 
Rule in the Law Society of Western Australia Professional Conduct Rules (December 2005 Revision) r 8.1. For 
an academic’s account of the mediator’s role, see Weston, above n 187, 598. Mediator functions are specified in 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 94 - 15- Aug-11 
 
 
The standards point to the existence of at least six central overlapping duties owed by 
mediators to the parties to a mediation (these duties are also founded in contract ie the 
Agreement to Mediate in the case of private mediations; in tort and in equity relying on a 
fiduciary relationship between the mediator and the parties).
500
 The duties are:
501
 a duty to 
exercise reasonable care and skill in the conduct of the mediation (ie mediators owe the 
parties a duty of competence);
502
 a duty to maintain procedural fairness;
503
 a duty to maintain 
impartiality towards the parties
504
 coupled with a duty to avoid actual and potential conflicts 
of interest;
505
 a duty to maintain the confidentiality of anything said or done at the 
mediation
506
 (which duty is subject to a number of exceptions);
507
 and a duty to terminate the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
more detail in the Queensland Law Society, Standards of Conduct for Solicitor Mediators (at 23 September 
1998) s 2. 
499
 LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) s 1. Also see Queensland Law Society, Standards 
of Conduct for Solicitor Mediators (at 23 September 1998) s 2. 
500
 The mediator is not an agent of any one party. ‘Rather, the mediator has a duty to serve the parties and the 
situation in the aggregate rather than to represent either party as such’: Stempel, above n 472, 263, footnote 65. 
501
 For a list of matters with respect to which mediators under the NMAS Practice Standards are required to have 
ethical understanding, see NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 7.3.c. For a discussion of the position 
under the Joint Standards, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005), see Weidner, above n 455. 
502
 The NMAS Practice Standards provide that mediators ‘should be competent and have the capacity to apply 
knowledge, skills and an ethical understanding and commitment’ in a range of enumerated areas: NMAS 
Practice Standards, above n 494, s 7.3. Also see LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) s 4, 
comment (a).   
503
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 9 (the standard sets out eight more specific mediator duties aimed 
at ensuring procedural fairness). Also see the Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for 
Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 2008) s 4.3. Some authors express the view that mediators owe a 
duty of loyalty to the process ie to ensure integrity of process: Laflin, above n 73, 481. It might be better 
expressed as a duty owed to the parties to ensure that the process is conducted in certain ways. See, eg, Joint 
Standards, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005) s VI: Quality of Process (which requires the 
mediator to advance, among other things, party participation, procedural fairness and mutual respect).  
504
 See, eg, NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 5. Also see LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at 
February 2006) ss 1 and 2; the Mediation Rule in the Law Society of Western Australia Professional Conduct 
Rules (December 2005 Revision) r 8.3; the Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for Solicitors 
who act as Mediators (at 1 January 2008) s 5; Joint Standards, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators 
(2005) s II. For a discussion of the Joint Model Standards, see Paula M Young, ‘Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give 
Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR, and AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators’ (2006) 5 
Appalachian Journal of Law 195, 209. 
505
 A mediator must disclose any factors which might create a conflict of interest: see NMAS Practice Standards, 
above n 494, s 5.2; the Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for Solicitors who act as 
Mediators (at 1 January 2008) s 5.4; LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006), s 3; and the 
Mediation Rule in the Law Society of Western Australia Professional Conduct Rules (December 2005 Revision) 
r 8.4. For a discussion on the mediator’s duty to avoid a conflict of interests under the Joint Standards, Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005), see Young, above n 504, 210, 214-215. 
506
 The Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 
2008) s 6. Also see LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) s 5; NMAS Practice Standards, 
above n 494, s 6; and the Mediation Rule in the Law Society of Western Australia Professional Conduct Rules 
(December 2005 Revision) r 8.7. Generally, see MacFarlane, above n 31, 52, 77. 
507
 The limitations will be set out in the agreement to mediate (if there is one) or the statute pursuant to which 
the mediation takes place and the standards of conduct. Also see the LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at 
February 2006) s 5 and NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 6.1(d) which provides the following 
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process in certain circumstances.
508
 This last duty raises an issue which is still open to debate 
ie the question of whether mediators also owe a duty to ensure a fair outcome.  
  
The discussion which follows touches on those aspects of these duties most central to this 
exegesis – it does not cover the issues of conflict of interest and confidentiality in detail. 
 
A Duty of Competence: The standards of conduct provide that mediators should be 
competent ie they should have the capacity to apply knowledge, skills and an ethical 
understanding and commitment in a range of enumerated areas, sufficient to satisfy the 
reasonable expectation of the parties.
509
 In reality, the scope of the duty of competence (and 
the tasks required to be performed to discharge that duty) depends on what the mediator 
perceives his or her role to be, which depends on the model/s of mediation favoured by the 
mediator and the purpose/s of the mediation, such as whether it is primarily to settle disputes, 
to improve the way the parties communicate, to facilitate negotiations, to promote 
transformation of the parties and their relationship or to evaluate the parties’ respective 
claims.  
 
A Duty to Ensure Procedural Fairness (and Terminate in Certain Circumstances): 
Whatever model of mediation is chosen by the mediator, the duty of competence includes a 
duty to ensure procedural fairness. In scoping out the mediator’s duty in relation to 
procedural matters, the NMAS Practice Standards speak to the mediator:
510
 
1. supporting the parties to ‘reach any agreement freely, voluntarily, without undue 
influence, and on the basis of informed consent’;511 
2. providing the parties with an opportunity to speak and to be heard and to articulate 
their interests and concerns; 
3. encouraging and supporting ‘balanced negotiations’; and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exception: ‘where permitted by existing ethical guidelines or requirements and the information discloses an 
actual or potential threat to human life or safety’. 
508
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 7.3.c. 
509
 For a more detailed discussion of the competences required by mediators, see Wolski, above n 15, 644-5. 
Also see NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 7.3; LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 
2006) s 4, comment (a); the Mediation Rule in the Law Society of Western Australia Professional Conduct 
Rules r 8.6. Also see Weckstein, above n 42, 519; Honoroff and Opotow, above n 480, 157; Bush, Ethical 
Standards in Mediation’, above n 2, 258-9. 
510
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, ss 9.1, 9.2, 9.4, 9.7 respectively. 
511
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 9.1. 
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4. ‘supporting the participants in assessing the feasibility and practicality of any 
proposed agreement’ taking into account the parties’ interests and where appropriate 
the interests of third parties, while leaving primary responsibility for resolution of the 
dispute with the parties. 
 
The NMAS Practice Standards impose an obligation on mediators to recognise and 
manage power imbalances.
512
 The standards also recommend that mediators be alert to 
parties and advisers misusing mediation (eg to delay other proceedings or to buy time to 
divert assets), or otherwise acting in bad faith.
513
 The NMAS Practice Standards and the LCA 
Ethical Guidelines for Mediators allow mediators to terminate the process if they consider 
that one or more of the parties is abusing the process or that ‘there is no reasonable prospect 
of success’.514 The agreement of the parties is not required in these circumstances. 
 
The difficulty for mediators is to intervene to balance power and negotiations without 
negatively impacting the appearance of impartiality. 
 
A Duty to Remain Impartial: Most standards of conduct require mediators to conduct 
mediation in an impartial manner. For example, the NMAS Practice Standards provide that a 
mediator ‘must conduct the dispute resolution process in an impartial manner and adhere to 
ethical standards of practice’. 515  The standard defines impartiality as ‘freedom from 
favouritism or bias either in word or action, or the omission of word or action, that might give 
the appearance of such favouritism or bias’.516 
 
  
                                                          
512
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 4. 
513
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 11.1. Also see the Law Society of New South Wales, Revised 
Guidelines for Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 2008) s 8 which provides for termination of the 
mediation in certain circumstances. The broadest provision is contained in the Law Society of New South 
Wales, Guidelines for Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 2008) – it provides that each of the parties 
and the mediator has the right to withdraw from mediation at any time and for any reason without the agreement 
of the others: s 8.4.1. 
514
 LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) s 6. Also see NMAS Practice Standards, above n 
494, s 11.2. 
515
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 5. Also see LCA, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 
2006) s 1 and 2; and the Mediation Rule in the Law Society of Western Australia Professional Conduct Rules 
(December 2005 Revision) r 8.3. 
516
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 5.1. 
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I have argued previously that mediators may not be impartial if ‘impartiality’ is taken to 
mean an absence of bias or preference in favour of one or other of the parties.
 517
 Mediators 
often develop such preferences. Not all authors agree with this view. Boulle regards 
impartiality as a core requirement in mediation. (Neutrality, he notes, is a less absolute 
requirement.)
518
 By impartiality, Boulle means ‘an even-handedness, objectivity and fairness 
towards the parties during the mediation process’.519  ‘It seems that what is really being 
emphasised is the need to be perceived to be impartial.’520 
 
Early definitions of mediation also commonly referred to the mediator as a neutral third 
party
521
 but in recent years, the concept of mediator neutrality has come under scrutiny (and 
the reference to neutrality has disappeared from some of the standards and definitions).
522
 
There is growing recognition that mediators cannot be neutral if ‘neutrality’ is taken to refer 
to disinterest in the outcome of a dispute and absence of influence over the outcome. As some 
authors put it, mediators lack neutrality ‘in any absolute sense’.523 
 
  
                                                          
517
 Wolski, above n 458, 249. 
518
 Boulle, above n 53, 20-1. In the most recent edition of this text, Boulle draws a distinction between three 
elements of neutrality ie, disinterestedness, independence and impartiality: Boulle, above 39, 73-4. He asserts 
that impartiality is essential but that the other two aspects of neutrality can be waived: Boulle, above n 39, 75. 
519
 Boulle, above 39, 73, 77. 
520
 Wolski, above n 458, 249. In fact, Weckstein maintains that ‘[t]he more realistic ethical standards for the 
practice of mediation do not mandate that a mediator be a neutral or impartial person but only require that the 
mediator act impartially’: Weckstein, above n 42, 510. Also see Gulliver, above n 486, 211; Weckstein, above n 
42, 509-10; Kressel and Pruitt, above n 406, 190. MacFarlane also argues that ‘since notions of impartiality and 
expertise are inevitably culturally specific, they may not be universally embraced by mediators’: MacFarlane, 
above n 31, 52. 
521
 In the first edition of his popular text on mediation, Moore described mediators as ‘acceptable, impartial, and 
neutral’ third parties: Moore, above n 68, 14. In a later edition of the text, he describes mediators merely as 
‘acceptable’ third parties: Moore, 39, 15.  
522
 See, eg, NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 5 (although neutrality is mentioned in s 7); LCA, Ethical 
Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) ss 1 and 2; the Mediation Rule in the Law Society of Western 
Australia’s Professional Conduct Rules (December 2005 Revision) r 8.3. Also see Queensland Law Society, 
Standards of Conduct for Solicitor Mediators (at 23 September 1998) s 4.1 (although the heading mentions 
neutrality).  
523
 Susan Douglas, ‘Neutrality in Mediation: A Study of Mediator Perceptions’ (2008) 8 Queensland University 
of Technology Law and Justice Journal 139, 150; Tony Bogdanoski, ‘The “Neutral” Mediator’s Perennial 
Dilemma: to Intervene or Not to Intervene’ (2009) 9 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice 
Journal 26, 39. Also see Burns who speaks of ‘the practical elusiveness of true or complete neutrality in the 
conduct of the mediation’: Burns, above n 2, 702.  
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The concept of mediator neutrality has not been entirely abandoned, at least, not by some 
commentators.
524
 Several authors recommend a movement away from a binary construct of 
neutrality (as something that either does or does not exist) and urge instead that mediator 
neutrality be reconceptualised or reframed as a situated, contextual concept
525
 although 
authors vary slightly between themselves as to how it should be reframed. Douglas reframes 
it in such a way as to enable mediators to intervene to foster party self-determination;
526
 
while Astor reframes it to strengthen the concept of consensuality.
527
 These efforts to 
reconceptualise neutrality seek to make it legitimate for mediators to intervene to deal with 
the parties’ problematic power relations’528 and to ‘ensure fair outcomes’529  – something 
which Astor proclaims may involve some equalization.
530
 Astor maintains that such an 
approach ‘provides for the inevitable situatedness of mediators’.531 It also means that the 
propriety of an intervention can only be evaluated in the particular context in which it 
occurs.
532
 
 
Alison Taylor takes a slightly different view of neutrality. She suggests that neutrality 
might be viewed as a continuum ranging from ‘strict neutrality’ to ‘expanded neutrality’ and 
that a mediator might practise ethically anywhere along this continuum. A mediator who 
embraces the expanded neutrality concept would, among other things, ‘feel a need to 
empower and power-balance between clients, and actively intervene between clients to help 
bargaining’.533 
 
                                                          
524
 Douglas claims that there have been a number of responses to deal with the apparent inconsistency between 
the rhetoric of neutrality and the actuality of practice, ranging ‘from calls to simply abandon neutrality as an 
integral component of mediation practice; calls to reframe its significance as no longer a core tenet of practice or 
to reframe it as a question of ethics; and calls to replace it with alternative legitimating principles.’: Douglas, 
above n 523, 140 (citations omitted). Also see Kathy Douglas and Rachael Field, ‘Looking for Answers to 
Mediation’s Neutrality Dilemma in Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2006) 13 eLaw Journal 177.   
525
 See, eg, Hilary Astor, ‘Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and Practice’ (2007) 16 Social & Legal 
Studies 221, 221; Bogdanoski, above n 523, 36, 42; Douglas, above n 523, 155. Taylor asserts that ‘[n]eutrality 
is extremely context sensitive’: Taylor, above n 373, 220.   
526
 See Douglas, above n 523, 155 who argues that self-determination can in turn be constructed to depict 
optimal exercise of the parties’ exercise of power, individually and collectively.  
527
 Astor prefers to reconstruct neutrality in terms of the core mediation value of consensuality which she argues 
is about enabling all the parties ‘to have the maximum control possible given their context and situation’: Astor, 
above n 525, 234. Also see Bogdanoski, above n 523, 36. 
528
 Bogdanoski, above n 523, 36. Indeed, Astor asserts that mediators have an obligation to deal with power 
relationships in mediation: Astor, above n 525, 236. 
529
 Bogdanoski, above n 523, 43. 
530
 Astor, above n 525, 236. 
531
 Ibid 221. 
532
 Bogdanoski, above n 523, 38. 
533
 Taylor, above n 373, 227. 
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This line of argument from authors such as Douglas, Astor and Taylor raises some 
concern for clearly it is the mediator who determines when equalisation and power-balancing 
is required.  
 
Still other commentators believe that the whole notion of neutrality is a ‘fiction’.534 
Coben asserts that the reality is ‘the routine, but undisclosed mediator exercise of 
influence’.535 I agree with this view.  
  
I have argued previously that mediators bring their own values and interests to mediation 
and that to some extent they encourage outcomes consistent with those values and 
interests.
536
 Generally, the primary goal of mediators is to achieve agreement between the 
parties.
537
 They may be motivated in their attempts by concern for the parties or for third 
parties; by their desire for the outcome to conform to certain norms and standards; by concern 
for their reputation or by the need to secure remuneration and future business.
538
 Either way, 
all mediators (even those using less interventionist models)
539
 use a range of strategies to 
influence the content and outcome of mediations. They may, for example, use questions 
creatively (mediators may use hypothetical questions to introduce ideas, create acceptable 
focal points for discussion, assist the parties to package offers and counter-offers and to 
engage in conditional linked bargaining; focusing questions to steer negotiations in a 
particular direction and leading questions to suggest ideas and possible answers). They may 
create opportunities to explore some (favoured) options, but not others; and use time 
deadlines to force concessions and prevent further exploration of options.
540
 
 
                                                          
534
 James R Coben, ‘Gollum, Meet Sméagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-
determination and Neutrality’ (2004) 5 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, 73. 
535
 Ibid 74. 
536
 Wolski, above n 458, 250. Silbey also refutes claims to mediator neutrality or disinterest: Silbey, above n 
406, 351. Also see Gulliver, above n 486, 203. 
537
 Silbey and Merry, above n 70, 7; Wolski, above n 458, 250. As Weckstein notes ‘inherent in the nature of the 
mediator’s calling is a “bias” in favour of settlement ... and many mediators push hard to achieve that end’: 
Weckstein, above n 42, 510. Even mediators adhering to a therapeutic model of mediation are trained to reach 
for agreements, see H H Irving and M Benjamin, ‘An Evaluation of Process and Outcome in a Private Family 
Mediation Service’ (1992) 10 Mediation Quarterly 35; Shapira, above n 31, 261. 
538
 Shapira, above n 31, 218. See Wolski, above n 458, 250 for a discussion of possible mediator interests. 
539
 Much as it is useful to use the analytical models of settlement, facilitative, therapeutic and evaluative, these 
categories may disguise the extent to which all mediators may influence the course and outcome of mediation.  
540
 David Greatbatch and Robert Dingwall, ‘Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations on a Strategy 
Used by Divorce Mediators’ (1989) 23 Law and Society Review 613, 617; Shapiro, Drieghe and Brett, above n 
70, 101. Also see Wolski, above n 458, 255-6 for more comprehensive discussion of strategies used by 
mediators to direct parties towards outcomes that mediators consider acceptable. 
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The standards of conduct prohibit mediators from coercing the parties to settle.
541
 
However, the standards do not draw any clear dividing lines between what is, and what is not, 
‘coercion’ and what is, and what is not, an appropriate intervention. The standards generally 
avoid referring to the specific interventions which mediators can make.
542
 Mediators use a 
range of techniques which exert pressure to settle on the parties.
543
 Most techniques are subtle 
(eg emphasising the mutual benefits to be obtained by agreement and stressing the possible 
negative consequences of failure to agree); others are more obvious (eg indicating impatience 
or disapproval; using long silences; and holding lengthy sessions that facilitate compromise 
and wear the parties down).
544
 
 
Mediators can even use a range of more directive techniques and still stay within the 
limits imposed by relevant standards of conduct.
545
 They may, for instance, give legal 
information.
546
 While the standards generally recognise that the first recourse should be to 
encourage the parties to consult independent counsel if they have not already done so,
547
 the 
standards allow a mediator to provide information ‘that the mediator is qualified by training 
or experience to provide’548 as long as the information is couched in general terms and at 
least, under standard 10.1 of the Australian National Mediator Standards, the parties have 
given informed consent. The standard recognises that this information-giving function is 
consistent with ‘preserving participant self-determination’.549 In the US, the Model Standards 
of Conduct for Mediators also leave ‘questionable wiggle room with regard to the facilitative 
versus evaluative debate’550 permitting mediators to take on additional dispute resolution 
roles in certain limited circumstances.
551
  
                                                          
541
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 2.5; the Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for 
Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 2008) ss 2.2, 2.3; Queensland Law Society, Standards of Conduct 
for Solicitor Mediators (at 23 September 1998) ss 1.2, 7.1, 7.2. 
542
 Boulle, above n 39, 482-4. Also see Weckstein who urges that the ‘ethics of activist mediator interventions’ 
be given proper attention in standards for mediators: Weckstein, above n 42, 510. 
543
 For a detailed discussion of these techniques, see Wolski, above n 458, 248-262. 
544
 Ibid 251-4. 
545
 See, eg, Weckstein, above n 42, 545-6 on interventions which influence the course and outcome of mediation 
(most of which interventions can be considered as process suggestions and are acceptable to facilitative 
mediators).  
546
 A distinction between giving legal advice and giving legal information was made to avoid falling into the 
‘unauthorised practice of the law’ trap: Weckstein, above n 42, 543. Weckstein notes that the distinction has 
been criticised as being too vague to guide mediator behaviour: Weckstein, above n 42, 544. 
547
 Ibid 530. 
548
 In the case of lawyer mediators, this would include information about legal norms: Weckstein, above n 42, 
540, 549; Laflin, above n 73, 507. 
549
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, s 10.1. 
550
 Weidner, above n 455, 566. 
551
 Ibid. 
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There is considerable latitude in the standards for mediators to suggest options for 
settlement. For instance, the New South Wales Law Society’s Guidelines for Solicitors who 
act as Mediators provide that mediators ‘may raise and help the parties to explore options for 
settlement’.552 They may also disclose to a party that her or his demands are inconsistent with 
precedents, trends and societal norms. As already noted above, the NMAS Practice Standards 
make provision for evaluative mediation or advisory mediation in some circumstances
553
 
(with notice and the parties’ consent).554 
 
The opportunity to hold separate meetings at various intervals with each of the parties 
(with or without their legal representatives) is one of the most powerful ‘tools’ in the 
mediator’s ‘toolbox’.555  Generally, anything said between a mediator and a party during 
separate meetings is confidential and cannot be disclosed to the other party or parties without 
the express permission of the confiding party.
556
 Separate meetings can be used for positive 
non-manipulative purposes.
557
 But they can also be used by mediators to manipulate and 
control the flow and content of communications between the parties.
558
 Information can be 
re-shaped, modified, or omitted altogether. Mediators can also add their own interpretations, 
add new messages, or offer their opinions in a covert manner.
559
 For this reason, at least one 
author claims that mediation is naturally conducive to the use of deception - by the 
                                                          
552
 The Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 
2008) ss 2.2, 4.4. 
553
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, ss 2.7, 10.5. Also see the provision made for Family Dispute 
Resolution Practitioners by the Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioners) Regulations 2008 (Cth) 
reg 29. 
554
 On the position under the Joint Standards, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005) in the US, see 
Young, above n 504, 225. Also see the Florida court mediation rules discussed in Welsh, Self-Determination in 
Court-Connected Mediation, above n 385, 34. 
555
 This terminology is attributable to Wade: see John H Wade, ‘Tools From a Mediator’s Toolbox: Reflections 
on Matrimonial Property Disputes’ (1996) 7 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 93. For a discussion of the 
use and abuse of separate meetings, see Wolski, above n 15, 603-6. 
556
 A number of standards address this point: see, eg, NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, ss 6.2; LCA, 
Ethical Guidelines for Mediators (at February 2006) s 5; Queensland Law Society, Standards of Conduct for 
Solicitor Mediators (at 23 September 1998) s 5.2; the Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Guidelines for 
Solicitors who act as Mediators (at 1 January 2008) s 4.8. 
557
 For instance, separate meetings can be used to control the expression of emotions; redress inappropriate 
behaviour; acquire a range of information that the parties will not share in joint sessions; provide a safety zone 
for a party to consider proposals and to offer proposals without fear of commitment or loss of face; and 
encourage parties to consider the consequences of particular options, including the consequences of failing to 
reach agreement. Generally, see Wolski, above n 15, 603-606. 
558
 Silbey and Merry, above n 70, 14. 
559
 Gulliver, above n 486, 227; Cooley, above n 6, 265; James A Wall, ‘Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and 
Proposed Research’ (1981) 25 Journal of Conflict Resolution 157, 163. 
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mediator.
560
 The mediator standards offer no specific guidance to mediators about how 
truthful they must be in conducting mediations, and in particular, in acting as a conduit for 
information revealed in separate meetings.
561
 
 
The effectiveness of mediator strategies relies to a large degree on the mediator utilising 
various sources of power and influence.
562
 The mediator’s most obvious source of power 
derives from his or her ability to control the process and procedure of mediation.
563
 As 
Shapira notes, ‘[c]ontrol over process is a powerful tool of influence’.564 The standards give 
mediators broad and explicit power over procedural matters. Most of the interventions made 
by mediators can be justified as process interventions. Yet many of these interventions have a 
profound effect on the substantive outcome of the mediation.
565
 Shapira concludes: ‘[e]ven 
though mediators lack the formal power to impose an outcome on the parties, they are still 
powerful professionals who use a variety of powers in the exercise of their professional role, 
and have considerable influence on the parties, the process, and its outcome’.566 
 
All mediators have the ability to influence the substance and outcome of mediations. 
They may also have an overriding ethical obligation to do so in some circumstances.  
 
A (Possible) Duty to Ensure Fair Outcomes: There is a long-standing debate on whether 
or not mediators ought to be responsible for ensuring fair mediated outcomes. There are two 
issues involved here for an outcome might be considered unfair to one or more of the parties 
or it might have negative (and unfair) consequences for third parties not present at the 
mediation. 
 
                                                          
560
 Cooley, above n 6, 265. 
561
 Ibid. 
562
 See Wolski, above n 458, 250-251 and sources cited therein for discussion of mediator sources of power and 
influence. In particular, see Bernard Mayer, ‘The Dynamics of Power in Mediation and Negotiation’ (1987) 16 
Mediation Quarterly 75; John H Wade, ‘Forms of Power in Family Mediation and Negotiation’ (1994) 6 
Australian Journal of Family Law 40; Silbey and Merry, above n 70, 12; Moore, above n 39, 278-81; Omer 
Shapira, ‘Exploring the Concept of Power in Mediation: Mediators’ Sources of Power and Influence Tactics’ 
(2008-2009) 24 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 535, 541-58. 
563
 Wade identifies ten forms of power that a mediator has in relation to process, see Wade, above n 562, 20-23. 
564
 Shapira, above n 562, 556.  
565
 In the early years of the modern mediation movement, some authors maintained that there was a distinction 
between process and outcome. However, it now seems widely accepted that the process and the substance of 
negotiations cannot be separated: see Shapira, above n 31, 256; Shapiro, Drieghe and Brett, above n 70, 101; 
Silbey and Merry, above n 70, 12. 
566
 Shapira, above n 562, 568. 
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Assuming the procedure used is fair and that the proposed outcome does not involve the 
commission of an offence or fraud, should a mediator intervene to protect a party against a 
manifestly unfair agreement? 
 
The matter is still highly contentious
567
 and there is no evidence of clear agreement on the 
issue in the literature.
568
 One of the reasons it is contentious is that it begs the question of 
what is fair. Mediators may not be in a position to make an objective assessment about 
fairness issues. They are also not well placed to ensure consistency. Hyman concedes that 
‘[m]ediators rely on their intuitive moral sense to identify substantial unfairness’569 and that 
‘they have no standard vocabulary or method to do so’.570 
 
Schuwerk asserts that the question of whether a mediator should remain completely 
impartial or should be ‘free to intercede to some extent to protect one party – particularly if 
unrepresented – against a clearly unjust outcome, should be decided in favour of 
intervention’.571 On the other hand, authors such as Bush and Stulberg take the view that ‘it is 
not the mediator’s job to guarantee a fair agreement, or any agreement at all; it is the 
mediator’s job to guarantee the parties the fullest opportunity for self-determination and 
mutual acknowledgment.’572 If a party makes what appears to be a free and informed choice, 
he or she can settle for less than they are entitled to – in the name of self-determination.  
  
As with Schuwerk, Mendel-Meadow favours mediator intervention. She suggests that 
lawyer mediators should decline to approve or otherwise sanction an agreement which the 
mediator has reason to believe would cause injustice to any party (including third parties).
573
   
 
                                                          
567
 MacFarlane, above n 31, 52. 
568
 Robert B McKay, ‘Ethical Considerations in Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (1990) 45 Arbitration Journal 
15, 22. 
569
 Hyman, above n 332, 42. 
570
 Ibid. 
571
 Schuwerk, above n 2, 764. 
572
 Bush, Ethical Standards in Mediation, above n 2, 272. Similar views are expressed by Stulberg who argues 
that to intervene for the sake of fairness compromises the mediator’s commitment to neutrality: Joseph B 
Stulberg, ‘The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind’ (1981) 6 Vermont Law 
Review Review 85, 86-88; Peters, above n 6, 132; Riskin, above n 2, 330 (who argues that mediator intervention 
erodes the consensual nature of any agreement). Also see discussion of the Joint Standards, Model Standards of 
Conduct for Mediators (2005) s I, which Weidner asserts places self-determination before ‘outcome fairness’: 
Weidner, above n 455, 556. 
573
 Menkel-Meadow, Non-Adversarial Lawyering, above n 2, 167-8. 
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This brings the discussion to the second issue, of whether or not a mediator should 
intervene to protect the interests of unrepresented parties. The answer may depend in part on 
the subject matter of the dispute. Hobbs and Susskind suggest that mediators and possibly 
legal representatives have duties to parties beyond those at the mediation table in family law 
and public interest disputes.
574
 Susskind argues that mediators of environmental disputes 
‘ought to accept responsibility for ensuring that agreements are as fair and stable as possible 
and that they set constructive precedents’.575 In family law matters, an obligation to consider 
the interests of children is imposed on mediators (and legal representatives) by relevant 
legislation.
576
 Alison Taylor agrees that it is appropriate for mediators to ‘suspend client self-
determination’ and intercede when parents agree to a course of action for their child which is 
contrary to law.
577
 
 
Several authors take a more moderate approach on this issue. Hyman believes that a 
mediator should deal with matters of fairness and justice in mediation but only to a limited 
extent - in much the same way as lawyers might deal with moral issues in an interview with a 
client - by non-directive discussion of fairness and justice issues after which the parties are 
free to determine the final outcome.
578
 A similar view is expressed by Hughes who suggests 
that the mediator should assist the parties to assess any agreement they reach for its fairness 
and enforceability without the mediator taking responsibility for the content of the 
agreement.
579
 This appears to be the position adopted in relevant mediator standards, which 
impose upon mediators duties to help the parties reach a fair and equitable settlement (eg by 
raising questions as to the fairness, equity and feasibility of proposed options for settlement) 
                                                          
574
 Steven H Hobbs, ‘Facilitative Ethics in Divorce Mediation: A Law and Process Approach’ (1987-1988) 22 
University of Richmond Law Review 325, 327, 339; Lawrence Susskind, ‘Environmental Mediation and the 
Accountability Problem’ (1981) 6 Vermont Law Review 1, 40-1 (‘Environmental Mediation’); Lawrence 
Susskind, ‘Expanding the Ethical Obligations of the Mediator: Mediator Accountability to Parties Not at the 
Table’ in Menkel-Meadow and Wheeler, above n 16, 513, 514-518. 
575
 Susskind, Environmental Mediation, above n 574, 4-6. Also see Senecah who argues that mediators in 
environmental matters have an obligation to influence the outcome to assist participants ‘to avoid or minimize’ 
negative fallout in the future: Susan L Senecah, ‘Current Issues Facing the Practice of Environmental 
Mediation’ (2000) 17 Mediation Quarterly 391, 397. Generally, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, ‘Ethics in 
Environmental ADR: An Overview of Issues and Some Overarching Questions’ (1999-2000) 34 Valparaiso 
University Law Review 403. Brown suggests that the mediator may fill in some of the gaps if the parties fail to 
give due consideration to the interests of the public: 421. 
576
 Honoroff and Opotow, above n 480, 158; MacFarlane, above n 31, 52.  In England and Wales and Australia, 
the law dictates that the children’s welfare is paramount. Generally see Lisa Webley, ‘Divorce Solicitors and 
Ethical Approaches – The Best Interests of the Client and/or the Best Interests of the Family?’ (2004) 7 Legal 
Ethics 231, 247. 
577
 Taylor, above n 373, 222. 
578
 Hyman, above n 332, 32, 37, 44. 
579
 Hughes, above n 6, 259-60. 
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and to ensure consideration of the interests of vulnerable parties and other affected and absent 
third persons - while leaving primary responsibility for the decision with the parties.
580
 
 
3.4.6 The Exercise of Discretion by Mediators 
 
The principles articulated in relevant mediator standards may conflict. Such a conflict 
may arise, for instance, if a mediator considers that one party cannot make a fully informed 
decision because the other party is withholding material information known to the mediator 
because it was disclosed in separate session (the duty of confidentiality owed to one party 
potentially conflicts with the duty to ensure procedural fairness and possibly, with a duty to 
ensure outcome fairness). 
 
When such a conflict arises, mediators can look to the relevant standards and guidelines 
but they are unlikely to find specific answers there. The standards of conduct for mediators, 
as for lawyers, are stated in general terms – according to some authors, they are too 
general.
581
 Macfarlane opines that codes of conduct for mediators ‘are merely generalized, 
albeit worthy, sentiments into which mediators will read their own version of moral 
relativism’.582 When ethical dilemmas arise in practice, Macfarlane claims that ‘mediators are 
left with wide discretion and without adequate guidance, in a process which constantly 
requires mediators to make decisions with ethical implications’.583 
 
However, Macfarlane and other commentators are actually in favour of broad general 
standards of conduct for mediators.
584
 For example, Pou favours broad codes which allow 
mediators flexibility to use ‘intuition, judgment, and proficiency’;585 codes which will allow 
mediators to be ‘reflective rather than prescriptive’.586  He suggests that mediator ethical 
expectations ‘will, and should, depend on case-specific factors’587 including the location of a 
                                                          
580
 NMAS Practice Standards, above n 494, ss 9, 10.4. See Young for discussion of the Joint Standards, Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005) s VI(A): Young, above n 504, 216.  Also see the standards and 
guidelines for mediators discussed in Boulle, above n 39, 481. 
581
 Pou, above n 2, 202; Field, above n 3, 178. 
582
 MacFarlane, above n 31, 87. The same observations are made by Pou, above n 2, 202. 
583
 Shapira, above n 31, 252-3 (citations omitted).  
584
 MacFarlane, above n 31, 65. 
585
 Pou, above n 2, 211. 
586
 Ibid 222. 
587
 Pou, above n 2, 209. The same argument is advanced by Weckstein, above n 42, 555, 557. Some authors 
claim that we need specific standards of conduct for ‘variant types of mediation’: Alison E Gerencser, 
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particular mediation process (eg court-annexed, agency-based, or purely private); the 
substantive nature of the dispute (eg family, commercial, neighbourhood); ‘the sophistication 
level of the parties, or their explicit expectations as to how a mediator will assist them’;588 the 
goal of the mediation process and which of the various styles or approaches a mediator 
follows (eg whether facilitative, evaluative or transformative).
589
 In essence, Pou’s view is 
‘that variations in ADR settings do and should, have an impact on expectations about what 
mediator behaviour is appropriate (or ethical or unethical)’.590 
 
Pou argues further that mediator standards are beginning ‘to be defined very differently 
by practitioners in different settings’ 591  and that concepts such as impartiality and self-
determination are ‘calling for different reactions’, depending on whether the mediator is 
involved in eg a family dispute involving the long-term welfare of children, a commercial 
case involving sophisticated business people, or an international dispute.
592
 We have seen this 
‘malleability’ already with the concepts of neutrality and impartiality. Mediators are giving 
these concepts context-specific meanings. 
 
Several authors argue that existing mediator ethics need to be reassessed to allow for 
more responsive, reflexive conduct by mediators. For example, Honoroff and Opotow 
criticise the current approach to the formulation of mediator ethics. It is their view that 
current ethical mandates have been derived from a particular conception of the mediator’s 
role – a conception that they call a ‘top down’ approach. Honoroff and Opotow suggest 
instead that a ‘bottom-up’ approach be used (an approach they refer to as ‘grounded 
ethics’), 593  allowing mediators to make ethical judgments that are more contextualized, 
‘guided by the particulars, the substance, and the context of the dispute’.594 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed Into Mediation: Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed’ (1998) 
50 Florida Law Review 843, 864. 
588
 Pou, above n 2, 209. 
589
 Ibid. 
590
 Pou, above n 2, 201 (citations omitted). Also see Stempel who advances the same argument: Stempel, above 
n 472, 248. Field argues in favour of ‘a contextual ethical method’ for mediators ‘because it would respond to 
the special and unique character of the mediation process itself – its contextual and relational quality, and the 
intuitive, responsive, reactive and integrated nature of its practice’: Field, above n 2, 10. 
591
 Pou, above n 2, 202. 
592
 Ibid 203. 
593
 Honoroff and Opotow, above n 480, 166. 
594
 Ibid 168. 
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Macfarlane also proposes that we should adopt new ‘context-responsive’ ways of 
thinking about mediation ethics.
595
 She calls for the adoption of a ‘reflective-practice’ 
approach as an alternative or complementary vehicle to codes of conduct for mediators,
596
 a 
model which requires practitioners ‘to develop a capacity for reflective self-analysis of their 
effectiveness in practice situations’.597 In essence, ‘[t]he outcomes of ethical judgments by 
mediators must be supported by the reasoned and contextual perspective of that mediator and 
that mediation’.598  
  
Critically for the arguments in this exegesis, Macfarlane asserts that ethical dilemmas in 
mediation are less predictable than those in litigation and that ‘the exercise of individual 
discretion by the mediator is inevitable’.599  
 
3.5 Summary and Review 
 
There are a number of similarities and differences in the processes of litigation, mediation 
and negotiation. As will be discussed further in the next part of this exegesis, proponents for 
new rules rely on these ‘similarities and differences’ to argue in favour of new rules of 
conduct for legal representatives in mediation. However, there are at least three common 
problems with many of these comparisons, especially with those made between litigation and 
mediation. First, commentators assume that mediation is a standard process – it is not. They 
also assume that mediation has an agreed core set of objectives and values – it does not. At 
one extreme, mediation may resemble litigation – at the other, it may be more like a tea party. 
As has been demonstrated in this part, the objectives and values may vary from one 
mediation to the next. 
 
Second, commentators often compare the ideal functioning of one process (mediation) 
with the actual functioning of another (litigation) forgetting that processes that are 
analytically distinct can, in practice, be identical. For example, it is claimed that mediation 
                                                          
595
 MacFarlane, above n 31, 73, 70. 
596
 Ibid 56. 
597
 Ibid 72. 
598
 MacFarlane, above n 31, 71. Also see Barbara Wilson, who argues that mediators should respond 
‘reflectively and reflexively to the process and content’: Barbara Wilson, ‘Mediator Ethics: What Does the ADR 
Literature Say?’, Paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1574438., 20. 
599
 MacFarlane, above n 31, 62. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 108 - 15- Aug-11 
 
focuses on interests, creative problem-solving and on the future.
600
 Litigation is a truth-
seeking process which is past oriented, focuses on the facts, and determines right and wrong 
according to law. While it is true that in mediation each party can retain their different 
perceptions of the facts and reach agreement despite the differences,
601
 frequently fact-
finding, legal argument and even apportioning of blame also occur.  
 
Third, comparisons are often drawn to mediation and an out-dated version of litigation. 
Boulle notes that ‘[l]itigation is not, however, a static system and some of the contrasts 
between mediation and litigation are based on overstated and outdated features of the latter, 
such as its formality, inflexibility and binary outcomes’.602 In reality litigation now consists 
of a series of events, many of which are aimed at narrowing the differences between the 
parties and encouraging settlement.  
 
In some respects, the objectives and values of these dispute resolution processes show a 
remarkable similarity which is often overlooked. These similarities are discussed further in 
the next part of the exegesis. 
 
But as Boulle points out, ‘there are still important contrasts between mediation and 
litigation’.603 When it comes to the adjudicative aspects of litigation, there are ‘degrees of 
formality, procedural technicality, transparency and finality not encountered in mediation’.604 
For many parties, the fact that mediation produces ‘consensual’ outcomes rather than 
imposed ones will also be important. For other parties, the process used will be more 
important than the outcome achieved.
605
 
 
It is my view that there are at least two additional differences between litigation and 
mediation – differences which are overlooked by proponents for new rules; differences which 
support the retention of general rules of conduct which give legal representatives some 
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discretion over matters such as candour and cooperation in mediation. The differences are 
that: 
1. Although there is some uncertainty as to the balance to be struck between the 
objectives of case management and justice in an individual case, the features, 
objectives and values of litigation remain fairly consistent from one case to the next. 
Judges and legal practitioners must follow the same set of rules of procedure and laws 
of evidence (and abide by requisite standards of proof). They must apply the same 
rules of substantive law. On the other hand, mediation is an extremely diverse process 
which may take different forms and serve a range of different objectives and values. 
Each mediation will differ from the next. 
2. The ethical expectations of judges in litigation do not vary.606 Macfarlane claims that, 
as compared to mediators, ‘judges or arbitrators, do not face the same scope of choice 
in ethical matters, as they are constrained by external rules and a journey towards a 
fixed end.’607 Mediation, in contrast, has ‘no fixed end point’.608 Codes of conduct for 
mediators leave mediators with wide discretion to make ethical judgments in the 
context of each mediation. ‘[T]he mediator is both more active and more complex a 
third-party neutral than the judge who is governed by the Judicial Code of 
Conduct.’609  Judges do not have the same potential as mediators to influence the 
course and outcome of proceedings. For all the recent reforms made to the civil 
justice system, judges are less influential and less activist than mediators.  
 
In the next part of the exegesis, I critically analyze a number of proposals which have been 
made for new non-adversarial rules of conduct for lawyers representing parties in mediation 
and the reasons given for these proposals.     
 
  
                                                          
606
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PART 4: PROPOSED NEW ETHICS RULES FOR MEDIATION 
 
Several well-known authors have proposed changes to the ethical mandates for lawyers 
who represent parties in mediation.
610
 Similar proposals have been made with respect to legal 
representatives in negotiation for well over thirty years.
611
 In the discussion which follows, I 
first examine and critique the rationale given for change and then, the content of a range of 
proposals for modification of the current rules of professional conduct.   
 
4.1 Rationale for Change 
  
The reasons given for the need to reform the current rules of professional conduct for 
legal representatives in negotiation and mediation varies between authors. Three separate 
approaches are evident in the literature. For the purpose of discussion, I have labelled these 
approaches as follows: 
1. Negotiation is surrogate litigation. 
2. Negotiation lacks due process controls. 
3. Mediation is more than ‘ordinary’ negotiation.  
Each of these approaches is critiqued in turn below. 
 
Negotiation is surrogate litigation: Some commentators point to the similarities between 
the processes of negotiation and litigation and argue that the standards of conduct for lawyers 
in negotiation should be raised to the same level as that owed by lawyers to a tribunal in 
litigation.
612
 It is argued that although the style and procedural format of litigation distinguish 
it from the relatively informal nature of private settlement negotiation, the objectives and 
corresponding methodologies of the two processes are quite similar.
613
 The processes have a 
shared purpose ie ‘the fair and efficient resolution of disputes’.614 Gordon goes so far as to 
assert that private settlement is ‘in several respects surrogate litigation, mirroring in purpose, 
if not process, the trial it replaces’.615 Gordon notes that lawyers in negotiation may offer 
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versions of the facts in much the same way as witnesses would at trial.
616
 They also bargain 
‘in the shadow of the law’ with knowledge of their clients’ legal rights and obligations in 
mind. Gordon argues that, at least in as much as negotiation may determine substantive legal 
rights, the ethics of the process should safeguard the reliability of information provided so 
that negotiation produces ‘analogous outcomes’ to those which would be produced in 
litigation were those controversies to be formally litigated.
617
 
 
In like manner, some authors argue that mediation and litigation are similar. For example, 
Sabatino points to the existence in mediation of information exchange procedures and to the 
practice of mediators asking for issues papers and risk analysis documents from the parties.
618
 
He goes so far as to refer to ADR as ‘litigation lite’.619 He observes: 
 
In fact, the supposed dichotomy between what is collectively described these days as ‘ADR,’ on 
the one hand, and ‘traditional adjudication,’ on the other, actually is not as severe as it may appear 
on the surface. A close examination of the ADR programs connected with the federal and state 
courts, as well as ADR services offered in the private sphere, reveals that evidentiary and 
procedural norms underlying our traditional adjudicative system are substantially replicated in 
those alternative processes.
620
 
 
Negotiation lacks due process controls: Some authors point to the differences between the 
processes of negotiation and litigation and rely on those differences to argue that lawyers in 
negotiation should owe higher standards of conduct than those that they owe to an opponent 
in litigation.
621
 These authors point out that negotiation lacks a third party arbiter,
622
 formal 
codified rules of procedure and evidence (including those which permit each party to test the 
veracity of the other party’s information), and the need to apply substantive rules. 623 
Negotiation is a ‘largely invisible, undocumented, and unreviewable’ process. 624  Higher 
standards of conduct are needed, it is argued, in order to protect the integrity of the process. 
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These arguments might also be applied to mediation, which like negotiation, lacks due 
process controls. 
 
It should be noted that authors in this second group recommend adoption of much the 
same standards of conduct as those in the first group – they simply start from a lower 
reference point ie duties owed to an opponent in litigation as opposed to duties owed to the 
tribunal in litigation. A lawyer in litigation owes higher duties to the tribunal than those that 
he or she owes to an opponent. 
 
Mediation is more than ‘ordinary’ negotiation: Despite widespread acceptance of 
mediation as a process of assisted negotiation, some authors assert that standards of conduct 
in unassisted negotiation do not, by extension, become acceptable in mediation. They argue 
further that higher standards should apply in mediation (and problem-solving negotiation) 
than those that govern conduct in ordinary negotiation and litigation.
625
 As to why mediation 
requires higher standards, a number of overlapping reasons are given. It is said that the 
general rules of conduct which apply to litigation (and negotiation) were fashioned with 
adversarial litigation in mind
626
 and that they are inappropriate for, and incompatible with, 
mediation
627
 - a process which, say the critics, is based on values and goals which are 
fundamentally different from those of litigation.
628
 A related argument is that legal 
representatives perform different roles in ADR from traditional adversary practice
629
 - roles 
that ‘are sufficiently different and complex to require their own “rules”’.630 
 
The discussion which follows examines the assumptions underlying each approach. 
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4.1.1 Assumption: Negotiation is Similar to Litigation 
 
Gordon is correct in asserting that litigation and negotiation have a shared purpose, as 
indeed do litigation and mediation (ie the peaceful resolution of disputes) but both he and 
Sabatino overstate the case for procedural similarities between litigation on the one hand and 
negotiation and mediation on the other. Negotiation (both unassisted and assisted) may take a 
variety of forms. It might be formal and ‘litigation like’; or it might be very informal and bear 
no resemblance to litigation, even when it involves legal matters. It might also be argued that 
parties enter into negotiation because they do not want to end up with outcomes that are 
analogous to those which might be produced by a court. 
 
4.1.2 Assumption: Negotiation is Different from Litigation 
 
Negotiation does lack due process controls. While the arguments made by proponents of 
the second approach at least remain fairly true for all negotiations (unlike those of the 
‘negotiation is surrogate litigation’ approach), there are a number of arguments which can be 
made against the introduction of more formal rules regulating conduct in negotiation (these 
arguments apply regardless of which of the three approaches is relied upon). The introduction 
of more rules would lead to formality and inflexibility.
631
 Many disputants choose negotiation 
because of its informality and flexibility ie because of the absence of rules. Many disputants 
choose it because it is a private process and the content and outcome can remain confidential. 
These features of negotiation make its regulation problematic, so much so that some authors 
claim that the process has to be ‘almost entirely self-regulated’ as a practical matter.632 ‘The 
informality, flexibility, and freedom of the process are attributes that many cite as essential to 
the continued success and viability of the process.’633 All of these arguments apply equally 
well to mediation. They are explored in further detail later in this part of the exegesis in the 
context of specific proposals for reform. 
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4.1.3 Assumption: The Rules of Professional Conduct Reflect an Adversarial Paradigm 
of Legal Practice 
 
The first claim or assumption made by proponents of the ‘mediation is more than ordinary 
negotiation’ approach is that the professional conduct rules were fashioned with adversarial 
litigation in mind.
634
 In fact, historical accounts of the development of the rules of conduct do 
not support this conclusion.
635
 
 
As to the current rules, some authors reject the notion that professional regulation is based 
entirely on adversarial notions.
636
 For instance, Schneyer points to recent ethics opinions 
given in the US on the practice of collaborative law and argues that they provide ‘strong 
evidence that the mainstream bar does not understand the prevailing rules of legal ethics to be 
grounded in an “adversarial” paradigm today, if they ever were’.637  At most, ‘the prevailing 
rules may give undue attention to litigation ethics’.638 However, even this criticism may not 
be warranted. It seems that the drafters of the rules had a choice. They could devise a set of 
rules which dealt with lawyering activities according to the tasks involved eg advising, 
counselling, interviewing, drafting (various types of letters, opinions, contracts, etc), 
negotiating (in various settings), advocating (in various settings including litigation) and so 
on. Alternatively, they could draft a set of rules which categorised lawyering activities 
according to the entity (person or institution) with whom the lawyer engages and owes duties 
eg the court, clients, other practitioners, third parties, and the public. This may not be an 
exhaustive account of the way in which lawyering activities can be ‘unbundled’639 but it 
appears that this later approach was chosen in Australian jurisdictions where the rules are 
divided into categories according to the entity with whom lawyers deal – the court, clients, 
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other practitioners and other third parties. A similar categorical framework underlies the 
ABA Model Rules.
640
 This may be the reason why there are no rules dedicated to negotiation. 
  
The current formulation of the rules reflects, and flows naturally from, those beliefs or 
values which, according to many commentators, are fundamental to the legal profession. The 
most well known formulation of ‘fundamental professional values’ is that appearing in the 
MacCrate Report which lists the following as fundamental professional values:
641
  
 
• providing competent representation to clients - the responsibility to clients; 
• striving to promote the administration of justice, fairness, and morality – the public 
responsibility to the justice system; 
• maintaining and striving to improve the profession – the responsibility to the legal profession; 
and 
• professional self-development – the responsibility to oneself. 
 
These values underlie the professional conduct rules (and they are also captured in other parts 
of the law of lawyering). At present, some of these values are clearly captured in ‘rule’ 
format. For example, the value of responsibility to clients translates into a series of specific 
duties owed by lawyers to clients, including the duty to provide competent representation to 
clients and the duty to act with due diligence in carrying out clients’ instructions.642 Until 
recently, the rules in Australian jurisdictions could justifiably be criticised for placing 
insufficient emphasis on the value of promoting the administration of justice. As mentioned 
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in part 2, the draft new rules remedy this defect by explicitly providing that lawyers owe a 
paramount duty to the administration of justice.
643
 
 
To the extent that the rules might reflect an adversarial paradigm, they do not exclude 
non-adversarial practice even in the context of litigation. The rules do not demand 
combativeness and aggression as prerequisites to effective adversarial litigation. ‘[O]ur 
adversary system considers that litigation is not a street-fight. On the contrary, the system 
involves a complicated cooperative interaction between contending advocates’.644 The rules 
certainly do not prohibit cooperation between ‘opponents’ in negotiation. 
 
4.1.4 Assumption: Mediation is Based on Values and Objectives Fundamentally 
Different from Those of Litigation 
 
The next claim made by proponents for new rules ie that the values and objectives of 
mediation are fundamentally different from those of litigation, also cannot be supported, for 
at least two reasons. First, some authors in this area compare the values of mediation with the 
values of client representation in litigation. It is submitted that these are inappropriate points 
of comparison. One such author is Menkel-Meadow who compares the values of trust, 
confidentiality, creativity and openness (for mediation) with the values of zeal, client loyalty, 
partisanship and non-accountability.
645
 This last set of values (ie those of zeal, client loyalty, 
partisanship and non-accountability) are not the values of litigation (arguably, they are not 
even the values of representation in litigation). Additionally, some of the values that Menkel-
Meadow claims for mediation eg openness and creativity, are arguably not values in the sense 
of important beliefs but rather (idealised) structural features of the mediation process. 
 
Second, the processes of litigation and mediation have more in common than is 
commonly thought. As Gordon argues with respect to litigation and negotiation, at the most 
basic and abstract level, the primary objective of these processes is peaceful dispute 
resolution and decision-making.
646
 Even at a less abstract level, the processes have much in 
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common. The objectives articulated by the ALRC (with respect to the Australian federal 
system of civil litigation) and NADRAC (with respect to ADR in Australia) overlap to a 
significant degree. The ALRC called for a litigation system which is ‘just, accessible, 
efficient, timely and effective’.647 NADRAC considered that certain core objectives of ADR 
could be identified (despite the differences in perspective of the various stakeholders) ie: to 
resolve disputes, using a process considered by the parties to be fair, which achieves 
acceptable lasting outcomes, and uses resources effectively.
648
 Certain values underlie and 
inform these objectives, in both litigation and mediation. For example, the values underlying 
‘fair’ dispute resolution include human dignity, personal autonomy, self-determination, party 
participation and control.
649
 Sherman noticed this similarity between litigation and mediation, 
claiming that: 
 
our litigation system and ADR have a great deal in common – indeed, they are but different points 
along a spectrum of dispute-resolution processes. Both place a high value on a rational approach to 
dispute resolution, fairness of process, and the centrality of party autonomy.
650
  
 
Mediation enthusiasts (and litigation detractors) might argue that litigation does not 
honour values such as self-determination, party autonomy and party control. These are the 
values that are usually claimed for mediation. They are claimed for mediation because parties 
have control over the decision in mediation whilst they do not in litigation. However, this 
presupposes that parties value highly those processes which allow them to control the 
outcome. The practice of distinguishing among dispute resolution processes on the basis of 
‘the locus of decision control may be misguided’.651 There is evidence that ‘disputants care as 
much or more about the procedural justice offered by dispute resolution processes than about 
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decision control’.652 ‘[T]he procedural justice literature demonstrates that, regardless of their 
decision control, disputants consistently value processes that feel fair because they offer a 
meaningful opportunity for voice and consideration and assure even-handed, dignified 
treatment.’653  
 
It should come as no surprise that litigation and mediation as practised in the West serve 
similar objectives and reflect similar values. Each is a product of Western culture.
654
 The 
connection between culture, society and dispute resolution is more openly acknowledged in 
the case of litigation. It has been said, for instance, that personal autonomy and individual 
liberty ‘crystallized in the adversary system’.655 We are less open about, and cognizant of, the 
fact that mediation, as practised in the West, also reflects values such as individualism (and 
all of its associated tenets such as the concepts of free choice, self-definition, self-fulfilment 
and self-realisation). 
656
 
 
As illustrated in part 3, the values of a process can be articulated with more specificity 
and when this is done, it may be the case that adjudication places less emphasis on some 
values than others eg it has been claimed that adjudication treats recognition by the parties as 
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reconciliation. The interests, preferences, views and goals of the individual are subsumed in those of the larger 
self ie the group. See Wolski, above n 41; N T Feather, ‘Value Systems Across Cultures: Australia and China’ 
(1986) 21 International Journal of Psychology 697, 700; Sternlight, above n 653, 298. 
655
 Riskin, above n 333, 30. Also see Menkel-Meadow, above n 323, 29.  
656
 Feather, above n 654, 711; Bush, above n 327, 17; Warren Pengilley, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: The 
Philosophy and the Need’ (1990) 1 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 81, 85; Bush and Folger, above n 59, 
239-41. Also see Riskin, above n 333, who notes that the Confucian ideal of harmony ‘contrasts sharply with 
the predominant Western perspectives which focuses on freedom as an absence of restraint and on autonomy 
and individual liberty as the highest goal’: 30. More generally, see Gold, above n 385. Also see Boulle who 
notes that mediation in the Australian context places value on individualism and a rational approach to decision-
making: Boulle, above n 39, 85-6. 
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irrelevant.
657
 What is overlooked by authors who favour this third approach is that some 
models of mediation also treat recognition by the parties as irrelevant.  
 
4.1.5 Assumption: Legal Representatives Undertake Different Roles in Mediation 
 
Proponents of the ‘mediation is more than ordinary negotiation’ approach also claim that 
legal representatives perform different roles in ADR from those that they undertake in 
traditional adversary practice.
658
  Proponents of this approach have no problem with the 
lawyer’s role as adviser, counsellor and negotiator. Their real argument is that advocacy is 
inappropriate in mediation. This topic is explored in more detail in the context of specific 
proposals for change, commencing below. 
 
4.2 Content of Proposals for New Rules of Professional Conduct  
 
The content of the proposals for change to the professional conduct rules for mediation 
(and for negotiation) also varies between authors. However, some common themes emerge. 
‘The exact changes that each [author] would propose to adopt varies, but the common 
underlying thread rests upon the belief that a form of good faith and fair dealing obligation 
needs to be imposed in order to insure that attorneys engage in negotiations ethically.’659 
Another common theme, perhaps encompassed in the notions of good faith and fairness, 
relates to the need for candour. Each of these themes is discussed in turn below. 
 
4.2.1 Proposals for Higher Standards of Disclosure 
 
Several authors suggest the implementation of new rules (or the modification of the 
current ones) which would impose a significantly higher duty of disclosure on legal 
representatives in negotiation and mediation than is currently owed by them. However, there 
are wide ranging views on what is an appropriate level of disclosure. 
  
                                                          
657
 Bush, Ethical Standards in Mediation, above n 2, 271. 
658
 Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 409; Kovach, Ethics for Whom?, 
above n 28, 61. 
659
 Rosenberger, above n 273, 618 (citations omitted).   
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 120 - 15- Aug-11 
 
As long ago as 1975, Rubin argued that lawyers in negotiations ‘must act honestly and in 
good faith’.660 He did not elaborate on what he meant by acting ‘honestly’. Peters argues that 
all deception in negotiations should be prohibited.
661
 Stated positively, lawyers would be 
required to disclose all facts known to them and known to be important to their 
counterpart.
662
 It is unclear whether Rubin and Peters intended that lawyers should also 
disclose relevant legal authorities and legislative provisions. 
  
Menkel Meadow proposes that rule 4.1 (which deals with honesty to third parties) and by 
implication, rule 3.3 (which deals with candour to a tribunal) of the ABA Model Rules be 
amended.
663
 In her view: 
  
1. ‘Lawyers should not misrepresent to or conceal from another person, a relevant fact or 
legal principle (including opposing counsel, parties, judicial officers, third party 
neutrals or other individuals who might rely on such statements)’.664 
2. ‘Lawyers should not intentionally or recklessly deceive another or refuse to answer 
material and relevant questions in representing clients’. 
  
If Menkel-Meadow’s suggestions were adopted, lawyers would have a positive duty to 
disclose relevant facts and law to an opponent, to a mediator and to a judge.
665
 There would 
be no safety in silence, and deflection or outright refusal to answer relevant questions would 
not be permitted. 
 
Less radical suggestions are made by Alfini, who would omit the word ‘material’ from 
rule 4.1, forbidding lawyers from making any false statement of fact or law to a third person 
(a party or a mediator)
666
 and Peters who suggests that rule 4.1 be amended so as to prohibit 
                                                          
660
 Rubin, above n 422, 589. Also see Gordon, above n 611, 530.  
661
 Geoffrey M Peters, ‘The Use of Lies in Negotiation’ (1987) 48 Ohio State Law Journal 1, 4, 49. 
662
 Ibid 50. 
663
 Her proposed rules are contained in what she calls, ‘The Ten Commandments of Appropriate Dispute 
Resolution: An Aspirational Code’, see Menkel-Meadow, Non-Adversarial Lawyering, above n 2, 167-8. These 
‘rules’ are numbered 4 and 5 respectively on the list formulated by Menkel-Meadow.  
664
 Menkel-Meadow, Non-Adversarial Lawyering, above n 2, 167-8. 
665
 Currently, r 3.3(a)(1) of the ABA Model Rules does not require practitioners to reveal adverse facts to a 
tribunal. 
666
 Alfini, above n 6, 270. Also see Bordone, above n 8, 30 (who suggests a similar mandatory ethical guideline 
for negotiation). Lakhani also recommends removing the reference to ‘material’ so that there is an obligation to 
disclose ‘all facts (and law if relevant)’ which might aid in resolving the dispute to everyone’s satisfaction: 
Avnita Lakhani, Deception as a Legal Negotiation Strategy: A Cross-Jurisdictional, Multidisciplinary Analysis 
Towards an Integrated Policy Reforms Agenda (PhD Thesis, Bond University, 2010) 341. 
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false statements about interests and priorities to another party or the mediator (Peters defines 
interests in such a way as to exclude value estimates and settlement intentions).
667
 Under both 
of these proposals, many forms of deception could still be practised including puffing, 
exaggeration and lying about willingness to settle. Neither proposal addresses instances of 
silence ie lawyers would still be permitted in most circumstances to choose not to disclose 
relevant information. 
 
Sammon argues that the same duties of candour as apply ‘in court’ ought apply to a 
lawyer in mediation.
668
 Dal Pont argues that the standard of candour in negotiations ought not 
be lower than that imposed in court. He says, ‘[i]t is difficult to conclude that this standard 
ought to be diluted (or nullified) simply because the conduct or omission occurs outside the 
walls of the court’.669 But neither Sammon nor Dal Pont specify to whom the duty is owed ie 
to the mediator and the opponent or just the mediator, and neither is specific about the form 
the duty should take (bearing in mind that there are two different standards operating under 
the current rules: that owed to ‘the court’ and that owed to ‘other parties’ including 
opponents). They might assume that a mediator is to be afforded the same standard of 
candour as a tribunal but they do not clarify the matter.  
 
Meyerson is more specific about the duty of candour owed to a mediator, asserting ‘that 
the same ethical obligations of candor that a lawyer owes to a judge are owed to a 
mediator’.670 Thus, a legal representative in mediation would be: 
1. Prohibited from knowingly misleading the mediator on any matter. 
2. Under an obligation to inform a mediator of any relevant binding authority and 
legislative provisions of which the lawyer is aware.
671
 
 
                                                          
667
 Peters, above n 6, 139. There has been much criticism of r 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules and many authors 
have suggested that it be changed. Bordone calls it a ‘euphemism for lying’: Bordone, above n 8, 13. Also see 
Christopher M Fairman, ‘Why We Still Need a Model Rule for Collaborative Law: A Reply to Professor Lande’ 
(2006-2007) 22 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 707, 716. On the other hand, some commentators 
assert that the exception allowed in r 4.1 is ‘actually quite narrow. It merely permits “puffing” and 
“embellishment” but no overt or subversive misstatements of true material fact’: Craver, above n 283, 345. 
668
 Sammon, above n 6, 195. Sammon says that this reform is necessary ‘in order to preserve the integrity of 
mediation’: 195.  
669
 Gino Dal Pont, ‘Are Ethical Principles Malleable in the Negotiation Environment?’ (2008) (September) Law 
Society Journal 42, 43. 
670
 Bruce E Meyerson, ‘Telling the Truth in Mediation: Mediator Owed Duty of Candor’ (1997-1998) 4 Dispute 
Resolution Magazine 17, 17. There is an inconsistency in Meyerson’s approach for he then bases his arguments 
on the requirements of r 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules (which governs candour to third persons) rather than r 3.1 
which governs candour to a tribunal.  
671
 See, eg, LCA Model Rules r 14.6; Barristers’ Rules r 25; ABA Model Rules r 3.3. 
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If I am correct in assuming that the reference to ‘mediations’ in the definition section of 
the rules in Australia refers to ‘mediators’, then this represents the position in Australia at the 
current time. Presumably the disclosures required under Meyerson’s proposal could be made 
in separate sessions with the mediator (a point on which Meyerson is silent), in the absence of 
the other party and under the cloak of confidentiality. There would be no obligation to reveal 
adverse facts to a mediator under this proposal (so long as non-disclosure was not tantamount 
to misleading or deceiving the mediator). Meyerson does not address the issue of the duty of 
candour owned to opponents.  
 
4.2.2 Problems with Proposals for Higher Standards of Disclosure 
 
There are a number of problems with proposals to raise the standard of disclosure owed 
by legal representatives in negotiation and mediation (quite apart from the fact that 
commentators seem unable to agree on the appropriate level of disclosure which should be 
owed). 
 
The first problem is that deception commonly occurs within negotiation – indeed, it 
seems almost to be universally accepted that ‘some form of deceit, at least in the broadest 
sense of the word, is inherent in all negotiations’.672 This fact does not mean that deception 
should be the norm. However, it seems, and here is the second problem with raising the bar, 
that some deception (such as deception over settlement points) is legitimate and even 
necessary in ‘many traditional modes of bargaining’. 673  Rosenberger asserts that ‘it is 
unproductive to discuss a “utopian negotiation world” in which complete disclosure is the 
norm. Arguably, making negotiations objectively fair and requiring complete and honest 
disclosure would break down the very essence of the informal negotiation process.’ 674 
Consequently, it is argued that Rubin’s ‘universalist’ standards675 of honesty and good faith 
are ‘so comprehensive that they do not differentiate venal conduct from other behavior that 
                                                          
672
 Walter W Steele Jr, ‘Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality’ (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1387, 1399; Lakhani, above n 666, 145; Temkin, above n 236, 180, 182; Parke, above n 11, 221. Also see 
Robert J Condlin, ‘Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limitations of a Communitarian Conception 
of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can’t All Just Get Along’ (2007-2008) 9 Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 1, 73. 
673
 Norton, above n 161, 508; Steele, above n 672, 1399; Lakhani, above n 666, 145. 
674
 Rosenberger, above n 273, 626. 
675
 Universalism assumes that societal ethical norms (such as ‘honesty is the best policy’) can be made to fit 
ethics in bargaining, a view rejected by Norton, above n 161, 522-4. Even Rubin, who argues for ‘honesty’ notes 
that candour is not inconsistent with striking a deal on terms favourable to the client because, within limits, that 
is the purpose to be served by negotiation: Rubin, above n 422, 589.  
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may well be essential to bargaining’676 such as the overstatement of bottom lines involved in 
making decisions on settlement points.
677
 The third problem has been mentioned previously - 
more rules might destroy the informal nature of negotiation.   
 
But just as it is almost universally accepted that some deception does and should occur, it 
is also almost universally accepted that there ought to be some limits to deception in 
negotiation.
678
 The difficulty lies in deciding where the line should be drawn. Some realistic 
and practical suggestions have been made in this regard.  
 
For example, Temkin argues that negotiators (whether in negotiation or mediation) ought 
not have to disclose everything. He maintains that there ought to be some definite limits on 
the duty of candour in mediation, what he calls a ‘silent safe harbor’. 
 
[A]bsent court rule, principle of substantive law, or prior factual representation, an attorney should 
have no duty to make affirmative factual representations in the course of settlement negotiations, 
subject only to the crime/fraud exception contained in the Model Rules. In short, there should be a 
silent safe harbor. An attorney who makes no representations (and does not condone or repeat 
those of a client) makes no misrepresentations. Once an attorney speaks, what is said should be 
truthful, consistent with the attorney’s duty to preserve client secrets and confidences.
679
 
  
In my opinion, this is an appropriate place at which to drawn the line. It is the place at 
which the line has been drawn in the current rules in the US vis à vis mediators and 
opponents and in Australia, vis à vis opponents. As mentioned in part 2, while lawyers must 
refrain from certain misrepresentations, currently they are not subject to a duty of candour as 
regards their opponent; they do not have to correct an opponent when he or she is wrong and 
they do not have to help an opponent when he or she does not have the information they 
need. There currently exists a silent safe harbour. I agree with Temkin that it should remain 
safe. As I discuss in part 7, I recommend that the harbour be extended so that lawyers in 
Australia are also free from a duty of candour vis à vis mediators (or at the least, that the rules 
be amended to stipulate that all required disclosures may be made in separate sessions on a 
                                                          
676
 Norton, above n 161, 514; White, above n 230, 929. 
677
 Norton, above n 161, 514. 
678
 White, above n 230, 928. White is often quoted as representing one extreme view in this regard - an 
‘anything goes’ approach. He expressed the view that ‘[t]o conceal one’s true position, to mislead an opponent 
about one’s true settling point, is the essence of negotiation’: White, above n 230, 928. White is not given credit 
for recognising that ‘there are limits on acceptable deceptive behaviour in negotiation’: 928. 
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 For instance, see Temkin, above n 236, 181. 
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confidential basis). Without that safe harbour, there is no incentive for lawyers and clients to 
prepare for mediation. Lawyers must charge their clients for time spent in preparation. The 
lawyer who fully prepares (and charges his or her client accordingly) should not have to 
enlighten the lawyer who is under-prepared. If the system depended on each of us helping the 
other, eventually each would come to rely upon the other and neither would adequately 
prepare.  
  
4.2.3 Proposals for a Good Faith Requirement 
 
Some commentators have suggested that a good faith requirement ought to be imposed on 
parties and lawyers in mediation, despite the lack of clarity as to the meaning of the term. 
They argue that such a requirement will promote more constructive and meaningful 
participation in the mediation process.
680
 
 
Rubin was an early proponent of a good faith standard in negotiation.
681
 It is interesting 
that Rubin does not define good faith apart from stating that ‘all lawyers know that good faith 
requires conduct beyond simple honesty’.682 A number of authors have reiterated Rubin’s 
arguments – for both negotiation,683 and for mediation.684 All authors have had difficulty 
defining the concept of ‘good faith’.  
 
One of the most prolific authors on this issue is Kovach who calls for the implementation 
of rules requiring good faith participation ‘in each and every mediation, in every context’685  
whether the mediation takes place by court referral, contract or self-referral.
686
 Kovach argues 
that such a requirement ought to be mandated and enforced ‘by legislation, court rule, rules of 
conduct for lawyers, or rules of practice in mediation’.687 In the terminology adopted in this 
                                                          
680
 Generally see Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above 8, 598; Weston, above n 187, 630; NADRAC, 
Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 34 [2.5.1]. 
681
 Rubin, above n 422, 589. Also see Gordon, above n 611, 530.  
682
 Rubin, above n 422, 590. When Rubin spoke of good faith, it appears that he meant that lawyers could not 
seek or agree to unconscionable settlements: Condlin, above n 105, 77. 
683
 See, eg, Gordon who includes an obligation to participate in good faith as one element in a suggested ‘Model 
Rule of Settlement Negotiation Ethics’: Gordon, above n 611, 530. 
684
 Several authors are of the view that lawyers in mediation should ‘commit to a standard of fairness and good 
faith higher than the standard applied to “ordinary” direct negotiation’: Shapira, above n 31, 265-6 (citations 
omitted). Also see Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above 8, 616-8; Carter, above n 188, 372; Weston, above 
n 187, 630. 
685
 Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above 8, 616. 
686
 Ibid 617.  
687
 Ibid 618. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 125 - 15- Aug-11 
 
exegesis, Kovach argues that good faith participation should be required in both private and 
mandatory mediations.  
 
Kovach offers a suggested ‘Model Rule for Lawyers Requiring Good Faith Participation 
in the Mediation Process’688 that consists of an itemised list of behaviours which would 
constitute good faith. Such behaviour includes:
689
 
 arriving at the mediation prepared (with a knowledge of the case including the facts 
and possible solutions); 
 having all necessary decision makers present in person; 
 ‘coming to the mediation with an open mind’;690 
 ‘demonstrating a willingness to listen and attempting to understand the other side’,691  
and ‘at the very least, not summarily and without consideration’ 692  immediately 
rejecting what the other party has to say; 
 ‘taking into account the interests of the other parties’;693 
 having a willingness to discuss one’s own position in detail, explaining the rationale 
for a particular offer or refusal of an offer; 
 participating in meaningful discussions with the mediator and all other participants, 
and 
 refraining from conveying information that is misleading or false.694 
 
Other authors assert that it still makes more sense to ‘focus on defining what is 
inappropriate behaviour by mediation participants’. 695  For example, Carter suggests that 
conveying information that is misleading or false
696
 will constitute bad faith,
697
 as will use of 
                                                          
688
 Generally see Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above 8, 617 and 622-623 for a suggested model rule for 
lawyers requiring (and specifying the elements of) good faith. 
689
 Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins, above n 6, 963. Also see Weston, above n 187, 630, who 
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 Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation, above 8, 616. 
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696
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mediation ‘primarily to gain strategic advantage in the litigation process.’698 However, even 
Carter concedes that such definitions are ‘subjective to the point of being amorphous’.699   
 
In an attempt to avoid ‘subjective’ good faith requirements, Edward Sherman suggests the 
imposition of a standard of ‘minimal meaningful participation’ under which the parties would 
be required to provide the mediator and each other with a short statement about the issues in 
dispute, the party’s position with respect to those issues, the relief sought and any offers and 
counteroffers already made.
700
 
 
NADRAC recently considered the question of the statutory imposition of conduct 
obligations on participants (parties, their representatives and ADR practitioners) in ADR 
processes.
701
 NADRAC’s recommendations differed according to whether the process was 
mandatory or private.
702
 NADRAC gave two reasons for differentiating between processes on 
this basis, the first of which is relevant in the context of the present discussion. It noted that 
‘[p]ublic interests are invoked when a court or tribunal orders parties to undertake ADR – in 
particular, the need for parties to act in ways which facilitate, rather than undermine, the 
objectives sought to be achieved by the order.’703 NADRAC’s reasoning shows a tilting of 
the objectives of mandatory mediation towards those of efficiency and settlement favoured by 
the court.  
 
NADRAC favours the implementation of more legislation at the federal level in Australia 
which imposes an obligation on participants to mediate in good faith for it recommended that 
‘[w]here such a requirement does not already exist, legislation should be introduced which 
requires participants (disputants and their representatives) in mandatory ADR processes to 
                                                          
698
 Carter, above n 188, 372. 
699
 Ibid. 
700
 Edward F Sherman, “‘Good Faith” Participation in Mediation: Aspirational, Not Mandatory’ (1997-1998) 4 
Dispute Resolution Magazine 14, 16. 
701
 The Attorney-General’s reference to NADRAC focused on possible legislative reform of the federal civil 
justice system: NADRAC, Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 34 
[2.5]. 
702
 NADRAC, Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 38 [2.6]. 
703
 NADRAC, Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 34 [2.5]. 
NACRAC also identified a second more practical reason for making the differentiation – since the Federal 
Attorney General’s reference to NADRAC was limited to ‘possible legislative reform of the federal civil justice 
system’, NADRAC reasoned that ‘[c]onsiderable constitutional implications would attend any attempt by the 
Commonwealth to impose conduct obligations on participants involved in private ADR processes.’: 
Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 34 [2.5].    
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participate in those processes in good faith’.704 It further recommended that such legislation 
should define ‘good faith’ inclusively and ‘capture the concept of a genuine effort to abide by 
certain enumerated ADR principles’705 etched out in an earlier NADRAC publication.706 One 
such principle is that ‘people who attend a dispute resolution process should show their 
commitment to that process by listening to other views and by putting forward and 
considering options for resolution’.707 
  
NADRAC was of the view that 
[p]articipants in private ADR processes should not be required, through legislation, to adhere to 
any prescribed conduct standard. Instead, consensual adherence to appropriate conduct standards 
in private ADR should be encouraged in other ways, such as through codes of conduct, industry 
standards, and community education.
708
 
 
NADRAC appears to have had in mind standards for ADR practitioners, not standards for 
legal representatives.
709
  
 
As discussed below, in stark contrast to the view taken by NADRAC, some authors 
consider the fact that mediation is court-ordered to be a reason for not imposing conduct 
obligations on the parties. 
 
4.2.4 Problems with Proposals for a Good Faith Requirement 
 
Commentators in Australia
710
 and in the US
711
 have identified a series of problems with 
the imposition of a good faith requirement on participants in mediation. 
                                                          
704
 NADRAC, Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 38 [2.6.1]. 
Despite the recommendations made by NADRAC, its report does not constitute, in my view, a strong 
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The first problem is that we do not have a clear understanding of what good faith means 
or requires from a party or from his or her lawyer.
712
 As Lande notes ‘legal authorities 
establishing good-faith requirements and commentators’ proposals do not give clear guidance 
about what conduct is prohibited’.713 Most articulated elements of good faith such as ‘coming 
to the mediation with an open mind’714 and ‘attempting to understand the other side’, depend 
on an assessment of a person’s state of mind ie they are subjective and vague.715 NADRAC’s 
proposal for an inclusive definition by reference to general principles such as that mentioned 
above does not clarify the concept. Boettger analyses each element of Kovach’s positive 
formulation of good faith, Carter’s attempt to provide a negative definition, and Sherman’s 
minimal meaningful participation proposal and dismisses them all for subjectivity, for failing 
to provide objective grounds for sanctions, and for failing to provide reliable guidelines for 
what is and what is not appropriate behaviour.
716
 
 
A good faith requirement cannot be imposed unless everyone is clear about what it means 
and requires. ‘Commentators agree that the definition of good faith needs to be clearly and 
objectively determinable so that everyone can know what conduct is considered bad faith.’717 
As a legal term and as a basis for sanctions, it ‘must be judicially-reviewable without 
increasing the danger of case-by-case definitions’.718  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
710
 For submissions opposing further legislative action with regard to the imposition of conduct obligations, see 
Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes Report, above n 7, 32 [2.4.2] and Appendix 2.4. 
The submissions are divided into a number of categories pertaining to difficulties with definition, enforcement, 
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711
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2, 2. 
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The uncertainty generated by the concept of good faith and the lack of a clear dividing 
line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, is evident in the words of one of the 
strongest proponents for good faith. According to Kovach: 
 
Good faith would not obligate the parties to possess a sincere desire to resolve the matter, nor 
should it necessitate complete disclosure to the other participants or even the mediator. But 
information exchange is a vital part of mediation, so it is likely that an element of good faith would 
call for some sharing of information. The scope of information to be disclosed, however, would 
remain within the discretion of the participants. Honesty in terms of this information also should 
be a basic consideration in defining elements of a good faith mandate. Just ‘being nice’ also is not 
an element of good faith. One can be kind and cooperative, and yet do nothing to advance the ball 
in terms of resolution. ... Moving or changing an offer or demand also is not an essential element 
of good faith. In fact, consideration of good faith should not be based upon the content of the 
proposals.
719
 
 
The most that one can draw from the words of Kovach is that good faith requires some 
sharing of information, and that the information that is shared must be honestly given. 
 
The second problem is the over-breadth of the bad-faith concept.
720
 The proposal from 
Kovach is so broad that it effectively would prohibit defensible behaviour in mediation such 
as withholding information justifying bargaining strategies
721
 and shifting positions and 
introducing new demands as the mediator asks for additional information. These tactics are 
all integral parts of mediation. How then can these things be signs of bad faith? Boettger 
concludes that ‘[t]he only behaviour that could constitute an expression of bad faith in 
mediation is to send a representative without sufficient settlement authority’.722 However as 
discussed immediately below, this element is itself problematic.  
 
The next problem with the imposition of a good faith requirement is that of finding 
someone with authority to settle.
723
 Given that one of the primary objectives of most models 
of mediation is to devise creative solutions, it may be difficult to know ahead of time what a 
party (or a party’s representative) will be required to agree to eg it may be difficult to foresee 
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720
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the need to issue or accept an apology (and difficult to know who that apology must come 
from or go to), in order to satisfy a party.
724
 The requirement to send someone with authority 
to settle may hinder rather than promote meaningful participation. 
 
Another group of problems lies in the potential for the parties to abuse good faith 
requirements (they might just go through the motions with surface bargaining and pro forma 
compliance) and bad faith sanctions (they might make frivolous bad faith claims).
725
 
Bennight argues that the ‘harm from increased “satellite” litigation would far outweigh any 
benefit that might be realized’ and would be ‘worse than the status quo’.726 
  
The next problem has to do with the potential for inroads to be made into the 
confidentiality of mediation. If a good faith requirement is to be enforced and parties 
sanctioned for breach, someone (usually the mediator) must report on the behaviour of the 
parties. Weston suggests that a narrow confidentiality exception might be crafted to allow a 
mediator to report good-faith participation violations.
727
 However, even a narrow exception 
will result in a weakening of the confidentiality of mediation communications.
728
 The 
proponents for rules requiring higher standards of conduct in negotiation and mediation 
generally do not deal with issues such as the possible dismantling of the lawyer-client 
privilege
729
 or with the inroads which would be made into the privacy and confidentiality of 
processes designed to be private.
730
 
 
Good faith requirements are also susceptible to abuse by mediators. Such requirements 
may give mediators too much authority over the parties and increase the risk of coercion and 
inappropriate mediator conduct.
731
 Bennight argues that Kovach’s proposal ‘places 
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frightening power in the mediator’s hands’.732 The risk of inappropriate mediator intervention 
is heightened in mandatory mediation programs.
733
 
 
A good faith requirement might negatively impact on the principle of self-determination, 
particularly where mediation is mandated. Although NADRAC specifically recommended the 
use of good faith provisions in ‘mandated’ contexts, other authors argue that this is precisely 
the circumstances in which good faith participation should not be required. For instance, 
Sherman claims that in private mediations, ‘the parties are free to agree to reasonable 
participation requirements that would be enforceable by an action for breach of contract’.734 
He continues: 
 
[b]ut where the mediation is ordered by a court, participation requirements should not unduly 
interfere with the parties’ choice as to such forms of participation, how to present and argue their 
case, what information to reveal, whether to make offers or counteroffers and whether to settle.
735
 
 
Sherman further asserts that ‘[a] requirement of “good faith” participation, which is 
inherently vague and subjective, unduly entrenches on the voluntariness of settlement and on 
the parties’ legitimate right to demand their day in court.’ In short, he concludes that such a 
requirement is inconsistent with the objectives of mediation.
736
 Similarly, Boettger believes 
that a good faith requirement in mandatory mediation would further deplete the parties’ self-
determination.
737
    
 
In reality, it may be that we are not all entitled to our day in court - at least, not since the 
reforms to the civil justice system and the evolution of case management principles. 
However, Boettger may be correct in claiming, at the least, that a good-faith requirement 
overemphasizes the objective of efficiency and furthers the institutionalization of 
mediation.
738
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Finally, even assuming that the problems with respect to confidentiality can be outcome, 
good faith participation may be difficult to enforce and bad faith participation may be 
difficult to identify
739
 and sanction (a problem for which proponents for new rules generally 
do not offer a solution).
740
 In private mediations, there is little possibility of enforcement and 
effective sanction as the mediator has no authority to issue orders. In mandatory mediations, 
the court may take non-compliance into account in exercising discretionary power (such as 
discretion to award costs or to impose an adverse costs order) but it can do little else. In both 
private and mandatory mediations, it is difficult to assess the damages that might have 
resulted from alleged ‘bad faith’.741 The whole concept of sanctioning for bad faith may in 
the end be a little silly - it may lead to the absurd situation where both parties allege bad faith 
and the court has to decide who acted in ‘worse faith’.742 
 
On the subject of good faith participation, Boettger concludes that ‘the absence of a 
litigation-proof definition for good faith, the problem of determining appropriate sanctions, 
and the serious damage to mediation’s confidentiality’ make it difficult to prove that a good 
faith requirement is beneficial.
743
 In a court related context, Lande concludes that the 
imposition of a good-faith requirement is ‘likely to be ineffective and counterproductive in 
ensuring the integrity of court-connected mediation programs’.744 A good faith requirement 
does not convince the parties to engage meaningfully in the mediation process.  
 
Before leaving the subject of good faith participation, it has been suggested that ‘good 
faith’ in mediation, from the lawyer’s perspective, might include an additional obligation of 
‘allowing the client to discuss the matter directly with the other side and with the 
                                                          
739
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740
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mediator’.745 This argument illustrates one of the problems with imposing detailed regulatory 
frameworks on participant conduct in mediation (a matter which is discussed in more detail in 
part 5). There is a need for flexibility in mediation. In almost all cases, a client should be able 
to discuss an issue directly with the other side and with the mediator should the client be 
willing and able to do so. But clients are not always willing to play an active role in 
mediation, at least not initially. Additionally, there may be rare occasions when it is not in the 
best interests of the client for the client to speak freely.
746
 There are occasions when it is more 
appropriate for a lawyer to speak on behalf of his or her client, a fact acknowledged by the 
LCA Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations. Guideline 1 describes the role of lawyers in 
mediation. It states that the role will vary ‘from merely advising the client before the 
mediation, to representing the client during the mediation and undertaking all 
communications on behalf of the client’ (emphasis added).747 
 
4.2.5 Proposals with Respect to Fairness and Cooperation 
 
The matter of fairness in negotiation was addressed many years ago by Schwartz and 
Rubin. Schwartz opined that lawyers in negotiation should refrain from assisting a client by 
‘unconscionable’ means and from aiming to achieve ‘unconscionable’ ends.748 Rubin also 
argued that ‘[t]he lawyer may not accept a result that is unconscionably unfair to the other 
party’.749 Rubin reasoned that a lawyer owes a duty of fairness to the profession and to 
society such that he ought not be free to negotiate an unconscionable result with his 
                                                          
745
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opponent.
750
 This duty, in Rubin’s view, ‘must supersede any duty owed to the client’.751 
Rubin accepts that ‘some difficulty in line-drawing is inevitable’ but believes that ‘there must 
be a point at which the lawyer cannot ethically accept an arrangement that is completely 
unfair to the other side’.752 Both Schwartz and Rubin define ‘unconscionable’ by drawing its 
meaning largely from the substantive law of rescission, reformation and torts.
753
  
  
Menkel-Meadow suggests that lawyers in ADR should be subject to the following two 
commandments touching on fairness:
754
  
1. ‘Lawyers as representatives should not agree to a resolution of a problem or 
participation in a transaction that they have reason to know will cause substantial 
injustice to the other party. In essence, a lawyer should do no harm’. 
2. ‘Lawyers should treat all parties to a legal matter as they would wish to be treated 
themselves and should consider the effects of what they accomplish for their clients. 
In essence, lawyers should respect a lawyer’s golden rule’. 
 
Steele goes well beyond the general law in proposing a codification of a fairness standard 
(and one which calls for cooperation) in negotiation in the following terms:  
 
When serving as an advocate in court a lawyer must work to achieve the most favorable outcome 
for his client consistent with the law and the admissible evidence. However, when serving as a 
negotiator lawyers should strive for a result that is objectively fair. Principled negotiation between 
lawyers on behalf of clients should be a cooperative process, not an adversarial process. 
Consequently, whenever two or more lawyers are negotiating on behalf of clients, each lawyer 
owes the other an obligation of total candor and total cooperation to the extent required to insure 
that the result is fair.
755
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As mentioned in part 2, in some circumstances lawyers must think beyond the interests of 
their clients. For instance, family law practitioners are obligated by legislation to have regard 
to the interests of children. There are also some commentators, such as Hobbs, who argue that 
in family law matters at least, a lawyer should take into account the interests of other affected 
parties (eg grandparents and children) and society, in addition to those of the client.
756
 
 
Concern for the ‘fairness’ of an agreement and the interests of third parties lead 
Rutherford to argue that a legal representative should play a neutral non-adversarial role in 
mediation, providing advice to his or her client to help ensure the mediated agreement is fair 
rather than attempting to help the client obtain an advantage over the opposing party.
757
 
Rutherford asserts that a legal representative’s role is to facilitate achievement of a fair 
agreement. He rejects notions of advocacy in mediation. ‘For mediation to succeed as a 
profession and to reach its highest objectives, advocacy has no place in any part of the 
process. For outside counsel to advocate a client’s interests contradicts the very essence of 
mediation and can produce inequitable results’.758 
 
4.2.6 Problems with Proposals for a Fairness Rule and Rules Mandating Cooperation 
 
In part 2, I noted that although the professional conduct rules require lawyers to act with 
‘fairness’ in their dealings with others, they do not offer any specific guidance in relation to 
fair process, at least, not in relation to mediation. This is appropriate in the context of 
mediation for the parameters of procedural fairness are laid down by the mediator and agreed 
to by the parties. He or she will usually set out at least two behavioural guidelines, namely, 
that the parties (including their lawyers) not interrupt each other and that they not denigrate 
or threaten each other.
759
 He or she will expect (and might indeed list as a separate 
requirement) that the parties be civil and courteous to each other. The mediator is responsible 
for ensuring that the participants comply with these procedural guidelines.
760
 Mediators have 
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a number of techniques available to keep the parties and their lawyers ‘in line’. Ultimately, if 
a party or a lawyer acts contrary to established guidelines, a mediator can separate the parties 
and continue the mediation in shuttle format, or terminate the mediation.  
 
On the question of substantive fairness, the propositions advanced by Schwartz and Rubin 
have been criticized for being too general
761
 but they do not, in any event, seek to extend the 
law governing lawyers. They simply reiterate the doctrine of unconsionability. The proposals 
advanced by Menkel-Meadow – ‘do no harm’ and ‘do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you’ are fine sentiments but unworkable and vague (which Menkel-Meadow herself 
acknowledges in suggesting that they would be no more than aspirational guidelines). 
 
There are a number of problems with Steele’s proposal. He does not define pivotal 
concepts such as ‘objectively fair’ and ‘cooperation’. Such concepts may not be susceptible 
to definition and they are subject to the same problems of lack of enforcement as good faith 
provisions. Rosenberger notes that any attempt to codify concepts such as fair dealing in the 
negotiation context ‘may well both be unworkable and create more problems than any such 
obligations would solve.’762 Notwithstanding that the Victorian Parliament recently saw fit to 
include a directive to cooperate in civil proceedings (including dispute resolution processes 
associated with those proceedings),
763
 Condlin also writes of the difficulty ‘of expressing the 
idea of cooperative bargaining through the medium of rule-based incentives and 
constraints’.764 ‘Cooperation is not a formula or technique so much as it is an attitude or state 
of mind for approaching a bargaining setting’.765  He observes further that ‘[t]he idea of 
legislating cooperation has some of the same oxymoronic properties as ordering freedom or 
compelling moral action’. 766  In any event, as will be illustrated shortly, a degree of 
competition is necessary for negotiations to be effective. 
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Steele also assumes, incorrectly, that all negotiations (including mediations) should be 
conducted using principled negotiation. He assumes, again incorrectly, that principled 
negotiation calls for complete candour and cooperation. The limitations of principled or 
interest-based negotiation are explored separately in this part of the exegesis.  
 
Rutherford’s proposal is also flawed. He does not define what he means by a ‘fair 
outcome’. He goes too far in suggesting that lawyers should play a neutral role in mediation. 
If anyone in the mediation process should be neutral, it surely must be the mediator. It is 
unlikely that clients would retain separate representatives if those representatives were to 
function as neutrals. 
 
And so Fox is strongly of the view that legal representatives owe a duty to the client, not 
the mediation process and not to a fair outcome.
767
  
 
Some assert that the role of the lawyer in mediation is not to advocate for the client, but to assure 
the process is a fair one that results in a settlement satisfactory to all participants. But the ethical 
lawyer cannot apply that standard to his or her conduct in mediation. Whatever outward 
appearance the lawyer representing a client in mediation may assume, the duty of the lawyer must 
be clear: to represent the client and only the client during the entire mediation process.
768
 
 
According to Fox, a range of conciliatory behaviours might be appropriate – ‘but only if their 
sole purpose is to advance the interests of the client’.769 In the main, I agree with Fox except I 
would qualify his statements by adding that lawyers owe a paramount duty to the 
administration of justice and that there may be occasions when that duty supersedes the duty 
to the client (as it would, for example, when the client’s interests diverged from those of 
children involved in a family law dispute). I agree with Fox that lawyers do not owe a duty to 
the mediation process and that they do not owe a duty to ensure a fair outcome (whatever that 
means). As discussed in Part 2, they do not even owe their own clients a duty to ensure a fair 
outcome. 
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Rutherford is also incorrect in asserting that advocacy has no place in mediation. The 
connection between mediation and advocacy is discussed separately later in this part of the 
exegesis. 
 
4.2.7 Proposals in Relation to Interest-based Negotiation  
 
Steele proposes that lawyers in mediation should use ‘principled negotiation’.770 Parker 
and Evans assert that the purpose of ADR is ‘to assist the client to resolve their dispute 
through interest-based negotiation’.771 Mendel-Meadow argues that mediation is premised on 
problem-solving negotiation.
772
 All of these authors assert that the parties should use a 
particular approach to negotiation (variously referred to as principled, interest-based or 
problem-solving negotiation). 
 
Parties in negotiation typically adopt one of two major approaches,
773
 positional (or 
distributive) negotiation or interest-based (or integrative) negotiation.
774
 In positional 
negotiation, each party begins by advocating a single specific solution (or position) to the 
problem. In order to maximise their respective gain, each party will usually adopt an extreme 
position and conceal information as to the level or point at which they are prepared to 
settle.
775
 An agreement can only be reached by the parties successively conceding to new 
positions. Proponents of interest-based negotiation argue that in the process of maintaining 
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and then giving up on a series of positions, the parties may overlook the reasons why they 
originally adopted the position (ie to satisfy their needs or interests).  As a result, the 
agreement reached may not be reflective of the interests of either party.
776
  
 
In interest-based negotiation, attention is given to the needs or interests of the parties, the 
reasons why they have adopted a particular position rather than to the position itself.
777
 The 
rationale for focusing on interests is that for every interest there may exist several possible 
solutions that could satisfy it. It may be possible to find a solution which meets the interests 
of all parties.
778
 In the sense that interest-based negotiation seeks to broaden the range of 
acceptable solutions, it is said to expand the pie to be divided between the parties (for this 
reason, it is often referred to as value creating rather than value claiming negotiation). 
 
Interest-based negotiation was popularized by Fisher and Ury in their book Getting to 
Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.
779
 Their model of interest-based negotiation 
relies upon the following four principles:
780
 
1. ‘Separate the people from the problem’:781 disentangle the people problems from 
the substantive problems and work on each separately. 
2. ‘Focus on interests, not positions’: 782  identify and make explicit the needs or 
interests that the people want satisfied from the negotiation.
783
 
3. Generate a variety of options for mutual gain: before deciding upon a specific 
solution, invent a variety of alternatives ‘that advance shared interests and 
creatively reconcile differing interests’.784 
4. ‘Insist that the result be based on some objective standard’: 785  where interests 
conflict, make a decision based on ‘some fair standard independent of the naked 
will of either side’.786 
 
                                                          
776
 Fisher and Ury, above n 183, 5. 
777
 Ibid 11. 
778
 Ibid 43. 
779
 Ibid. 
780
 Bobette Wolski, ‘The Role and Limitations of Fisher and Ury’s Model of Interest-based Negotiation in 
Mediation’ (1994) 5 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 210, 211. 
781
 Fisher and Ury, above n 183, 11. 
782
 Ibid. 
783
 Ibid. 
784
 Ibid 12. 
785
 Ibid 11. Condlin asserts that the distinctive characteristic of interest-based negotiation is its insistence on 
using objective criteria: Condlin, above n 105, 25. 
786
 Fisher and Ury, above n 183, 12. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 140 - 15- Aug-11 
 
According to Fisher and Ury, the desired outcome of interest-based negotiation is a ‘wise 
agreement’,787 defined by Fisher and Ury as ‘one which meets the legitimate interests of each 
side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes 
community interests into account’788 and which is reached through a process that does not 
adversely affect the parties’ relationship.789 
 
There is undoubtedly a procedural bias towards interest-based negotiation in mediation. 
Much of the literature (and rhetoric) pertaining to mediation has it premised on ‘interest-
based’ negotiation. 790  Most mediators are trained in some variant of Fisher and Ury’s 
model
791
 and in at least one model of mediation (ie the facilitative model), there is a clear 
focus on interests rather than positions.
792
 The terminology of interest-based negotiation has 
even found its way into some mediator standards. For example, clause 2.1.5 of the 
Queensland Law Society’s Standards of Conduct for Solicitor Mediators (at 23 September 
1998)
793
 states that one of the functions of mediators is to ‘promote interest-based bargaining 
among the parties where possible’.  
  
Presently neither the law of lawyering (including the professional conduct rules) nor any 
rule of custom requires lawyers (or their clients) to use interest-based negotiation. Nor is 
there any prohibition on lawyers acting competitively rather than cooperatively. This position 
should be maintained for interest-based negotiation is not always possible or appropriate. 
 
4.2.8 Problems with Proposals Requiring Interest-based Negotiation 
 
Many situations are not amenable to interest-based negotiation. Interest-based negotiation 
assumes that ‘the pie can be expanded’ by focusing on interests and inventing alternative 
solutions that leave everyone satisfied. However, in real life the opportunities to create 
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integrative solutions that meet the interests of all the parties might be limited. They are likely 
to be limited when:
794
 
 
1. The underlying interests or values of the parties are actually opposed (as they are in 
the right to life versus right to abortion debate). 
 
2. There is one critical issue involved (for instance, the amount of compensation to be 
paid for injury to a person or damage to property or where each side claims exclusive 
possession of property).
795
 When compensation is the issue, one more dollar for the 
victim usually means one less dollar for the insurance company. Some authors claim 
that single-issue negotiations do not exist, except in theory. When the central issue is 
the amount of money to change hands (as compensation or for the purchase of a 
commodity), the timing and manner of payment are also negotiable issues.
796
 In 
addition, the parties usually have a mutual interest in the process or manner by which 
their substantive issue is resolved. But it is undoubtedly the case that the opportunities 
for integrative bargaining are fewer when there are fewer disputed issues on the 
negotiation table.
797
 
 
3. There are conflicting objective criteria (such as varying judicial decisions and a 
number of different opinions from experts).
798
 The search for objective criteria may 
result in a conflict as to which criteria are more legitimate or persuasive. 
Alternatively, there may be no objective criteria by which to gauge likely outcomes 
(in this case, it may be appropriate to obtain an authoritative decision from a judge). 
In fact, Fisher and Ury conceded that in most negotiations there will be no one ‘right’ 
                                                          
794
 Wolski, above n 780, 214-7. Wetlaufer also uses a number of fact scenarios to demonstrate that 
‘opportunities for integrative bargaining, especially meaningful opportunities for integrative bargaining (e.g., 
where the pie may be made to expand and to stay expanded), exist within a narrower range of circumstances 
than sometimes has been claimed’: Gerald B Wetlaufer, ‘The Limits of Integrative Bargaining’ (1996-1997) 85 
Georgetown Law Journal 369, 390. 
795
 Wolski, above n 780, 215-6; Raiffa, above n 774, 13; Raymond A Whiting, ‘The Single-Issue, Multiple-Issue 
Debate and the Effect of Issue Number on Mediated Outcomes’ (1992) 10 Mediation Quarterly 57. 
796
 Ross P Buckley, ‘The Applicability of Mediation Skills to the Creation of Contracts’ (1992) 3 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 227, 235; Whiting, above n 795. 
797
 Gifford, above n 258, 70. 
798
 Wolski, above n 780, 217. Fisher and Ury do not explain why it is reasonable to find only one meta-criterion: 
Condlin, above n 105, 33. 
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or ‘fairest’ answer and that people will advance different standards by which to judge 
what is fair.
799
 
 
In all three situations described above (when interests or values conflict, when there is 
one critical issue involved and where objective criteria are uncertain or absent), the parties 
are likely to adopt a positional approach to negotiation.
800
  
 
While there are more opportunities to expand the pie in multiple-issue negotiations,
801
 
‘one simple fact remains: [s]ooner or later, that pie must be cut and the value claimed’.802 
Most negotiations will reach a distributive phase where value is being claimed,
803
 a point at 
which ‘the gains of one party are won at the loss of the other’.804 When that point is reached, 
each party will be interested in getting a bigger slice of the pie and in convincing the other 
side, and the mediator, of the merits of their position. At that point, the parties will use tactics 
associated with distributive negotiation.
805
 
  
  
                                                          
799
 Fisher and Ury, above n 183, 153. Wheeler points out that even the standards that Fisher and Ury suggest eg 
legal precedents, business norms etc may not themselves be just: Michael Wheeler, ‘Swimming with 
Saints/Praying with Sharks’ in Menkel-Meadow and Wheeler, above n 16, xxxvii. 
800
 Even Fisher and Ury recognise that some situations are not amenable to interest-based negotiation. They 
concede that positional bargaining might be the best way to proceed where the negotiation concerns a single 
issue (such as the price to be paid for a commodity), where it takes place among strangers, where the transaction 
costs of exploring each party’s interests are high and where each side is protected by competitive opportunities: 
Roger Fisher, ‘Negotiating Power’ (1983) 27 American Behavioral Scientist 123, 149. 
801
 The parties will only reap the benefit of these opportunities if they negotiate on issues simultaneously. If they 
negotiate on one issue at a time – that is, they negotiate issues sequentially rather than simultaneously, they are 
likely to take up successive positions and make successive concessions until a point of agreement is reached in 
relation to each issue. Agreement on any one issue may reduce the ability to make trade-offs on later issues and 
reduce the number of options available for overall resolution of the problem: Jeffrey Z Rubin and Bert R Brown, 
The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (Academic Press Inc, 1975) 146; Wolski, above n 780, 
218. 
802
 Zachery Z Annable, ‘Beyond the Thunderdome – The Search for a New Paradigm of Modern Dispute 
Resolution: The Advent of Collaborative Lawyering and Its Conformity with the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct’ (2004-2005) 29 Journal of the Legal Profession 157, 164 (citations omitted). Also see Wetlaufer, 
above n 794, 390. 
803
 Also see Kay Elkins-Elliott and Frank W Elliott, ‘Settlement Advocacy’ (2004-2005) 11 Texas Wesleyan 
Law Review 7, 21; Norton, above n 161, 530. 
804
 Karrass, above n 774, 145. Also see James J White, ‘Essay Review: The Pros and Cons of “Getting to Yes”’ 
and Comment by Roger Fisher (1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 115, 116.  
805
 Wetlaufer, above n 794, 390; Raymond A Friedman and Debra L Shapiro, ‘Deception and Mutual Gains 
Bargaining: Are They Mutually Exclusive?’ (1995) 11 Negotiation Journal 243, 250. In this context, the terms 
‘integrative’ and ‘distributive’ bargaining are more apt than interest-based and positional negotiation. See 
Wetlaufer for a useful description of integrative and distributive bargaining: 370. 
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The reality then is that ‘even within the range of circumstances in which there are 
significant opportunities for integrative bargaining, the bargainer must almost always engage 
in distributive bargaining as well’.806 Put another way, most negotiations involve a mixture of 
styles and approaches; they are neither purely integrative nor purely distributive.
807
  
 
Cooperative tactics (eg being open, sharing information and not misleading about 
minimum requirements) are thought appropriate to interest-based negotiation while more 
competitive tactics (making high opening offers and small and slow concessions, concealing 
and misrepresenting information, threatening and bluffing) are generally associated with 
positional negotiation.
808
 But this categorisation is an oversimplification – negotiators may 
select tactics from both sets ie they may simultaneously (or sequentially) employ both 
cooperative and competitive tactics.
809
 ‘[F]ew negotiations occur where a wise negotiator 
would not employ at least some of each set of behaviors. Indeed, one of the more interesting 
challenges faced by negotiators is how to balance both of these elements.’810 
  
Most negotiators will have to manage a constant tension between integrative and 
distributive moves. Rubin writes of the way in which negotiators are continually pulled in a 
number of extreme directions.
811
 He identifies three ‘tightropes of negotiation’ along which 
negotiators must traverse and, ultimately, attempt to find some balance.
812
 The tightropes (or 
extremes) that he identifies are: 
 
Cooperation as against competition. A negotiator will want to be competitive enough to 
secure the most favourable outcome for herself or himself but not so competitive as to 
alienate the other party. A negotiator will also want to be cooperative enough to ensure an 
agreement is reached but not so cooperative as to give up more than is necessary. 
                                                          
806
 Wetlaufer, above n 794, 390. 
807
 Friedman and Shapiro, above n 805, 244, 247. 
808
 Wetlaufer, above n 794, 371. 
809
 Gifford, above n 258, 57. Also see Gifford’s discussion of Dean Pruitt’s strategic choice model of 
negotiation ‘which recognises that various negotiation strategies will be used in the same negotiation’: Gifford, 
above n 258, 57. 
810
 Friedman and Shapiro, above n 805, 247. This tension is recognised by other authors, see, eg, Craver, above 
n 283, 305; Alex J Hurder, ‘The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be a Problem-Solving Negotiator’ (2007-
2008) 14 Clinical Law Review 253, 291; Annable, above n 802, 33; Gifford, above n 258, 42.      
811
 Also on the tensions facing negotiators, see Jonathan M Hyman, ‘Trial Advocacy and Methods of 
Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?’ (1986-1987) 34 University of California Los 
Angeles  Law Review 863, 889-93. 
812
 Rubin, above n 67, 136-7. For a discussion on ‘negotiation tightropes’, see Wolski, above n 15, 497-8. 
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‘[O]verly cooperative negotiators will fail to engage in the most creative problem solving 
and reach the most effective outcomes’.813 
 
Honesty and openness as against misrepresentation and non-disclosure. Candour can help 
negotiators expand the bargaining zone (the area in which an agreement is possible) but if 
a negotiator is too honest and open, he or she runs the risk of being exploited. On the other 
hand, if a negotiator adopts a policy of non-disclosure and even misrepresentation, he or 
she may lose the trust of the other side.
814
  
 
 Short-term gains as opposed to long-term gains. If a negotiator pushes hard and ruthlessly 
in order to secure short-term goals, he or she runs the risk of losing the cooperation and 
respect of other parties that may be needed to secure long-term goals in the next round of 
negotiations.
815
 
 
As Rubin’s work demonstrates, negotiation is ‘a study in tensions’. Condlin captures 
these tensions in stating that: 
  
If dispute settlement is primarily strategic, its central strategic choice is whether to cooperate or 
compete, both in deciding how to make each of the hundreds of individual tactical maneuvers and 
moves that make up a single negotiation, and in selecting an overall bargaining strategy. These 
decisions include whether to share information or conceal it, exploit leverage or seek a fair return, 
browbeat an adversary or discuss and analyse views evenhandedly, and describe wants accurately 
or inflate and state them as demands. With respect to the selection of an overall strategy, these 
decisions also include whether to give the opponent the benefit of the doubt and cooperate until 
betrayed, or to assume the worst and try for a pre-emptive or decisive first strike’.816 
 
  
                                                          
813
 Burr, above n 202, 13. 
814
 The question of how much candour to exhibit is ‘one of the most difficult normative questions with which 
negotiators wrestle’: Russell Korobkin, ‘A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation’ (1999-2000) 88 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1789, 1816.  
815
 This assumes a long term relationship. Condlin notes that ‘in any single negotiation, where there is no 
prospect of future dealing, it is usually irrational for individual bargainers to act cooperatively’: Condlin, above 
n 105, 12. Also see Wolski, above n 15, 498. 
816
 Condlin, above n 105, 11. 
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Condlin confirms that an effective negotiator uses both cooperative and competitive 
strategies, noting that:  
 
Successful bargainers are those who blend cooperative and competitive choices into a unified 
approach so that they are able to share private information without making themselves 
disproportionately vulnerable, test differing legal views without weakening their support for 
nonrelated issues, and invent and make multiple proposals for settlement without committing 
themselves to the worst of the possibilities. They cooperate with an eye toward protecting their 
competitive positions and compete so as not to preclude the development of mutual trust and 
bipartisan effort, even though competitive strategies make cooperation more difficult and 
cooperative moves make parties disproportionately vulnerable to competitive responses.
817
 
 
Those commentators who call for use of interest-based negotiation (including Fisher and 
Ury, Steele, Mendel-Meadow and Parker and Evans), ignore a great deal about the reality and 
theory of negotiation. Condlin concludes that ‘ADR bargaining scholarship overdid things 
somewhat, rejecting all types of adversarial maneuvering rather than just its mean-spirited 
and asocial forms’.818 
   
As a more realistic alternative (although still inclined towards interest-based negotiation), 
Robinson proposes that practitioners take a ‘cautiously cooperative approach to mediation’819 
to deal with the tension between integrative and distributive negotiation.
820
 He urges 
negotiators to ‘be cautious and circumspect, revealing as little and defending as much as 
possible until the other’s intentions are known.’821 This approach is nothing but common 
sense.  
 
There are two additional overlapping misconceptions about mediation and interest-based 
negotiation that often appear in the literature.  First, it is wrongly assumed that interest-based 
negotiation is synonymous with ethical negotiation (and that positional negotiation is 
                                                          
817
 Condlin, above n 105, 11. Also see Condlin’s detailed analysis of a number of cooperative or communitarian 
approaches to negotiation including cordial bargaining, principled bargaining and the problem-solving 
bargaining model proposed by Menkel-Meadow: Condlin, above n 672, 16-34. 
818
 Condlin, above n 672, 88. Wetlaufer echos this sentiment in noting that: ‘[i]t seems clear that there has been 
a certain amount of overclaiming that has been done in the name of integrative bargaining’: Wetlaufer, above n 
794, 391. 
819
 Peter Robinson, ‘Contending with Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: A Cautiously Cooperative Approach to 
Mediation Advocacy’ (1998) 50 Baylor Law Review 963. 
820
 Ibid 963. 
821
 Condlin, above n 105, 9. 
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unethical). Second, it is wrongly assumed that interest-based negotiation requires complete 
candour. 
 
Ethics and interest-based negotiation are separate issues (although it is not uncommon for 
proponents of interest-based negotiation or Mutual Gains Bargaining (MGB)
822
 to equate the 
two).
823
 In fact, neither the interest-based (integrative) nor positional (distributive) approach 
is unethical.
824
 Unfortunately, the ‘principles’ of interest-based negotiation enumerated by 
Fisher and Ury ‘inadvertently’ give the impression that they are more ‘honest’ and ethical 
than traditional negotiations (especially with the label ‘principled’ being used to describe the 
approach).
825
 As a result ‘[e]thics and MGB become conflated’.826 
 
But as Friedman and Shapiro point out: 
 
MGB suggests that negotiators explain to their opponent what their interests are, so that the 
opponent can propose actions that meet one’s real needs at least cost. It does not, however, say 
anything about revealing one’s alternatives to a negotiated agreement, what one’s true reservation 
price is, or how much money is in the bargaining budget – all of which influence what final 
position will be acceptable.
827
 
 
In other words, MGB and deception are not mutually exclusive, as some proponents of 
MGB claim.
828
 
 
MGB says only that you should not deceive the other party about your core, underlying interests. 
And – this is worth emphasizing – the reason for this prescription is not that being honest about 
interests is inherently ethical. Rather, it is that being honest about one’s interests can help you get 
more.
829
 
 
                                                          
822
 Friedman and Shapiro refer to interest-based negotiation as Mutual Gains Bargaining or MGB: Friedman and 
Shapiro, above n 805, 244. 
823
 Ibid. 
824
 McKay, above n 568, 19. 
825
 Friedman and Shapiro, above n 805, 246. 
826
 Ibid 247. 
827
 Ibid 246. 
828
 Ibid 244. 
829
 Ibid 246. 
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Wetlaufer takes the same view as Friedman and Shapiro stating that the argument for 
openness and truth-telling in interest-based negotiation is not an argument for openness and 
truth-telling with respect to everything, but instead is ‘limited to information useful in 
identifying and exploiting opportunities for integrative bargaining’.830 Even in interest-based 
negotiation, negotiators may hide their true level of dependency (eg by asserting that they 
have other offers), fail to disclose their bottom line and exaggerate the value of their options 
in the event of no agreement.
831
  
 
The truth of these assertions is borne out by statements from members of the pro interest-
based negotiation camp. For example, Menkel-Meadow, the most ardent of proponents for 
new rules for mediation, concedes that ‘completely open, information sharing, trusting, and 
joint-solution seeking behaviour’ will not be appropriate or fair in all settings.832 And Peppet 
states that ‘[c]ollaboration does not mean revealing all of one’s information, preferences, 
interests, and litigation strategies’.833 Hurder claims that the problem-solving approach does 
not require total disclosure of a party’s secrets and confidences (and he categorically states 
that it does not require lawyers to violate the confidentiality of clients),
834
 but it does require 
that the parties take the risk of exposing themselves to some degree.
835
 Even in interest-based 
negotiation, honesty and full candour is not the norm.  
 
Finally, I suspect that some proponents of interest-based negotiation in mediation think 
that mediation should be about interests, not law – after all, one of its principles is to focus on 
interests. They forget that one of the other principles of interest-based negotiation is to use 
objective criteria to determine differences and that the law is one such criteria. There is 
nothing wrong with arguing over legal rights in informal dispute settlement. As Condlin 
asserts, ‘[l]egal argument contributes to the legitimacy of bargained-for agreements by 
resolving the substantive conflicts at the base of disputes’. 836  As he sees it, substantive 
competitiveness ‘is indispensable to successful bargaining’.837 Substantive competitiveness 
includes eg making strong demands when warranted, refusing to change views without good 
                                                          
830
 Wetlaufer, above n 794, 390-1. 
831
 Friedman and Shapiro, above n 805, 245. 
832
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 16, xxx (she does not indicate the circumstances in which it would not be 
appropriate). 
833
 Peppet, above n 28, 535. 
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 Hurder, above n 810, 295. 
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 Condlin, above n 672, 82. 
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reasons, and supporting positions with well-developed arguments – ‘its goal is to have one’s 
views about applicable law or practical concerns adopted by the parties as the basis for 
settlement, and thus, to produce the best outcome consistent with the strength of one’s 
substantive claims’.838 Surely there is a role for a legal advocate in this process. 
 
4.2.9 Proposals to ‘Remove’ (Adversarial) Advocacy from Mediation 
 
As was noted earlier, Rutherford believes that advocacy has no place in mediation.
839
 
Menkel-Meadow and Schuwerk both assert that the ‘ethic of zeal’ associated with adversarial 
advocacy is incompatible with mediation, and in particular, that ‘excessive adversarial zeal 
can undermine the goals of mediation’.840 Bowie thought that mediation might, by its nature, 
require non-adversarial behavior.
841
 Drawing upon the New South Wales Law Society’s 
Professional Standards for Legal Representatives in a Mediation, Parker and Evans assert 
that it is the duty of the lawyer ‘[t]o participate in a non-adversarial manner.’842 
 
4.2.10 Problems with Proposals in Relation to Adversarial Advocacy 
 
There are several separate issues involved in the assertion that excessive and/or zealous 
adversarial advocacy is incompatible with mediation (although the authors mentioned above 
do not unravel them). The issues are: 
1. Is there a place for excessive adversarial zeal in mediation? 
2. Is advocacy (even zealous advocacy) incompatible with mediation? 
3. Is all advocacy adversarial in nature (because that is the assumption made by the 
authors mentioned above)? 
4. Must the parties and their lawyers behave in a non-adversarial manner in mediation? 
 
The answer to the first two questions depends on how one defines ‘zeal’; the answer to 
questions numbered two and three depends on how ‘advocacy’ is defined. 
                                                          
838
 Ibid. 
839
 Rutherford, above n 757, 27. 
840
 Schuwerk, above n 2, 765 (Schuwerk was commenting on Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, above n 2, 427). 
841
 Bowie, above n 6, 34. 
842
 Parker and Evans, above n 17, 135. The standard to which they refer is not drafted in the language of a rule: 
see the Law Society of New South Wales, Professional Standards for Legal Representatives in a Mediation (at 
1 January 2008) s 2.3. 
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Menkel-Meadow chose to use ‘zeal’ in such a way as to ‘high-light the “zealotry” 
implicated in zeal’.843 But other commentators reject this meaning. For example, Bernstein 
argues that it is an error to equate zeal with zealotry.
844
 Bernstein suggests that ‘zeal’ has two 
elements, a ‘commitment to one side (rather than to a neutral search for truth)’ and passion.845 
With respect to the first element of zeal, he argues that all conscientious lawyers, even in 
transactional work, anticipate the possibility that harmony will turn sour and practise with a 
‘potential adversary in mind’.846 This approach does not preclude ‘treating this adversary 
with kindness or even deference, if such treatment would serve the needs of one’s client’.847 
Partisan commitment might even lead a lawyer to recommend settlement to a client.
848
 
Bernstein argues that the second element of zeal - passion - requires effectiveness, creativity, 
attention to detail, ‘enthusiasm, energy, and benevolent effort’.849  
 
However ‘zeal’ is defined, most authors agree that excessive adversarial zeal is out of 
place, in mediation and in litigation.
850
 There is no place in either context for ‘table-
pounding, endless discovery or boisterous behaviour’851 or ‘for a win-at-all costs mentality, 
and out-and-out dishonesty’.852 
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 Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 2, 430. 
844
 Anita Bernstein, ‘The Zeal Shortage’ (2005-2006) 34 Hofstra Law Review 1165, 1175, 1178. She also argues 
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1177.  
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 Ibid 1171. 
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 Fox, above n 131, 41; Hazard, above n 120, 379. Generally see Fred C Zacharias, ‘Five Lessons For 
Practicing Law In The Interests of Justice’ (2002) 70 Fordham Law Review 1939. 
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 Fox, above n 131, 41. 
852
 Sandra S Beckwith and Sherri G Slovin, ‘The Collaborative Lawyer as Advocate: A Response’ (2002-2003) 
18 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 497, 498. 
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But there are authors who see a place for zealous advocacy in mediation.
853
 For example, 
Bordone opines:
854
   
 
In my view, the duty of zealous advocacy is not the problem. Whether a lawyer is representing a 
client in mediation, arbitration, litigation, or negotiation, a goal of zealous advocacy in the interest 
of the client is laudable. We need not back away from this in any re-design of ethics rules for 
negotiators. The problem is not zealous advocacy, but rather what zealous advocacy might mean in 
the context of each individual dispute resolution process. In litigation, zealous advocacy means 
winning an argument by persuading a third person (a jury or judge) that your version of events or 
your understanding of the law is true or correct. On the other hand, in negotiation, zealous 
advocacy entails identifying the underlying interests of the client and then employing one’s skills 
of listening, creativity, and joint problem-solving to best meet those interests and attain a satisfying 
and efficient outcome.
855
 
 
Of course, advocacy must also be defined (authors who argue against it tend not to 
defined it). Bordone gives a satisfactory definition of advocacy in the context of litigation in 
the last mentioned quotation. Former Chief Justice Kirby similarly notes that in the litigation 
context, an advocate has the task of persuading ‘the decision-maker (judge, magistrate, 
tribunal member, juror) to accept the propositions advanced by the advocate leading to the 
success of the advocate’s cause.’856 I emphasise the words ‘task’857 and ‘persuading’ because 
advocacy might be thought of as the task of persuading another.
858
 Indeed, advocacy has been 
defined very broadly as ‘the art of persuasion’.859 In mediation, an advocate’s task is to 
                                                          
853
 See, eg, Fox, above n 131, 39-41 (who argues that zealous advocacy and mediation are compatible concepts 
and that lawyers’ duties are to their clients not the mediation process). For other authors who argue that 
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nd
 ed, 1991) 155. 
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persuade the other party
860
 and more controversially, the mediator. In this respect, I think the 
drafters of the LCA Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations had the wrong idea about 
advocacy. Clause 6.2 of the guidelines state: 
 
The skills required for a successful mediation are different to those desirable in advocacy. It is not 
the other lawyer or mediator that needs to be convinced; it is the client on the other side of the 
table. A lawyer who adopts a persuasive rather than adversarial or aggressive approach, and 
acknowledges the concerns of the other side, is more likely to contribute to a better result.  
 
Clause 6.2 still speaks of advocacy – ie persuasion. 
 
More recently, Julie Macfarlane expressed similar views on this topic and in the process, 
she appears to have coined some new phrases, those of ‘settlement advocacy’ and ‘client 
resolution advocacy’.861 She opines: 
 
There is no lessening of the lawyer’s responsibility to achieve the best possible outcome for his 
client in client resolution advocacy. In fact, advocacy as conflict resolution places the constructive 
and creative promotion of partisan outcomes at the center of the advocate’s role and sees this goal 
as entirely compatible with working with the other side. In fact, this goal can only be achieved by 
working with the other side. The new lawyer remains just as dedicated to achieving her client’s 
goals as the warrior or adversarial advocate. What changes is that her primary skill becomes her 
effectiveness and ability to achieve the best possible negotiated settlement, while she remains 
prepared to litigate if necessary. There is no contradiction between a commitment to explore every 
possibility of facilitating an agreement with the other side and a strong primary loyalty to one’s 
own client. ... A contradiction between client loyalty and creative consensus building only exists if 
counsel is convinced that the only effective way to advance the client’s wishes is by using rights-
based processes. Aside from these fairly exceptional cases, the goal of the conflict resolution 
advocate is to persuade the other side to settle – on her client’s best possible terms.862 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
technique of persuasion’: David Napley, The Technique of Persuasion (Sweet and Maxwell, 4th ed, 1991) 1. For 
even broader definitions of advocacy, see Lee and Fox, above n 858, 155; Timothy Pinos, ‘Advocacy Training:  
Building The Model - A Theoretical Foundation’ (1983) 1 Journal of Professional Legal Education 18. For 
more detailed discussion on the meaning attributed to ‘advocacy’, see Wolski, above n 15, 679-81. 
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 Lawrence also declares that ‘[m]ediation requires a change in mind-set from adversarial proceedings because 
the objective is different. At trial, the goal is to persuade the judge. In mediation, the goal is to persuade the 
other party to the dispute’: Lawrence, above n 73, 426-7. 
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 Marilyn A K Scott, ‘Collaborative Law: Dispute Resolution Competencies for the “New Advocacy”’ (2008) 
8 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 213, 227. 
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 Julie Macfarlane, ‘The Evolution of the New Lawyer: How Lawyers are Reshaping the Practice of Law’ 
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Some of these authors touch upon the skills required by lawyers in representing or 
advocating for their clients in mediation. This is a topic to which I return shortly.  
 
Clearly, not all advocacy is adversarial - if by that term we mean that representatives act 
like combatants. Bordone speaks of advocates engaging in joint problem-solving, while 
Macfarlane speaks of the advocate working with the other side. An advocate will consider 
solutions that accommodate the interests of other parties as well as those of their client, and 
help clients to see that solutions, not judgments, may be in their best interests.
863
 
 
Finally, must the parties and their lawyers behave in a non-adversarial manner in 
mediation? The answer to this question is ‘no’. Mediation need not be non-adversarial to 
retain its character as mediation.
864
 The same is true of unassisted negotiation. A client may 
approach mediation as a contest, determined to advance his or her legal position, rather than 
to secure an agreement which satisfies everyone’s interests. This fact does not mean the 
dispute is inappropriate for mediation and it does not make mediation ineffective. In order for 
the parties to reach an agreement, a proposal need only address the other side’s interests 
sufficiently well to move toward agreement.
865
 It may still be to everyone’s advantage to 
avoid legal costs and the trauma associated with a court case.  
 
In her work on negotiation, Norton expresses the view that ‘the basic character of the 
[negotiation] relationship is always in some respect adversarial’866 although ‘cooperative or 
problem-solving bargaining strategies and tactics are used’.867 Indeed, she believes that ‘[a]n 
adversarial posture is necessary in bargaining to protect and advance the parties’ interests, 
including their interests in ethical treatment’.868 An adversarial posture ‘facilitates the search 
for truthful information, helps guard against injurious disclosures, and helps prevent 
treatment that could prejudice a party’s interests’.869 But, lying and unfairness are ‘not a 
                                                          
863
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necessary function of the adversarial posture’.870 ‘The posture requires partisanship, not its 
excesses’.871  
 
4.3 The Lawyer’s Role: New Skills 
 
Menkel-Meadow claims that new professional conduct rules are needed because legal 
representatives perform different roles in ADR from traditional adversary practice.
872
 I do not 
agree with this view. To a large extent, the roles undertaken by legal representatives in a 
particular mediation will depend on the knowledge, skills, actions and attitudes of the 
mediator. At one extreme, legal representatives may be no more than passive observers (in 
fact, lawyers may not even be present at the mediation). At the other extreme, lawyers may 
take on the role of spokesperson for the client.
873
 But generally, as with litigation, so too with 
mediation - a lawyer may be required to undertake the roles of adviser, evaluator/risk 
assessor, counsellor, negotiator, advocate, and drafter of documents. As Nolan-Haley notes, 
‘[t]he scope of representational lawyering in mediation encompasses the functions which 
lawyers perform generally for clients: counselling, negotiation, evaluation, and advocacy.’874 
To discharge these roles, lawyers perform a common set of tasks such as: 
 gathering/giving information and reframing issues; 
 advising the client of the law that applies; 
 evaluating the merits of the client’s case and giving the client an objective view of the 
likelihood of success on the merits if the matter proceeds to trial; 
 reminding the client that ‘merit’ is only one matter that the client should be 
considering
875
 and encouraging the client to look at broader interests
876
 eg their 
‘social, psychological, and economic interests’877 and their relationship with the other 
party;  
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872
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 assisting the client to consider a range of process options; 
 assessing the client’s case for its suitability for mediation or other dispute resolution 
process; 
 facilitating negotiations (or mediation) and attempting to settle if it is in the client’s 
interests to do so; and 
 generating and evaluating alternative options and solutions.878 
 
In fact, the importance of some of these tasks is heightened in mediation. One of the 
primary tasks of legal representatives is to advise clients of their legal rights and obligations. 
This is a central task in every transaction undertaken by lawyers on behalf of clients. 
Nowhere is it more important than in mediation where the power of decision-making rests 
with the client (and there is no judge to ensure appropriate application of substantive law). 
Clients need to be in a position to make informed decisions. Lawyers are sometimes criticised 
for bringing law into mediation but if legal rights and obligations are involved, parties can 
benefit from an adversarial look at their position. ‘A prediction of the likely results of 
adversary processing is necessary for an informed, fully voluntary decision about a mediated 
solution.’879  
 
Lawyers can support and enhance the values of empowerment and self-determination in 
mediation by promoting informed consent. They can ‘safeguard client voice,’880 and ‘guide 
clients towards responsible decisionmaking’.881 
 
Legal representatives can also protect their clients against unfairness.
882
 Most standards of 
conduct for mediators assume that mediators will take appropriate interventions to address a 
power imbalance between the parties but legal representatives are better placed to do so than 
mediators (for a mediator must try to preserve at least the appearance of impartiality). 
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Lawyers can protect their clients where necessary from any unfair bargaining advantage the 
other side may have.
883 
 
It may well be necessary and appropriate for legal representatives to monitor a mediator’s 
use of power
884
 and to protect clients from the mediator.
885
 In particular, when dealing with 
an evaluative mediator, legal representatives may have to undertake the role of ‘strategic 
intervener’, anticipating and responding to the interventions of the mediator.886 Abramson 
suggests that the mediator’s approach is one of the single most important factors impacting 
the role undertaken by legal representatives. 
 
The mediator’s orientation should be especially highlighted, because it can singularly shape an 
attorney’s representation strategy. An attorney’s entire approach to interacting with and enlisting 
assistance from the mediator will be influenced by the mediator’s process management, that is, 
how problem-solving, transformative, or evaluative the mediator might be.
887
 
 
Abramson suggests that attorneys be asked the following question: ‘does knowing that the 
mediator might offer an evaluation influence how you would represent your client in 
mediation?’888 The answer, he says, is ‘yes’ every time.889  
 
Stark also emphasises the importance of the lawyer’s role in providing information and 
advice to clients in the context of evaluative mediation by referring to legal representatives as 
‘information maximizers’ for clients in contrast to the evaluative mediator who is not an 
information maximizer. The mediator’s advice to disputants is hedged by two significant 
constraints. ‘First, the mediator must be concerned about maintaining the appearance of 
impartiality as between the parties’. 890  The second ‘more powerful constraint’ 891  is that 
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evaluative mediators provide the parties with information and advice primarily in order to 
help them to close the gap between them – to help them integrate their claims.892 Mediators 
‘are loathe to provide legal information that widens the gap between the parties’ 893  or 
exacerbates differences.
894
 If this is the case, lawyers are needed to ensure that all relevant 
information is given to their clients. They do this best by acting as a partisan advocate for 
their client. Stark concludes that while the ‘adversarial/materialistic perspective’ of advocates 
has been criticised, ‘[y]et it is precisely the stance of partisanship that causes representative 
lawyers – advocates - to provide the fullest possible information to their clients’.895 
 
This is not to say that lawyers perform exactly the same tasks in every representational 
context. Hyman argues that different tasks are involved in trial advocacy
896
 than in mediation. 
For instance, he notes that trial lawyers typically prepare a theory of the case ie the most 
plausible explanation for what occurred, in preparation for a trial, whereas they may not do so 
in mediation.
897
 Trial lawyers also exam and cross-examine witnesses at trial – clearly they 
do not do so in mediation. But every representation by a lawyer involves the performance of 
a core set of tasks; and the discharge of those tasks involves a core set of skills. 
 
In carrying out the tasks involved in mediation (advising clients, evaluating the merits of 
the client’s case, assessing the likely litigated outcome etc), legal representatives use many of 
the same skills or skill sets as they use in other representational settings eg they use research 
and analysis skills; skills associated with factual investigation, selection, organisation and 
use; written and oral communication skills (and sub-skills such as those of active listening); 
negotiation skills and skills involved in problem-solving.
898
 Even Hyman concedes that there 
are ‘some precepts that apply with equal force to the accomplishment of good trial advocacy 
and to the creation of wise agreements’.899 ‘These include the need to pay very close attention 
to the facts, the ability to listen carefully and well, and a skill in building persuasive 
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conceptual frameworks that characterize the dispute and point to a mutually satisfactory 
resolution’.900  
 
There are a number of commentators who argue that lawyers may need to modify their 
‘standard philosophical map’901 and to learn to live with feelings and ambiguity rather than 
rules of law and the certainty provided through legal methods and solutions
902
 in order to be 
effective in facilitative mediation. The more moderate view, one which recognizes the value 
of the lawyer’s ‘standard philosophical map’ (if indeed there is one) is that lawyers may 
retain their standard orientation but enrich it
903
 by developing skills such as those associated 
with active listening, empathizing and creative problem-solving.
904
 This view also recognises 
that lawyers just as often are cooperative, as they are adversarial. As Linda Mulcahy notes: 
 
Lawyers commonly operate in settings which are not strictly adversarial and even within 
contentious situations they perform a wide variety of functions in which the normal pattern of their 
work is facilitative. Thus, although solicitors are trained in adversarial techniques they are as likely 
to be conciliatory as combative in practice.
905  
 
Lawyers may need to expand their knowledge and extend their repertoire of skills in order 
to fulfil their roles in mediation. For example, Macfarlane claims that: 
 
Conflict resolution advocacy also requires a certain amount of new knowledge, which can enhance 
the breadth and depth of the negotiator’s skills. For example, skillful negotiators understand the 
distinctive dynamics of both distributive (divide up the pie) and integrative (expand the pie, then 
divide it) negotiations as well as the need to move between these two modes depending on the type 
and stage of negotiation.
906
 
 
                                                          
900
 Ibid 867-8. 
901
 Caputo, above n 1, 90. 
902
 Anne Ardagh and Guy Cumes, ‘Lawyers and Mediation: Beyond the Adversarial System?’ (1998) 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 72, 74. The concept of a ‘lawyer’s standard philosophical map’ is 
attributable to Riskin. He reasoned that (most) lawyers’ view of the world is based on ‘two assumptions about 
matters that lawyers handle: (1) that disputants are adversaries – i.e., if one wins, the others must lose – and (2) 
that disputes may be resolved through application, by a third party, of some general rule of law’: Riskin, above n 
333, 44. 
903
 Chris Guthrie, ‘The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments to 
Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering’ (2001) 6 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 145, 180. 
904
 Ibid 182. 
905
 Linda Mulcahy, ‘Can Leopards Change Their Spots? An Evaluation of the Role of Lawyers in Medical 
Negligence Mediation’ (2001) 8 International Journal of the Legal Profession 203, 215. 
906
 Macfarlane, above n 862, 70. Also see Guthrie, above n 903, 180-2. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 158 - 15- Aug-11 
 
I have argued previously that changes to the civil justice system including the emphasis 
now given to ADR, might require the development of new skills for lawyers and responsive 
changes to the law school curriculum. Legal educators have become increasingly aware that 
negotiation and settlement skills are central to legal practice
907
 and have taken some steps to 
integrate the teaching of these skills in the law school curriculum.
908
 
 
But it is one thing to concede that lawyers may need new skills; it is another to say that 
their roles are different. Neither role (eg advising clients of their legal rights) nor duties (eg 
the duty of competence owed to clients) nor fundamental professional values (eg loyalty to 
clients) have changed with the advent of mediation and ADR. The responsibility to clients, 
the public responsibility to the justice system, the responsibility to the legal profession, and 
the responsibility to oneself - these professional values are just as relevant in mediation as 
they are in litigation. Since these are the values that underpin the existing rules of 
professional conduct, the rules are just as relevant and appropriate in mediation as they are in 
any other representational context.  
 
4.4 Proposals with Respect to an Ethic of Care 
 
Kovach has suggested that ‘an ethic of care’ provides an appropriate starting point for 
standards of conduct in mediation.
909
  
 
In a lawyer-client relationship, the ethics of care
910
 suggests that lawyers focus on the 
client and the client’s relationships with others and on non-legal as well as legal aspects of 
the client’s situation.911 Lawyers using this approach will focus on improving, or at least 
doing no harm to, the client’s relations with others. There is a place for such an ethic, to 
varying degrees, in all aspects of lawyering. 
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There is also a place for an ethic of care in some models of mediation. It is an approach 
which is most evident in the therapeutic or transformative model of mediation where 
mediators and parties are concerned with modifying behaviour and improving the pattern of 
interaction between the parties. It is not evident in all models of mediation and could not, 
without modification and much elaboration, be the basis for general rules of conduct with 
respect to mediation. 
 
4.5 Summary and Review 
 
In this part of the exegesis, I have critiqued a range of proposals for new rules of 
professional conduct for legal representatives in mediation and the rationale given for the 
need for new rules. I have endeavoured to show that the rationale (in three different 
approaches) is flawed. Each approach relies in part, or whole, on supposed similarities and 
differences between negotiation, mediation and litigation. Notwithstanding that these 
processes have a shared purpose (ie the peaceful resolution of disputes), proponents of the 
negotiation is surrogate litigation approach fail to take into account the fact that negotiation 
(and mediation) may bear no resemblance to litigation. Proponents of the negotiation lacks 
due process controls approach fail to account for the fact that participants who choose 
negotiation and mediation may do so because of the absence of rules and procedural 
formalities. Proponents of the third approach assert that the current professional conduct rules 
are based on an adversarial paradigm of legal practice and that lawyers undertake different 
roles in mediation than they do in litigation. At most, the rules may give more attention to 
advocacy in court, than they give to other roles and contexts in which lawyers are involved. 
Either way, the rules do not exclude or prohibit non-adversarial forms of practice. To the 
contrary, since the rules provide that lawyers should be honest, courteous and fair in their 
dealings with others, they tend to encourage cooperation. I have demonstrated that lawyers 
undertake the same roles in mediation as they do in litigation and other representational 
contexts: they counsel, advise, negotiate, advocate and draft a range of documents on behalf 
of their clients. 
  
Most proposals for new rules suggest that higher standards of disclosure ought apply to 
legal representatives in mediation. They also call for the imposition of good faith 
participation requirements, a duty of cooperation and an (unspecified) duty of fairness. 
Additionally a few authors call for rules which require legal representatives in mediation to 
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use interest-based negotiation instead of positional negotiation and to act more like neutrals 
and less like partisan advocates. There are problems with every one of these proposals. The 
problems include: 
 lack of consensus among proponents for change over the appropriate standard of 
disclosure required in mediation; 
 lack of consensus over, and uncertainty attached to, the meaning of concepts such as 
good faith and cooperation; 
 difficulty in articulating rules of this nature with any precision; 
 the inevitable subjectivity and vagueness of rules of the kind proposed; 
 difficulties of monitoring and enforcing compliance with rules of the kind proposed 
together with possible inroads which might be made into the confidentiality of the 
mediation process; and 
 destruction of the informally and flexibility which are hallmarks of mediation. 
 
Further rules of the kind proposed are unrealistic and undesirable for a variety of reasons, 
including the following: 
 parties need partisan legal representation in mediation to protect and enhance self-
determination and its underlying requirement of informed consent. 
 every negotiation will involve some positional negotiation (and we should remember 
that it is not the unethical evil twin of interest-based negotiation); 
 every negotiation benefits from some element of competition; 
 every negotiator must choose, within the changing dynamics of negotiation, where 
they should be at any given moment in time on the ‘tightropes of negotiation’, 
treading a line between honesty and openness as against misrepresentation and non-
disclosure and cooperation as against competition.  
  
None of the proposals for new rules discussed in this part offers a workable realistic 
alternative to the current rule systems the legal profession has in place. 
 
In chapter 3, I demonstrated that the critical differences between litigation, mediation and 
negotiation are the diversity of mediation; and the potential for influence by the mediator. 
These factors point to the desirability of retaining the existing rules of conduct which allow 
legal representatives to exercise discretion in relation to matters such as candour, cooperation 
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and the approach to negotiation that they adopt at any given moment in time; not to the 
introduction of new rules which reduce the flexibility and discretion allowed to lawyers. 
 
This leads to the next part of the exegesis in which I explore a number of more general 
reasons for favouring the existing rules of professional conduct for legal representatives in 
mediation over the alternative ‘non-adversarial’ ethics systems which have been proposed.  
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PART 5: OTHER REASONS FOR RETAINING EXISTING RULE SYSTEMS 
 
There are two general reasons for retaining the current professional rules of conduct for 
legal representatives in mediation (and for resisting the introduction of new ‘non-adversarial’ 
rules such as those discussed above).
912
 They are that: 
 
1. The existing general rules are more appropriate than detailed rules for highly 
contextual processes such as mediation. 
 
2. Legal representatives ought to be allowed scope to exercise discretion over certain 
ethical matters in mediation. 
   
5.1 General Rules of Conduct Are More Appropriate for Mediation 
 
A number of long-standing debates take place in the literature on the subject of 
professional rules or codes of conduct. The first debate concerns whether codes of conduct 
should be aspirational (hortatory) or regulatory (prescriptive or disciplinary) in nature. 
Aspirational codes lay down the aims and ideals for which practitioners should strive;
913
 
regulatory codes clarify ‘minimum expectations of acceptable behaviour’.914 
 
An hortatory code of ethics attempts to inspire members of the profession to a higher standard by 
articulating the general principles and underlying goals of the profession. A regulatory code, on the 
other hand, creates a minimum standard to which members of the professional will be held 
accountable through the use of rules, whether permissive or prohibitive.
915
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The first type of code tends to be non-binding in nature and difficult to enforce, while 
prescriptive norms tend to be binding and enforceable.
916
 
 
Each type of code has potential benefits and disadvantages. While aspirational codes ‘can 
foster pride and public respect for the profession’,917 they are often criticised for being too 
general and for failing to provide sufficient guidance to practitioners as to how to act in 
particular situations.
918
 Regulatory codes may provide more specific guidance and lead to 
more predictable behaviour but they suffer most from the problems of specificity mentioned 
below. 
 
The second long-standing debate is as to whether codes should be general or specific in 
nature.
919
 The two debates overlap for aspirational codes tend to be general, while regulatory 
codes tend to be more specific. Again, each type of code has benefits and disadvantages. 
‘Formulating rules in general terms has advantages. It anticipates application of the rules to a 
diverse range of practice situations and offers desired flexibility. At the same time, however, 
such an approach creates problematic gaps in guidance’.920 On the other hand, ‘the more 
numerous and more specific the rules get, the less flexibility the lawyer has in choosing a 
permissible course of action’.921 Complex rules are also difficult to communicate, remember, 
and enforce.
922
  
 
Additionally it has been argued that the increased specificity associated with regulatory 
codes tends to inhibit ethical deliberation,
923
 encouraging mindless conformity to rules 
instead of ethical evaluation.
924
 For example, Haines argues that ‘the proliferation of rules 
decreases moral sensitivity and development, reduces flexibility, and discourages critical 
thinking. In effect, the lawyer enters a “simplified moral world” and becomes an 
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“unreflective rule-follower”’.925 Loder argues that by following specific rules, ‘the lawyer is 
deprived of the opportunity to deliberate and choose the course of action that should be 
taken’.926 
 
Even if one favours detailed prescriptive rules, it is widely agreed that codes of conduct 
are inherently limited. It is neither possible nor desirable to govern all lawyer behaviour with 
strictly formulated rules.
927
 It is not possible because of the inherent vagueness of language 
(and the difficulty of defining terms such as ‘honest’ and ‘fair’), the difficulty of predicting 
the complex range of ethical issues that lawyers may encounter,
928
 the difficulty of 
enforcement and simply because no worthwhile human endeavour is capable of being 
captured in rules. ‘[E]thics (for lawyers or anyone else) can never be captured, once and for 
all, in a set of prescribed rules that if followed, result in a life of respectability. No 
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by a set of prescribed rules (roles of 
scripts).’929 
 
In practice, in order to deal with the tension between the need for certainty, predictability 
and enforceability on the one hand and flexibility and scope for the exercise of discretion on 
the other, most codes contain both aspirational and regulatory provisions ie ‘they are a 
“mixed model” of ethical regulation that provides some specific and some suggestive ethical 
standards’.930 ‘The legal profession’s codes are a compromise between these possibilities, 
providing regulation for members and addressing a wider audience by articulating values.’931  
 
There are some criteria available for judging when general as opposed to specific rules 
should govern a particular situation. ‘If the general principles justifying a given rule are 
uncertain or unclear, or if multiple and possibly competing principles are operating, this may 
indicate that the conduct in question is inherently inappropriate for specific and especially 
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mandatory rule-making.’932 The nature of the arguments (presented in part 4) over concepts 
such as disclosure (and candour), good faith, fair dealing and cooperation suggest that these 
are not areas that are appropriate for rule-making beyond the establishment of minimum 
general standards. There is no agreement amongst scholars as to the standard of disclosure 
and ‘fairness’ appropriate in mediation beyond that needed to satisfy the requirements of 
substantive law. The meaning of concepts such as good faith and cooperation are unclear. 
Some matters – such as the approach to negotiation adopted by the parties and their legal 
representatives – should not be the subject of rules at all since one approach is not more 
ethical than another.  
 
The case for retaining general rules of conduct such as those that currently exist, for 
negotiation and mediation, is strong. More rules in negotiation and mediation would freeze a 
standard of behaviour in place as ‘the only correct one’.933 It is impossible to provide a single 
formula – a single correct answer - for lawyers (and other negotiators) ‘to follow in order to 
achieve ethical and effective negotiation behaviour’.934 In negotiation, decision-making is 
contextual. 
 
More than almost any other form of lawyer behaviour, the process of negotiation is varied; it 
differs from place to place and from subject matter to subject matter. It calls, therefore, either for 
quite different rules in different contexts or for rules stated only at a very high level of 
generality.
935
 
 
Mediation is even more diverse than negotiation. It is also highly dynamic and fluid. In 
commenting on the difficulties of drafting a rule which requires truth-telling in mediation, 
Cooley argues that ‘the truth’ is more illusive in mediation than in other contexts, and that 
what is true for a party in mediation now (eg their risks, desires, BATNAs) may not be true in 
                                                          
932
 Loder, above n 631, 325. Loder seeks to provide some ‘preliminary methods and criteria which drafters 
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Loder, above n 631, 312. 
933
 Ibid 319. 
934
 Eyster, above n 623, 753. 
935
 White, above n 230, 927; Rosenberger, above n 273, 627; Burr, above n 202, 13. Even Menkel-Meadow 
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an area of behaviour which is ‘in fact quite context-dependent’: Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ethics, Morality and 
Professional Responsibility in Negotiation’ in Bernard and Garth, above n 3, 119, 122. 
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15 minutes from now as the parties continuously develop and share information and interact 
with the mediator.
936
  
  
It is acknowledged that the current rules do not provide all the answers to the ethical 
dilemmas that may arise in mediation (as they do not provide all the answers for lawyers in 
litigation). There are gaps and generalities and there is scope for flexibility in interpretation 
and application of the rules. How should lawyers fill the gaps? 
 
5.2 The Case for Discretion in Ethical Lawyering 
 
There is no doubt that lawyers have to exercise some discretion in dealing with ethical 
dilemmas and in choosing which alternative and contradictory course of action is the better 
one to take. As Peppet notes, ‘any code will have gaps and ambiguities that require some sort 
of discretion’.937 Indeed, a number of ‘discretionary’ or contextual approaches to ethical 
decision-making in lawyering have emerged. They have emerged largely as a result of 
criticism of the ‘standard conception’ or ‘dominant approach’ to legal ethics. 938  This 
approach is explained below. 
 
The current rules of professional conduct are said to reflect a role-based approach to legal 
ethics (in the sense that they are derived from the roles played by lawyers in the justice 
system).
939
 The literature refers to two such approaches: 
1. The adversarial advocacy approach 940  (variously referred to as the ‘dominant 
approach’ or the standard or traditional conception of lawyers’ ethics).941 
2. The Public Interest or Responsible Lawyer approach.942  
                                                          
936
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937
 Peppet, above n 28, 507. 
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The adversarial advocacy approach elevates loyalty to the client above all else (within the 
limits allowed by the law). It focuses on client-based values such as competence, 
confidentiality and loyalty to client. It legitimates ‘the lawyer in pursuing any arguably lawful 
goal of the client through any arguably lawful means’. 943  It is from this approach that 
references to ‘extreme adversarial advocacy’ and ‘zealous adversarial advocacy’ derive. 944 
But some authors argue that this extreme approach has never represented the ethics of the 
profession (Schneyer asserts that ‘[t]he Standard Conception is really a misconception’)945 
and that lawyers are required to and do behave ‘with all due fidelity to the court as well as the 
client’.946 Zacharias asserts that: 
 
Suffice it to say that the common view that professional conduct requires lawyers always to act in 
an ultra-partisan, ultra-aggressive fashion simply is wrong. More importantly ...  it is not necessary 
to trash existing professional standards to sanction tamer lawyering ‘in the public interest.’ The 
current codes already allow it.
947
 
 
Professional conduct rules in Australian jurisdictions have never embraced the concept of 
zealous representation
948
 and even the rules in the US (which formerly used the terms ‘zeal’ 
and ‘zealous representation’) have been amended such that lawyers are now required to act 
with diligence rather than zeal.
 949
  
 
Lawyers using the second approach mentioned above moderate loyalty to clients by 
reference to their duties as officers of the court. They will, say Parker and Evans, act in 
accordance with the purpose of the law in the many grey areas where there are choices.
950
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 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 168 - 15- Aug-11 
 
There is ‘evidence’ that ‘they often refrain from using every lawful means available to 
achieve their client’s ends’;951 and that they will forgo hardball tactics because of regard for 
colleagues. Parker and Evans conclude that, in Australia and other common law countries, 
lawyers tend to focus on and balance the responsible lawyer ideal and the advocacy ideal.
952
 
 
Both of these approaches have been criticised by William Simon. For Simon, ‘the critical 
fact’ is that both views (the Dominant and the Public Interest views), though with different 
priorities, ‘adopt a common style of decisionmaking’ that he calls ‘categorical’.953 He asserts 
that: 
 
Such decisionmaking severely restricts the range of considerations the decisionmaker may take 
into account when she confronts a particular problem; a rigid rule dictates a particular response in 
the presence of a small number of factors. The decisionmaker has no discretion to consider factors 
that are not specified or to evaluate specified factors in ways other than those prescribed by the 
rule.
954
 
 
Simon offers the ‘Contextual View’ as an alternative.955 He proposes that lawyers ‘should 
take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem 
likely to promote justice’956 where justice is determined on the basis of the legal merits of the 
matter at hand.
957
 His approach requires a consideration and weighing up of competing legal 
values.
958
 
 
Like Simon, David Luban finds fault with the categorical nature of standard conceptions 
of legal ethics. According to Luban, the Dominant Approach ‘insists on categorical rules of 
zeal, confidentiality, and disinterestedness that drastically and wrongly pare back the scope of 
discretionary judgment’.959 He coined the phrase ‘moral activism’ for his approach which 
calls for lawyers to exercise discretion on the basis of their own moral values in ways 
                                                          
951
 Schneyer, above n 863, 16. 
952
 Parker and Evans, above n 17, 27. Parker and Evans maintain that ‘existing professional conduct regulation 
attempts (at least half-heartedly) to put this [responsible lawyering] into practice’: 18. 
953
 Simon, above n 941, 9. 
954
 Ibid. 
955
 Ibid. 
956
 Ibid. 
957
 Simon, above n 941, 9-10. Peppet refers to this as a contextual approach to ethical problems: Peppet, above n 
28, 505. 
958
 Peppet, above n 28, 505. 
959
 David Luban, ‘Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 873, 884. Also see 
discussion by Peppet, above n 28, 505. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 169 - 15- Aug-11 
 
‘calculated to best promote social and political justice.’ 960  The moral activist lawyer is 
concerned with promoting justice in the broad sense of the term (in contrast to the way in 
which Simon used the term ‘justice’).961 
 
Rhode suggests a somewhat different discretionary approach to legal ethics. She argues 
that lawyers should make decisions on the basis of broader societal interests. She maintains 
that they should be required: 
 
to assess their obligations in light of all societal interests at issue in particular practice contexts. 
Client trust and confidentiality are entitled to weight, but they must be balanced against other 
equally important concerns. Lawyers also have responsibilities to prevent unnecessary harm to 
third parties, to promote a just and effective legal system, and to respect core values such as 
honesty, fairness, and good faith on which that system depends. 
 
Rhode does not suggest that lawyers should breach the law or the rules of ethics – just the 
opposite – she maintains that lawyers should be guided by relevant legal authority and 
regulatory codes, for respect for the law is a fundamental value which lawyers have sworn to 
uphold. As Rhode points out, there is ample room for discretion allowed under most codes of 
lawyers’ conduct. ‘[M]ost ethical dilemmas arise in areas where the governing standards 
already leave significant room for discretion’.962 This is true of the existing professional 
conduct rules. It would not be the case if more specific rules were adopted for legal 
representatives in mediation. 
 
There are many points of difference between these three approaches (which respectively 
urge the exercise of discretion on the basis of legal merit, personal moral values and societal 
interests).
963
 Each of these theories has strengths and weaknesses which I have not elaborated 
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upon here.
964
 Rather, I rely on what the approaches have in common. In each of these 
approaches to legal ethics, appropriate action (or inaction) on the lawyer’s part is to be 
determined by reference to the circumstances of the particular case (not the dictates of ethical 
rules although as mentioned above, Rhode does not advocate that lawyers go outside the 
framework of the existing rules). In this sense, each approach allows lawyers to exercise 
some discretion in resolving ethical dilemmas.  Each approach proposes a framework through 
which lawyers are encouraged to ‘replace simplistic ethical decisionmaking with more 
thoughtful and complex deliberation of ethical considerations’.965 
 
Discretionary approaches are not without problems or critics. Peppet criticises the 
discretionary approaches for their labour intensity.
966
 All discretionary approaches to ethics 
can be ‘exhausting’. They require lawyers to take ethical dilemmas apart, translate them into 
legal values or personal values, weigh up alternative courses of action, and arrive at a 
justifiable conclusion. Peppet writes ‘[o]ne may wonder whether lawyers have the time, 
inclination, or ability to engage in the reasoning of moral philosophers’.967 
 
Some of the discretionary approaches mentioned here (eg those of Simon and Luban) also 
cast practitioners adrift with too little guidance eg they leave ‘the decision to the moral 
universe of individual practitioners’.968  Concepts such as legal merit and personal moral 
values are subjective and vague. With this in mind, Peppet criticises discretionary approaches 
for placing too little importance on positive legal ethics ie on the codes of practice 
themselves. ‘The codes are of paramount importance in structuring attorneys’ behaviour. 
Lawyers turn to the codes for guidance, and they want to be able to trust the codes when 
making complex decisions under conditions of uncertainty.’969 
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Peppet does not believe that the codes of conduct should be abandoned. He proceeds on 
that basis that ‘we live in a pluralistic world, where consensus about complex moral and 
professional matters is unlikely’.970 (‘A code is necessary because we disagree’.)971 He urges 
us to ‘use the codes to facilitate discretion, not use discretion to abandon the codes’.972 On 
this point I agree with Peppet. We should use the framework of the existing rules because 
they encapsulate core values of the legal profession. 
 
However, at this point, Peppet takes a different path to the one that I recommend for he 
maintains that ‘[n]o single, unified code of ethics can account for the diversity of legal 
practice that lawyers undertake’.973 
 
5.3 Multiple Sets of Specialised Rules or One Set of General Rules 
 
Peppet proposes that we replace the current system (under which the profession is 
regulated by one set of ethical rules that applies to all lawyers regardless of circumstance) 
with a system ‘in which lawyers and clients could contractually choose the ethical obligations 
under which they wanted to operate’.974 He refers to this as a contract model of legal ethics 
and he suggests that such an approach can be used to sort out the ‘sharpies’ from the 
‘collaborators’ in negotiation. 975  This reasoning underpins the concept and practice of 
collaborate law which is discussed in the next part of this exegesis. 
 
Other approaches to the regulation of lawyers’ behaviour have been suggested, such 
approaches requiring something between the extremes of total discretion and observance of 
the general rules which currently govern the profession. For instance, Wilkins argues that it is 
not workable or desirable to delegate primary responsibility for ethical matters to individual 
practitioners.
976
 Such an approach he argues ‘underserves important values that must be a part 
of any viable system of professional regulation’.977  He suggests the concept of a set of 
‘middle-level’ principles which recognises that context matters but ‘is not an invitation to 
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adopt a purely case-by-case approach to professional ethics’.978 His approach is based on five 
broad categories: task (eg litigation versus counselling), subject matter (eg civil versus 
criminal), legal status of client (eg plaintiff versus defendant), lawyer status (eg sole 
practitioner versus large firm) and client status (eg individual versus corporate).
979
 There has 
been a trend towards the development of specialised rules of ethics for different areas of 
law.
980
 Rapoport relies on Wilkins’ work to argue the case for a specialised federal law of 
bankruptcy ethics for bankruptcy lawyers in light of differences in state codes in the US and 
the peculiarities of bankruptcy law.
981
 But neither of these authors suggest that any one of 
these factors alone – such as task or process - is sufficient to justify a separate code and in 
fact, Wilkins notes that the factors tend to be found in clusters eg lawyers who litigate 
divorces tend to practise alone or in small firms and to exclusively represent individuals.
982
 
 
Kovach suggests that we should establish a code for negotiation, another for mediation, 
another for arbitration and so on with each code designed to improve the way in which the 
particular process operates. She maintains that ‘[d]ifferent types of representation often 
necessitate different roles, behaviour, skills, and conduct for the lawyer. Because ethical 
codes often set the parameters of such practices, they likewise must differ’.983 
 
I have demonstrated in this research that the role (and values and duties) of lawyers does 
not change regardless of the dispute resolution process in which they are involved on behalf 
of clients. In any event, it would be impracticable to have different sets of rules as suggested 
by Kovach. Lawyer behaviours might be categorised by process as Kovach suggests. But it is 
equally as valid to argue that behaviour should be categorised by subject matter eg personal 
injury, commercial, family, public policy matters. It might then follow that we should 
establish a separate set of rules for family mediations, and another for personal injuries 
mediations, family arbitrations, commercial arbitrations and so. Of course, lawyers do not 
just act for clients in relation to one process. A lawyer will often simultaneously or 
sequentially represent a client in advice giving and counselling, negotiation, mediation and 
litigation. Lawyers would not be governed by one set of rules, but by many, and they would 
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be required to move from one set of rules to the next as they progress a client’s case or to try 
to comply with multiple (and possibly inconsistent) sets of rules at the same time. This 
situation would be unworkable. Other authors have also criticised the approach, suggesting 
that we may end up with ‘a grid of rules and roles that is too complex to be of practical 
use’.984  
 
The preferred option is to have lawyers governed by one set of general rules that 
safeguards crucial professional values ie that maintains ‘a commitment to systemic values’985 
(values such as the promotion of the administration of justice, and competence, loyalty and 
confidentiality to clients), providing a general framework of rules from which appropriate 
conduct can be derived while allowing lawyers to respond to relevant contextual factors. The 
legal profession’s current rules are sufficient and appropriate for this purpose. 
 
5.4 Discretionary Matters – Foundations for the Exercise of Discretion 
 
Assuming it is accepted that lawyers should exercise some discretion in relation to ethical 
matters (and it cannot be doubted that they have to exercise some discretion because there 
will always be gaps and uncertainties in the way the rules are interpreted and applied), the 
issues arise as to what matters are discretionary, and what factors legal representatives may 
take into account when exercising discretion. I suggest that legal representatives must: 
 
1. Follow the instructions of their clients with respect to objectives, providing those 
objectives are legal. If clients want to secure the most favourable outcomes for 
themselves, lawyers should proceed in such a way as to meet those objectives 
(remembering that it will rarely be in the best interests of the client to take unfair 
advantage of the other party), subject to acting within the limits of the law. As 
mentioned in part 2, there is scope under the rules to decline to act for a client who 
wants to use mediation for an ‘improper’ purpose. 
 
2. Decide for themselves (in consultation with clients) whether and to what extent they 
wish to use interest-based and other cooperative approaches to negotiation. This will 
involve making decisions about an overall negotiation strategy and about hundreds of 
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individual tactical moves that go in to make up a negotiation (eg making decisions 
about whether to share information or conceal it, to describe wants accurately or 
inflate them, to make or reject offers, to make or reject concessions, and to give or 
withhold reasons for doing so). In some circumstances, a lawyer may decline to act 
for a client who insists on withholding information that the lawyer believes should be 
disclosed.  
 
Legal representatives will adjust their strategy (with respect to matters such as candour 
and cooperation) to the actions of their counterpart and to those of the mediator. Lawyers will 
be particularly vigilant in their dealings with evaluative mediators. Many mediator tactics 
will lose their effectiveness if legal representatives know that they are being used. Without 
attempting to provide a book of strategies, legal representatives must ensure that clients are 
provided with information about their legal rights and obligations and ongoing advice about 
their options – even at the risk of widening the gap between the parties. They might also: 
 
1. Counsel their clients to reveal information slowly (and to withhold some information 
altogether). 
2. Speak on behalf of clients. 
3. Ensure that clients have some control over the agenda including the number of issues, 
the order for discussion and the coupling and packaging of issues. 
4. Recognise when mediators are steering clients in a particular direction with use of 
questions and intervene if necessary. 
5. Intercede to introduce new focal points in the discussion and new options for 
settlement. 
6. Ensure that all possible options are explored rather than allowing mediators to 
differentially create opportunities to discuss some options and not others. 
7. Ensure clients are prepared to make concessions before they commit themselves. 
8. Downplay the risks of not settling where the mediator has overemphasised them and 
played on the ‘fear-of-the alternative factor’ (ie put the negative consequences of 
failure to agree into perspective). 
9. Reassure clients that they do not let anyone down, not least the mediator, if they do 
not settle today. 
10. Ensure that clients are not pressured by time constraints, especially artificial ones. 
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11. Ensure that time deadlines are not used to force concessions and prevent further 
exploration of options. 
12. Ensure clients are not exhausted and pressured into compromise by long sessions. 
13. Call out a mediator who indicates impatience or disapproval, or even anger. 
14. Negate the effect of long silences. 
15. Ensure that mediators do not sidestep intractable differences or eliminate some issues 
altogether (if it is not in client’s interests to do so). 
 
Lawyers will also react to a range of contextual factors. As mediators choose their 
strategic interventions on the basis of a range of factors enumerated in part 4, so those factors 
will also impact on legal representatives. This includes factors such as the level of conflict 
between the parties, the level of sophistication of their client and so on. Of course lawyers 
may be proactive. If they decide to adopt a cooperate approach, they are wise to do so 
cautiously.  
 
It is possible that different lawyers will arrive at different decisions when confronted with 
the same or similar ethical dilemmas. According to the literature, that does not matter 
providing each lawyer is able to justify their decision in the particular context.
986
  
 
5.5 Summary and Review 
 
This part has discussed two general reasons for retaining the current professional rules of 
conduct for legal representatives in mediation. First, the existing general rules are more 
appropriate than detailed rules for conduct in highly contextual processes such as mediation 
and second, lawyers ought to be allowed to exercise discretion over certain ethical matters in 
mediation. The matters over which they should retain discretion are the very ones which 
proponents for new rules seek to regulate (or more heavily regulate than is presently the case) 
- matters such candour and cooperation. 
 
There is strong support for a discretionary approach to legal ethics. I have discussed three 
different discretionary approaches in this part of the exegesis. Each approach seeks to allow 
critical and reflective thinking and ethical deliberation on the part of lawyers. Such an 
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approach is particularly apt for those aspects of practice where notions of what is right or 
wrong vary considerably and there are competing principles at play. It is suggested that issues 
such as candour, good faith, fair dealing and cooperation are not areas that are appropriate for 
rule-making beyond the establishment of minimum general standards. Practice in negotiation 
and mediation is contextual – more rules would freeze a single standard of behaviour in place 
when it is impossible to provide a single correct answer. Put simply, the answer will vary 
between each moment in time in each mediation. 
 
But like Peppet, I do not believe that codes should be abandoned. The existing rules 
encapsulate core values of the profession and provide a framework from which lawyers may 
derive appropriate and ethical conduct. Unlike Kovach, I do not think we need multiple 
specialised codes for multiple processes. Such an approach would lead to the absurd situation 
where a lawyer would have to comply with multiple and possibly inconsistent codes at any 
one time. 
 
Peppet’s idea of a contractual model of legal ethics sounds promising. However, given 
our lack of ability to define appropriate terms in a single set of rules, one may be forgiven for 
doubting whether we have the capacity to draft and design a menu of codes. In the next part, I 
look at a dispute resolution practice that rests on a contractual model of legal ethics. 
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PART 6: COLLABORATIVE LAW: LESSONS LEARNED? 
 
As was mentioned in part 2, parties sometimes enter into an agreement to mediate (or 
dispute resolution clause) under which they agree to participate in mediation in good faith 
and to cooperate with the mediator and with each other. Similar obligations may be imposed 
by statute. The effort to shape ethical obligations towards the non-adversarial end of the 
continuum has peaked with the development of a process known as collaborative law. It is a 
practice which demonstrates some of the problems which arise when participants are required 
to adopt so called ‘non-adversarial’ ethics standards. 
 
6.1 Basic Features of Collaborative Law  
 
Collaborative law (CL)
987
 is a dispute resolution process in which the parties and their 
lawyers
988
 explicitly agree to participate in negotiations in good faith and in a cooperative 
non-adversarial manner
989
 using interest based negotiation.
990
 They also agree to make full 
and honest disclosure of all relevant information.
991
 Most importantly, the parties agree that if 
negotiations reach an impasse, the process is terminated and their lawyers are disqualified 
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from continuing to act in the matter.
992
 In essence, the lawyers are retained for the limited 
purpose of negotiating a settlement.
993
 Collaborative lawyers may also terminate the process 
if they believe that their client is not acting in ‘good faith’.994 
 
CL negotiations are conducted via a series of four-way meetings held between the parties 
and their respective lawyers.
995
 The process does not involve a third party ‘facilitator’ such as 
a mediator, although the parties may include a mediation clause in their agreement ‘so that, in 
the event of an impasse, the parties mediate before going to court’.996 
 
But for the disqualification provision, the participants (parties and lawyers) in CL agree to 
abide by the same obligations as proponents for new rules seek to impose on legal 
representatives in mediation. But the disqualification provision makes all the difference. It is 
considered the sine qua non of the CL process
997
 and ‘the real force’ behind it.998 It creates a 
powerful incentive for all concerned to try to reach agreement without litigation. In the event 
of impasse, the clients must engage new lawyers (at a new law firm) if they wish to 
commence legal proceedings and the collaborative lawyers each lose a client (although the 
lawyers may be recalled after litigation has commenced if the parties wish to attempt CL 
again).
999
 
                                                          
992
 The parties also agree to use joint experts. Absent agreement, those experts are disqualified from further 
involvement in the event that the matter proceeds to litigation: Isaacs, above n 989, 834; Schwab, above n 989, 
360; Tesler, above n 989, 320.  
993
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Applicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct to Collaborative Law’ [2007] Journal of Dispute Resolution 
255, 262, 264. 
994
 Schwab, above n 989, 358.  
995
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above n 989, 835; Schwab, above n 989, 357; Wolski, above n 15, 657-8. 
996
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(2008) 21 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 155, 163. 
997
 The disqualification requirement is consistently singled out as the unique and distinguishing characteristic of 
CL – it is the only dispute resolution process in which ‘withdrawal of counsel is required in the event of a failure 
to reach settlement’: Beckwith and Slovin, above n 852, 503. In fact all the professionals assisting the parties are 
‘contractually barred from participating in litigation between the parties’: Tesler, above n 993, 87. Also see 
Schwab, above n 989, 358; Webb, above n 996, 168. 
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 Fairman, above n 991, 80; Beckwith and Slovin, above n 852, 503. 
999
 Isaacs, above n 989, 834; Peppet, n 28, 490. Lawrence claims that if either lawyer continues to represent a 
client in subsequent litigation, the opposing party can enforce the terms of the agreement ‘in equity or by means 
of a motion to disqualify’: Lawrence, above n 991, 438.  
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 179 - 15- Aug-11 
 
By contracting away their right to continue their respective relationships into litigation, both the 
attorneys and clients have increased the stakes in the negotiation process and make a real 
commitment to settlement. This increased incentive to achieve settlement is ‘what sets 
collaborating lawyering apart from mediation.
1000
 
 
The disqualification provision recognises that parties must lose something if they fail to 
cooperate, otherwise they will have no incentive to comply with provisions of this type.
1001
 In 
theory, concepts such as good faith participation are less abstract and potentially enforceable 
because of the disqualification provision. 
 
According to some authors, the development of CL is a direct response to the adversarial 
culture of legal negotiation.
1002
 It offers the parties a way to change the context of negotiation 
from adversarial to collaborative. I suggest that CL has developed, at least in part, as a way to 
overcome difficulties inherent in provisions for complete candour, good faith participation 
and cooperation. However, as discussed later, the disqualification provision has caused major 
concerns and even with the provision in place, and presumably with the best of intentions by 
the parties (since they voluntarily enter into this arrangement) tensions between openness and 
non-disclosure, between cooperation and competition, and between the use of interest-based 
and positional negotiation continue to be felt. 
 
There are other reasons for the development of CL. It appears to have developed in part 
as a way to secure the presence of clients and lawyers in negotiation.
1003
 In some contexts 
(commercial matters are an example) negotiation often takes place without the parties being 
present.
1004
 Conversely, in many jurisdictions and in many contexts
1005
 lawyers are excluded 
from the mediation process.
1006
 Consequently, they are not on hand to give ongoing real-time 
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1001
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1004
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1005
 Some statutory schemes give the mediator the power to determine whether or not legal representatives will 
be permitted: see, eg, r 326 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). 
1006
 Generally, see Macfarlane, above n 1002, 215; Schwab, above n 989, 370; Fairman, above n 141, 318. There 
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legal advice to their clients as the negotiation ebbs and flows and reaches a conclusion.
1007
 
CL enables clients to be present and lawyers to ‘actively participate as negotiators and 
advisers for their clients’1008 in the moment to obtain a better agreement. 
 
I have read of no justification for removing the mediator from the negotiation context. 
What is clear though is that CL commits the parties and their lawyers to use of a very strict 
regime of four-way meetings. This is a uniform process over which the lawyers have absolute 
control and like all lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations, the process is highly ritualised. It is so 
ritualised that many clients apparently express frustration at the length of time it takes to get 
to substantive issues.
1009
 
 
6.2 Emerging Problems 
 
A number of problems have already emerged in connection with Collaborative Law practice. 
These are explored below. 
 
6.2.1 Contractual Confusion and A Possible Conflict of Interests 
 
CL is a creation of contract. However, it is no longer practised according to a unified 
contractual model. Peppet examines a number of different contractual arrangements and 
associated documents. He finds that there are two types of documents involved in CL but 
many more contractual variations such that it is ‘almost impossible to achieve a uniform 
description of what Collaborative Law is’. 1010  The two documents involved in the CL 
arrangement are:
1011
 
 
1. A Limited Retention Agreement (LRA) which is signed by each lawyer-client pair 
and provides for disqualification of the lawyers.  
 
                                                          
1007
 Hoffman, above n 52, 7. In addition, CL proponents also claim that mediation may be conducted too late 
when the matter is already well down on the litigation track: Cox and Matlock, above n 386, 47-8. 
1008
 Isaacs, above n 989, 835. On the role of the lawyers at the four-way meetings, see Beckwith and Slovin, 
above n 852, 501. 
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 Peppet, above n 989, 142. 
1011
 Fairman, above n 991, 80; Hoffman, above n 52, 5; Wolski, above n 15, 654-7. 
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2. A Four-Way Agreement which is signed by clients and lawyers and which sets out 
agreed process guidelines for negotiation. Some of these documents are framed as 
unbinding statements of principle or belief. Some are clearly stated in contractual 
terms.
1012
 Some Four-Way agreements may reiterate the mandatory lawyer 
withdrawal language found in the two separate LRAs (an arrangement which Peppet 
refers to as a Disqualification Four-Way). In some instances, the parties only sign a 
Disqualification Four-Way agreement ie there is no LRA between each lawyer-client 
pair (an arrangement which Peppet refers to as a Disqualification Four-Way Only).  
 
The LRAs plus Disqualification Four-Way agreements (framed as hortative statements of 
principle) do not bring lawyers into contractual privity.
1013
 This is the original and most 
common structure for CL.
1014
 However, Peppet finds that most of the Disqualification Four-
Way agreements do not deal clearly with the question of privity ie they are silent as to 
whether privity of contract is intended only between the clients, or also between the lawyers 
and between each lawyer and the opposing party.
1015
 
 
Another alternative is for the parties to sign a Four-Way agreement which does not 
involve mandatory disqualification in the event of litigation and allows the lawyers to 
continue to represent the clients in litigation. This arrangement is now recognised as a 
separate practice, known as co-operative Law.
1016
 
 
There have been at least seven ethics committee rulings in the US in relation to CL 
agreements.
1017
 According to Peppet, none of them address the diversity of contractual 
structures. Peppet focuses on the two most recent opinions, the Colorado Bar Association’s 
Ethics Committee Formal Opinion 115 and the American Bar Association’s Standing 
                                                          
1012
 Peppet, above n 989, 136. 
1013
 Peppet, above n 989, 136, 155. 
1014
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1015
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1016
 Peppet, above n 989, 135. This practice avoids potential problems associated with the disqualification 
agreement: see Isaacs, above n 989, 835; Hoffman, above n 52, 5; John Lande, ‘Possibilities for Collaborative 
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Committee on Ethics and Professionalism Formal Opinion 07-447.
1018
 In each case, the 
relevant committee made certain assumptions about the contractual arrangements involved in 
CL. The only opinion which held the CL arrangement to be ‘unethical’ in the sense of 
infringing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct was the Colorado Bar Association’s 
Ethics Committee Formal Opinion 115 which assumed a contractual, lawyer-privity, 
‘disqualification four-way only’ structure (ie the committee assumed that each lawyer was in 
privity with the opposing client). Such an arrangement was held to impair the lawyer’s ability 
to represent his or her own client.
1019
 Peppet agrees that this arrangement creates a formal 
conflict of interest.
1020
 In Peppet’s view, in order for CL to comply with the ethics rules it is 
necessary for the lawyer-client pairs to first execute a separate written LRA and it is best 
practice to limit the four way agreement to a ‘two-way’ agreement signed by the clients with 
the lawyers playing only a witnessing or affirming role.
1021
 What is clear from these 
discussions is that a lawyer cannot put the interests of the ‘other party’ before or even on a 
par with the interests of his or her own client.  
 
A number of other concerns have been raised about CL. 
 
6.2.2 Lack of Good Faith 
 
The most obvious concern is that CL may be used to the detriment of the unwary. There 
is always a possibility that one of the parties and/or that party’s lawyer will not participate in 
good faith and will take advantage of the other party’s openness and good faith initiatives. 
Parties in collaborative law might be ‘falsely reassured by the collaborative agreement’s 
requirement that the parties engage in complete disclosure of all relevant information early in 
the process.’1022 Although the provisions of CL appear to level the playing field, ‘participants 
have no power to forcefully obtain discovery and other documents from less-than-
forthcoming opposing parties.’ 1023  There is ‘no consequence for non-compliance besides 
potential damage to the attorney’s reputation’.1024 There is also the possibility of one client 
                                                          
1018
 Peppet, above n 989, 143-4, 148; Beyer, above n 373, 325; Fairman, above n 141, 250-5, 263-7 for 
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deliberately and strategically forcing a process termination for the sole purpose of triggering 
the automatic disqualification provision so that both parties will need to engage new 
lawyers.
1025
 
 
Problems with interpretation, application and enforcement of good faith requirements 
persist. 
Even if the parties try to bolster their intentions to act in good faith by expressly contracting, 
without elaboration, to negotiate ‘candidly and in good faith,’ the dynamics are unlikely to change, 
because these terms are open to a wide range of interpretations, breaches will be hard to detect, and 
enforcement efforts may provide no satisfactory remedy.
1026
 
 
6.2.3 Problems Relating to Disclosure 
 
As demonstrated in the last section, CL has not resolved the tension between the extremes 
of full candour, misrepresentation and non-disclosure.
1027
 The disclosure provisions require 
exchange of ‘relevant’ information. However, Macfarlane reports that there are wide 
differences in strategy adopted by various CL groups and different views as to what is 
relevant for the purpose of information exchange under the CL agreement.
1028
 A lawyer who 
discloses everything and leaves nothing in reserve must know that he or she might 
compromise the client’s interests should settlement not be reached.1029 As with mediation, 
while information and admissions revealed in CL are confidential, those matters are not 
protected if the dispute proceeds to litigation and they can be proven via completely 
independent formal discovery by subsequently retained lawyers.
1030
  
 
Is it permissible in CL to overstate one’s case and mislead about intentions to settle? 
There is some confusion in the literature about whether or not the standard set in rule 4.1 of 
the ABA Model Rules continues to apply in CL. Fairman asserts that ‘[a]bsent some 
intervening ethical guidance to the contrary, the same standard [rule 4.1] must apply to 
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collaborative law’.1031 A different view is taken by Voegele, Wray and Ousky who maintain 
that the tactics allowed under rule 4.1 are ‘not likely to be permitted’ in CL.1032 
 
In addition to ‘normal’ disclosure, the parties in CL agree to ‘provide good faith 
responses to any good faith questions and requests’.1033 However, the CL agreement does not 
specifically address the parties’ obligations to disclose relevant information that has not been 
affirmatively requested by the other side (ie it does not address the question ‘do you have to 
ask for the information in order to be supplied with it?’). Nor does it address the question 
whether a lawyer (with whom a client has shared confidential information) has an obligation 
independent of obligations of the client to disclose all relevant information to the other 
side.
1034
 Such an obligation would only exist, it is suggested, if a lawyer was in contractual 
privity with the opposing party. 
 
6.2.4 Positional Negotiation v Interest-based Negotiation 
 
The CL arrangement does not eliminate positional or distributive negotiation, nor does it 
eliminate adversarial behaviour. CL cases vary widely (as do all forms of dispute resolution). 
Hoffman notes that: 
 
[i]n the paradigmatic CL negotiation, the parties and attorneys negotiate in four-way meetings, in a 
nonadversarial manner. In some CL cases, however, despite the parties’ and counsel’s best 
intentions, the negotiations can become so protracted, positional, and adversarial that they are 
virtually indistinguishable from ordinary negotiation in a high-conflict case.
1035
 
 
Even Webb, the founder of CL,
1036 
concedes that distributive negotiations occur at the 
four way meetings.
1037
 This is not surprising if one accepts that distributive negotiation 
occurs in most, if not all, negotiations. 
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6.2.5 Potential for Conflict of Interest – Coercion by Lawyers of Their Own Clients  
 
In at least one contractual variation of CL (such as that considered by the Colorado Bar 
Association’s Ethics Committee Formal Opinion 115 where there is contractual privity 
between a legal representative and the opposing client), there exists the possibility of a 
conflict between the interests of one’s own client and those of the opposing party. 
 
Whatever the contractual arrangements that are used, there is also a potential for conflict 
between a lawyer’s interests and those of his or her own client and there is potential for a 
lawyer to coerce his or her own client.
1038
 This might be true, to some degree, in all lawyer-
client relationships but the stakes are higher in CL. If a settlement is not reached in CL, the 
collaborative lawyers are disqualified and each loses a client. In order to avoid having the 
process fail, a collaborative lawyer might exert undue pressure on a client to settle and he or 
she might recommend terms of settlement that do not truly represent the best interests of the 
client.
1039
 Tesler suggests that the ability of lawyers to withdraw gives them ‘more clout’ over 
their client than a mediator who may encounter difficulty working with parties and 
maintaining neutrality.
1040
 In other words, lawyers in this process carry a bigger stick with 
which to wave over clients than mediators do in mediation. The collaborative lawyer may no 
longer be fully representing the interests of the client
1041
 but rather he or she becomes an 
advocate for settlement as a matter of self interest.
1042
  
 
Not only might legal representatives in CL put their own interests before those of their 
client, there is concern that they might put the interests of opposing counsel ahead of the 
interests of their own clients.
1043
 Some lawyers see their primary relationship to be with the 
lawyer on the other side, rather than with their client.
1044
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6.2.6 Lack of Informed Consent by Clients 
 
Technically, there is nothing unethical about the disqualification provision which 
underpins CL. Lawyers are permitted to enter into ‘limited purpose retainers’ provided the 
client gives informed consent.
1045
 The lawyer must explain the limitations of his or her 
representation, the material risks involved in CL, the reasonably available alternatives and the 
probable impact of the limitation on the client’s rights and interests.1046 Lawyers are also 
permitted to withdraw from a representation if they can do so ‘without material adverse effect 
on interests of the client’.1047 However, clients may not fully understand what is at stake if the 
CL process is terminated. Most clients would expect their lawyer to continue to act for them 
until such time as the matter with regard to which instructions were given is completed. In 
CL, there is real potential for the parties to be trapped – to be committed to settle ‘out of 
necessity’.1048 When a client has sunk as much as $24,000 (US) in professional fees into the 
process and devoted some nine months to negotiation, it can be hard to call the process a 
‘failure’ and to begin afresh with litigation with a new lawyer.1049 
 
6.2.7 An Artificial Practice Setting 
 
CL depends for its ‘success’ on the organisational units which support the process. 
Collaborative lawyers signal their intention to collaborate by becoming members of CL 
practice groups (it is membership of this group which makes it easier to find ‘trustworthy’ 
and likeminded colleagues).
1050
 It is this ‘tight-knit’ unit which allows the external ethical 
constraints on negotiation behaviour ie reputation effect and peer criticism, to work. 
However, the CL arrangement is not a realistic practice setting for most legal firms and 
practitioners. Craver asserts that collaborative lawyers ‘have created a wholly artificial world 
which is impossible to effectively monitor’.1051 These groups are so tight-knit that research on 
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CL suggests that some clients are uncomfortable with the apparent friendliness of opposing 
lawyers.
1052
 
  
6.2.8 Inefficiency 
 
Other concerns about CL relate to more practical matters (client dissatisfaction with the 
CL process, frustration at the length of time involved and duplication of legal fees if 
settlement is not reached).
1053
 Beyer concludes that CL is ‘only a more expensive, longer, and 
less efficient process than the average mediated lawsuit, while accomplishing the same goal 
of the involved parties – settlement’.1054 
 
6.3 The Role of the Collaborative Lawyer: A Non-adversarial Advocate? 
 
There are no specific ethical guidelines for CL contained in existing professional conduct 
rules although some commentators are calling for the development of new rules for this 
process.
1055
 For instance, Fairman says that we may be able to ‘shoehorn the process of CL 
into traditional lawyer ethical codes,’ but he argues that it is an unsatisfactory way to 
proceed. We should not, he maintains, ‘put old ethical hats on new heads’.1056 However there 
is no agreement that the practice of CL calls for the introduction of new rules. 
 
One of the most controversial questions arising from CL practice is the question of 
whether or not the collaborative lawyer is still an advocate for his or her client. There has 
been some debate in the literature about the ‘appropriate’ ethical orientation of a 
collaborative lawyer. While Isaacs claims that the role of a collaborative lawyer is ‘not solely 
adversarial’,1057 there is no agreement on how ‘non-adversarial’ a collaborative lawyer should 
be. Lawrence attempts to distinguish the orientation of traditional lawyers, lawyer mediators 
and collaborative lawyers as follows: 
1. The ‘traditional advocate is committed first and foremost to the interests of the 
individual: the client.’1058 
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2. Lawyers who serve as mediators are not advocates at all since they are not retained to 
advance the interest of a particular individual; rather they are retained to mediate a 
dispute. 
3. The ethical orientation of the collaborative lawyer lies in between the divergent 
responsibilities of the advocate and mediator.
1059
 
 
Beckwith and Slovin strongly disagree with the view expressed by Lawrence and they 
disagree (although not so strongly) that we need new ethical hats. They argue that the 
collaborative lawyer does not function as a neutral (ie like a mediator), and that separate 
ethical rules for CL are not necessary. ‘The collaborative lawyer is, in every sense, an 
advocate. The ethical considerations applicable to traditional lawyering apply to collaborative 
lawyering equally, without need for alteration’.1060 The CL format ‘does not diminish the zeal 
with which they [collaborative lawyers] represent their client’s interests’.1061 ‘The lawyer-
advocate’s conduct in collaborative law is unlikely to differ significantly from that of the 
lawyer advocate in mediation. She continues to guard her client’s interest above all else. Her 
commitment is to her client and, by agreement, to the process.’ 1062  He or she does not 
represent the interests of the other party, but rather, the interests of his or her client, which 
might be best served by resolving the case without a court outcome.
1063
  ‘The collaborative 
lawyer has not taken off his advocacy hat or donned the hat of neutrality’.1064  What the 
collaborative lawyer foregoes is the positioning, posturing and puffing that many lawyers 
associate with effective advocacy.
1065
  
 
If this can be said of lawyers in a process where good faith, full disclosure and 
cooperation are explicitly agreed, surely there is no problem with a legal representative 
wearing his or her advocacy hat in mediation. 
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Lande also believes that CL fits the general model of lawyering – he reasons that as ‘the 
general model of legal ethics clearly permits lawyers to act collaboratively’ so there is 
nothing incompatible with the two models.
1066
 The current professional conduct rules give 
room for a cooperative, interest-based creative process. But ‘the [collaborative] lawyer 
should not forget that at the most fundamental level her client is involved in a legal matter, 
and that she is that client’s legal representative’.1067  This same reasoning applies to the legal 
representative in mediation. 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
CL offers some important ‘learning points’ in the context of this research. In CL, 
problems of interpretation, application and enforcement of concepts such as full candour and 
good faith persist (or in some instances, have been sidestepped). It appears that these 
concepts are inevitably subjective and vague. 
 
Although parties and their legal representatives may explicitly agree to honesty and full 
candour, and to the use of interest-based cooperative negotiation, as they do in CL, the 
tensions felt in negotiation between honesty and openness as against misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure, and between cooperation and competition, continue to be felt. These 
tightropes are inevitable in any negotiation. They cannot easily be fixed as points on a 
continuum. 
 
When one attempts to impose a single right answer in conditions of uncertainty, there is 
real concern that lawyers might put their own interests in settlement and the interests of their 
collaborative-lawyer colleagues ahead of those of their own client. 
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PART 7: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Lawyers who represent parties in mediation are likely to be confronted with a number of 
ethical dilemmas ie situations in which they have to choose between ‘competing and 
sometimes conflicting values’ 1068  (such as loyalty to a client, as against furthering the 
interests of justice) and, as a consequence, between ‘alternative and contradictory courses of 
action’1069 (such as keeping a client’s confidence, or disclosing material information to an 
opponent).  
 
At present, legal representatives in mediation are governed by the legal profession’s 
general rules of conduct which make no specific provision for mediation other than, in the 
case of the rules in Australian jurisdictions, the ad hoc inclusion of the term ‘mediations’ in 
the definition of ‘court’. 
 
Some authors, professional bodies and reform agencies are pressing for the promulgation 
of specific rules of conduct for legal representatives in mediation, rules which seek to 
regulate matters such as candour, good faith, cooperation and fairness. I contend that, not 
only are new ‘non-adversarial’ rules of conduct unnecessary, they are also impractical and 
undesirable. 
 
7.1 The Current Position: Resolving the Dilemmas 
 
In part 2, I identified five ethical issues which commonly confront legal representatives in 
mediation and suggested how those issues might be resolved using the current framework of 
law governing lawyers. The ethical issues considered are whether there are duties to make 
full and honest disclosure of relevant information, to act in good faith, to act cooperatively, to 
ensure fairness in process and/or outcome and, should these duties exist, which prevails in the 
event of conflict. Although this is not an exhaustive statement of the ethical issues which may 
arise, it provides a good sample of the most important dilemmas that legal representatives 
confront in mediation. 
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It is my contention that the ethical issues mentioned (and any others likely to arise) can be 
satisfactorily resolved through the application of the existing general rules of professional 
conduct for lawyers. Put another way, the current rules in Australian and US jurisdictions are 
compatible with, and adequate for, mediation. The existing rules are compatible with 
mediation if they do not destroy or detract from the essential nature and integrity of the 
mediation process. They do not. They are adequate for mediation if they provide appropriate 
minimum standards of conduct and a framework of values from which lawyers can derive 
appropriate conduct in a wide variety of circumstances including those likely to arise in 
mediation. They do. 
 
As mentioned in part 5, the legal profession has struck a compromise in its rules of 
conduct between specific regulatory rules and general aspirational statements. The current 
rules of conduct for lawyers ‘prescribe the minimum legally acceptable behavior, but 
encourage ethical conduct above and beyond the minimum.’1070  
 
The rules of professional conduct require lawyers to be honest in all of their dealings with 
the court and other persons (clients, opponents, and third parties including mediators). As to 
the application of the more specific rules governing disclosure, the situation in Australia is 
unclear. Currently, the professional conduct rules define ‘court’ to include ‘mediations’. By 
this reference, I think that the drafters of the rules meant ‘mediators’. If this is the case, then 
legal representatives in Australia are prohibited from knowingly making misleading 
statements about matters of law or fact to a mediator and they may even be prohibited from 
expressing certain opinions and from making certain (mis)representations about their client’s 
settlement intentions and bottom lines. They must inform a mediator of any relevant binding 
authorities and legislative provisions of which they are aware although the rules are silent on 
whether such disclosures need to be made in joint sessions or whether disclosure in a separate 
session will suffice. Legal representatives have no obligation to disclose adverse facts to a 
mediator or to correct errors in statements made to the mediator by the other party. 
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In the US, the rules are more straightforward. Legal practitioners owe mediators the same 
standard of disclosure as they owe to their opponents. 
 
In both Australia and the US, legal representatives are prohibited from knowingly making 
false statements about material facts or law to their opponents. If they make a statement to 
their opponent and subsequently discover that the statement is false (as Messrs Mullins and 
Garrett did), they must correct the statement. But, at least in their dealings with opponents, 
legal representatives can exaggerate values and bottom lines in mediation and they can 
misrepresent their client’s settlement intentions. As a general rule, there is no obligation of 
candour owed to one’s opponents in mediation. The rules of professional conduct do not 
prohibit ‘silence’, unwillingness to present a client’s case and refusal to make a settlement 
offer. Nor is there any duty to assist the opponent in any way. As Timkin put it, there 
currently exists a silent safe harbour - absent court rule, principle of substantive law, or prior 
factual representation, a legal representative is not subject to a duty to make affirmative 
factual representations in the course of settlement negotiations.
 1071
 
 
The professional conduct rules do not impose on legal representatives, duties to 
participate in mediation in good faith or to cooperate with a mediator or an opponent in 
mediation. Nor does it appear that these duties exist in general law (at least, the law in this 
regard is not settled). 
 
Some agreements to mediate and statutory directives to mediate impose upon participants 
(parties and legal representatives) an obligation to participate in good faith and to cooperate 
with the mediator. While some common threads as to the meaning of these provisions have 
emerged (eg it is widely agreed that a party who does not attend a mediation fails to 
participate in good faith; and it appears that a practitioner who defers mediation contrary to 
court directive may be held to have acted inconsistently with his or her duty to assist the court 
in the management of proceedings),
1072
 there is no universally agreed meaning that can be 
attributed to these terms. 
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The professional conduct rules require practitioners to act fairly, but in the context of 
mediation, it is suggested that practitioners discharge their duty of fairness with respect to 
process by complying with ‘reasonable’ guidelines set by the mediator. 
 
There is no general duty to ensure fair outcomes or to protect the interests of third parties 
although some areas of substantive law impose specific obligations in this regard (eg family 
law). In rare cases a lawyer’s actions in securing an agreement might be considered so unfair 
as to amount to a breach of the practitioner’s obligations to the administration of justice and 
to the court. Such an agreement might also be contrary to the principles of contract law and 
the law dealing with unconscionability. 
 
For the most part, legal representatives in mediation can decide for themselves the 
manner in which they conduct themselves in mediation (in the sense of choosing their 
preferred style and approach to negotiation) but, with some exceptions, they are bound to 
follow their clients’ instructions with respect to the objectives of mediation and as to whether 
or not to disclose confidential information. 
 
Presently neither the law of lawyering nor any rule of custom requires lawyers (or their 
clients) to use interest-based negotiation (nor is there any prohibition on lawyers acting 
competitively rather than cooperatively). 
 
But while the rules do not mandate full candour, good faith participation, cooperation and 
outcome fairness, nor do they prohibit legal representatives, subject always to a client’s 
instructions, from: 
1. Being candid, in particular, from revealing the client’s interests. 
2. Presenting the client’s case. 
3. Making offers, and giving reasons for refusing offers. 
4. Assisting mediators and other parties. 
5. Cooperating with mediators and other parties to the mediation. 
6. Acting in good faith. 
7. Using interest-based negotiation. 
8. Working towards ‘fair’ outcomes. 
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The existing professional conduct rules enable lawyers to cooperate, collaborate and use 
joint problem-solving methods, in the appropriate circumstances. 
 
The rules do not excuse rudeness or discourtesy – rather, they impose upon legal 
representatives general obligations to treat others with civility or courtesy. Courts have 
affirmed that these general concepts can and will be applied and given meaning but also, that 
the meaning will be construed according to the context in which specific behaviour takes 
place.
1073
 This approach is appropriate in the case of mediation which is a highly contextual 
process. 
 
The rules do not encourage bad faith participation in mediation. A lawyer does not act in 
bad faith when he or she takes refuge in the ‘silent safe harbour’ mentioned above. While 
commentators have been unable to define with clarity what the term ‘good faith’ means or 
requires by way of participation, there is broad agreement that it does not require parties to 
engage in total disclosure, to make any or any particular settlement offers, or to give reasons 
for refusing an offer. Good faith does not preclude the parties from having regard to self-
interest. Lawyers may act in the best interests of their clients consistently with ‘good faith’ 
obligations. 
 
There will always be exceptions to these general mandates. There is scope for a legal 
representative to withdraw from a mediation and to cease to act for a client if the client will 
not agree to reveal critical information to the other side. Likewise, if a lawyer feels that a 
client is using mediation for an improper purpose, there is scope within the context of the 
existing rule system for the lawyer to refuse to act for the client on the ground that to do so 
would involve a breach of the lawyer’s duty to the administration of justice. There is ample 
case law to the effect that lawyers are not mere mouthpieces for their clients (whether in 
litigation or any other context) and must exercise independent judgment in matters such as 
these.
1074
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The rules of professional conduct mandate that legal representatives put the interests of 
their clients before those of other persons. The only duty that supersedes the duty to the client 
is the duty owed to the administration of justice. 
 
Nothing about mediation requires that a legal representative put the interests of the other 
party or the interests of the mediator or ‘the integrity of the process’ before the interests of his 
or her client. Moreover, it is suggested that: 
 
1. By putting client interests first, legal representatives actually further the one objective 
and value of mediation that seems to be universally recognised and consistent with 
every model of mediation – ie party self-determination. 
 
2. A practitioner who participants in mediation in bad faith (whatever that means) 
breaches the existing rules of professional conduct for he or she does their client a 
disservice by not taking advantage of the potential benefits of mediation and the 
opportunity afforded to reach mutually satisfactory outcomes. 
 
7.2 Problems with Proposed Alternative Ethics Systems 
 
A range of proposals for new rules was addressed in part 4. Some influential authors and 
law reform agencies suggest that participants in mediation should owe a higher standard of 
disclosure, a duty to participate in good faith, a duty of cooperation and an (unspecified) duty 
of fairness. Additionally, several authors suggest that legal representatives in mediation 
should adopt an interest-based approach to negotiation and act more like neutrals and less like 
adversarial advocates. 
 
7.2.1 Flawed Assumptions 
 
I have argued that the rationale given for the need for new rules is flawed. It is by no 
means clear that the existing rules are based solely on an adversarial model of legal practice. 
At most, they may give undue attention to advocacy in court. They allow cooperative 
behaviour by lawyers in a range of contexts (given that most disputes involving lawyers do 
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settle, it is reasonable to assume that lawyers can and do cooperate with each other most of 
the time). 
 
Additionally, to the extent that one can make general claims about the objectives and 
values of mediation and litigation, they are more alike than acknowledged by authors calling 
for change. The objective of each process is dispute resolution by a process considered to be 
fair where procedural fairness is judged by whether or not the parties are offered a 
meaningful opportunity for voice, ‘assurance that a third party considered what they said, and 
treatment that is both even-handed and dignified’.1075   
 
I have also argued that legal representatives in mediation continue to act as advisers, 
counsellors, negotiators and advocates for their clients. Arguably some of these roles eg those 
of adviser and counsellor, are more important in mediation than in any other context for in 
mediation, responsibility for decision-making rests with the parties. 
 
None of the suggested alternative ethics systems present realistic, practical or desirable 
alternatives to the existing framework of rules governing the conduct of legal representatives 
in mediation. As argued in part 4, there are many problems with the proposals for new rules. I 
mention below some of the more significant problems. 
 
7.2.2 Lack of Consensus, and of Clarity, About the Meaning of Terms 
 
There is no consensus among proponents for change about the appropriate standard of 
disclosure required in mediation. This is not really surprising since negotiation literature 
recognizes that the question of how much candour to exhibit is ‘one of the most difficult 
normative questions with which negotiators wrestle’.1076 How then can a single right answer 
to this question be captured or prescribed in the rules? 
 
There is also a lack of consensus over, and uncertainty attached to, the meaning of 
concepts such as good faith and cooperation. These concepts have not been clearly defined, 
either by legislation, the courts or commentators in this area. Indeed, the court acknowledges 
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that these concepts are contextual – what they signify ‘in any particular context ... will 
depend on that context.’1077 
 
Proponents for new rules are vague about the criteria to be used for judging fairness. 
Again, this is not surprising since there are a number of different and competing criteria 
which may be used to judge outcome fairness in negotiation such as ‘equality, need, 
generosity, and equity.’ 1078  Each party (and the mediator) is likely to have a different 
perception about what is fair. 
 
Rules of the kind suggested are difficult to articulate with any precision; they are 
inevitably subjective and vague. It is impossible to communicate what is and what is not, 
appropriate behaviour. 
 
7.2.3 Difficulties of Monitoring and Enforcing Suggested Rules 
 
Some authors assert that rules must be enforceable enough, whether by formal or informal 
means, to promote confidence that they will be followed.
1079
 Not only are we unable to define 
concepts such as ‘good faith’ and ‘cooperation’, we cannot monitor and enforce compliance 
with such terms. Even the court has observed that there are few meaningful sanctions 
available to it to penalise anyone who ‘breaches’ this type of obligation.1080 Mediators in 
private mediations have even less power than the court to sanction for breach. 
 
Any attempt to monitor and enforce compliance with provisions of this type will also 
involve inroads into the confidentiality of the mediation process – which is often considered 
one of the more beneficial features of the process. 
 
7.2.4 Erosion of Other Hallmarks of the Mediation Process 
 
Mediation has the potential to offer the parties both informality and flexibility in the way 
they resolve disputes. Currently there are few rules of process and procedure, except those 
                                                          
1077
 United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177 (3 July 
2009) [70] (Allsop P with whom Ipp JA and Macfarlan JA agreed). 
1078
 Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, above n 385, 165. 
1079
 Schneyer, above n 276, 329. 
1080
 Hopeshore Pty Limited v Melroad Equipment Pty Limited [2004] FCA 1445 (9 November 2004) [38]. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 198 - 15- Aug-11 
 
‘suggested’ by mediators and agreed to by the parties. If more rules are imposed, as 
proponents for change suggest, the informally and flexibility of the process (the reasons why 
many parties choose the process to begin with) will be lost.  
 
7.2.5 Unrealistic Approach to Negotiation and Mediation 
 
Proponents for new rules ignore some aspects of the theory and practice of negotiation, 
such as that: 
1. Some deception is not only inevitable but vital to the effectiveness of negotiation. 
2. Some competition and even adversarial behaviour is inevitable and desirable in 
negotiation.  
3. Most negotiations do not have the potential to be conducted, from beginning to end, 
using interest-based negotiation. 
 
In negotiation theory, ‘there is little or no consensus on whether a negotiator should 
pursue a competitive or an accommodative approach when dealing with the other party’.1081 
A strategy of cooperation (and full candour) is not always appropriate. Every negotiation – 
even those which are predominantly interest-based, may benefit from some element of 
competition and adversarial behaviour. No one approach is always the best and most 
negotiations (and mediations) will involve a mix of approaches. As such, it is not appropriate 
to formulate codes of conduct which seek to freeze one approach in place, or to assume that 
one approach is better or more appropriate than another. 
 
7.2.6 Other Problems 
 
Proponents for change have not dealt with some of the possible negative consequences of 
new rules, such as: 
1. A rule which mandates ‘candour’ would eventually make inroads into the scope of 
lawyer-client confidentiality. Clients might then not feel free to make full disclosure 
to their lawyers. 
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2. A rule which mandates ‘candour’ might also remove the incentive to prepare for 
mediation. If the other party is obliged to reveal everything within its knowledge, 
each party might come to rely on the efforts made by the other side. 
3. Rules of the kind suggested, which would be imposed only on lawyers, would 
disadvantage anyone who chose to be represented as against parties who conduct their 
matters pro se. 
 
Those authors who call for multiple sets of rules have not considered the fact that, under 
such a scheme, lawyers may find themselves governed by several sets of, possibly 
conflicting, rules at any one time.  
 
7.2.7 The Problems with Explicit Obligations 
 
In private mediations, parties and their representatives have the opportunity to agree to, 
and make explicit, conduct obligations. The freedom to shape ‘rules of engagement’ has 
resulted in the development of collaborative law. This process affords us an insight into a 
situation where all participants agree to abide by obligations of good faith, full and open 
disclosure and non-adversarial behaviour. Since these terms are basically unenforceable 
without some inbuilt compliance and enforcement mechanism, the automatic disqualification 
provision has been adopted. It has resulted in the development of some critical ethical and 
practical problems ie the potential for conflict between the interests of the lawyer and his or 
her own client and the real potential (and incentive) for coercion of one’s own client to get a 
result and to forge and maintain a relationship with the opposing lawyer. The least of its 
problems may be that the practice of collaborative law requires what is for many 
practitioners, an artificial practice environment. Even in this artificial environment, the 
tightropes of negotiation identified by Rubin continue to exist.  
 
7.3 The Negotiation Tightropes – A Need for Discretion in All Negotiations  
 
Ultimately, every negotiation will involve a number of tensions or tightropes along which 
negotiators must traverse. Every negotiator must choose, within the changing dynamics of 
negotiation, where they should be on a particular tightrope at any given moment in time. 
They must tread a line between honesty and openness as against misrepresentation and non-
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disclosure and between cooperation as against competition. Rules (and rule drafters) cannot 
dictate how open or trusting a negotiator should be; they cannot dictate how cooperative or 
competitive a negotiator should be. Nor can they dictate whether interest-based or positional 
negotiation will be the more appropriate approach at any given moment in time. 
 
In areas in which there is so little agreement on what is the right or best thing to do, it 
would be a mistake to impose upon lawyers rules which mandated full candour, good faith, 
and a requirement to cooperate or to use interest-based negotiation. 
 
Ultimately the type of behaviour that commentators for change seek to regulate is 
inherently inappropriate for specific and especially mandatory rulemaking.
1082
 This reasoning 
applies to unassisted and assisted negotiation. 
 
7.4 Factors Unique to Mediation 
 
Authors who have called for new rules have focused on an ideal (possibly, mythical) 
version of mediation – in which mediators practise mediation in a uniform way (hovering 
around a facilitative approach), without their own agenda. They ignore two critical connected 
factors which distinguish mediation on the one hand, from litigation and unassisted 
negotiation on the other. These factors can and do have an impact on the behaviour and the 
ethics of legal representatives in mediation. The two factors are: 
 
1. The diversity of mediation. Mediation is an extremely diverse process. There is little 
consensus about the proper objectives and values of mediation (so much so that it is 
difficult to make generalised statements about its objectives and values). Ultimately 
the objectives and values of mediation depend on the choices made by individual 
mediators. 
 
2. The influence of mediators. While mediation has some core features, it consists of 
multiple variable features. It is no exaggeration to conclude that the single most 
important variable in mediation is the mediator, whose neutrality is either fictional
1083
 
or modified, as he or she sees fit, to deal with any perceived imbalance in negotiations 
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and power to ensure outcomes which the mediator considers to be fair. Mediator 
standards allow mediators wide discretion in handling ethical matters - they may 
make judgments that are contextualized, ‘guided by the particulars, the substance, and 
the context’.1084 
 
The one objective and value of mediation that is consistent across mediation practice is 
party self-determination – it is central to all models of mediation. In mediation, the parties 
retain decision-making responsibility. I agree with the many authors who argue that we must 
preserve the uniqueness of mediation ie we must preserve those things which set it apart as a 
separate, viable alternative to adjudication.
1085
 And I agree with Weckstein that ‘[t]he 
challenge is to construct and conduct a mediation that maximizes disputant determination and 
avoids mediator coercion and uninformed disputants.’1086 There is no better way to do this 
than to give each of the parties a partisan advocate who is obliged to ensure that his or her 
particular client is fully informed and as free as possible from coercion, including coercion 
exerted by the mediator, to make their own decisions. 
 
A lawyer remains an advocate for his or her client at all times. He or she does not take on 
a neutral or non-partisan role in mediation. But advocacy does not mean adopting dominating 
‘hard-nose, uncooperative’1087 tactics for to do so may often harm rather than help a client in 
mediation.
1088
 It does not mean minimising the client’s direct participation, or focusing 
exclusively on legal rights – where to do so ill serves the client’s interests. In order to serve 
their clients’ interests, lawyers should encourage their clients to play an active role in 
mediation; they should encourage their clients to engage in direct communication with the 
mediator and the other party, and they should allow the discussion to focus on emotional as 
well as legal matters.
1089
 
 
In some mediations some of the time (perhaps even, most of the time), it will be in their 
client’s best interests to use interest-based negotiation and to cooperate. It will be in the 
client’s best interests to reveal sufficient information (about interests but not necessarily 
bottom lines) to ensure that mediation is fruitful. 
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At other times, positional negotiation will be the better choice of approaches to 
negotiation. It will not always be in the client’s best interests to cooperate fully or to lay all of 
their cards on the negotiation table. A wise negotiator will ‘proceed cautiously, revealing as 
little and defending as much as possible until the other’s intentions are known.’1090 Nor will it 
always be in the client’s best interests for his or her representative to take a back seat in the 
mediation. ‘[I]n certain cases attorneys must play a very active or even dominant role in the 
mediation in order to protect their clients from being tricked, abused, or taken advantage of in 
the mediation process’.1091 
 
The one prescription that lawyers should follow is this: ‘[t]hey should work with their 
clients to choose an approach which best serves their clients’ needs and interests in the 
particular dispute’.1092 In order to do this, lawyers must be able to react to (and if necessary, 
be proactive about) mediator interventions. They also need the ability to respond to the 
actions of the other party. They need to exercise discretion in relation to matters such as 
candour, and with respect to all of the countless negotiation moves that make up 
‘cooperation’ in negotiation. The matters over which they should retain discretion are those 
matters which proponents for new rules seek to regulate (or more heavily regulate than is 
presently the case).  
 
7.5 Recommendations for Change 
 
In my opinion, the legal profession does not need new rules of conduct to govern the 
behaviour of its members when they are acting on behalf of clients in mediation. (I do not 
speak to the need for new rules for lawyer mediators. Mediators stand in an entirely different 
position than legal representatives for they do not represent the interests of any one client.) I 
advocate resistance to any attempts to introduce rules which mandate requirements such as 
full candour, good faith and cooperation. Provisions of this nature are not even appropriate as 
aspirational statements as they assume that one approach is better, more appropriate and more 
ethical than another, when it is not. 
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However, the rules in Australia could be improved. I make some recommendations in this 
regard below.  
 
7.5.1 Finetuning the Rules 
 
Currently, the professional conduct rules in Australia do not contain explicit statements 
about the administration of justice (references to ‘the duty to the administration of justice’ 
only appear in object sections and preambles).
1093
 The new draft Solicitors’ Rules make clear 
that solicitors owe a paramount duty to the administration of justice and that the duty is ‘to 
prevail to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty’.1094 I endorse this change which 
brings the duty to the administration of justice to the fore. I see no reason why a similar 
amendment should not be made to the Barristers’ Rules in Australia.1095 
 
The rules of conduct in most Australian jurisdictions currently impose a specific 
obligation on practitioners to inform clients (and where the practitioner is a barrister, to 
inform the instructing solicitor and client) about ‘the reasonably available alternatives to fully 
contested adjudication’.1096 This provision has not been retained in the new draft professional 
rules (for solicitors or barristers).
1097
 The provision is not strictly necessary.  
 
[I]t is difficult to see how a lawyer can fulfil his or her duty to inform and advise a client fully (so 
as to enable the client to make informed decisions about what is, and what is not, in the client’s 
best interests) without informing the client of all procedural options, in addition to litigation, in a 
contentious matter.
1098
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Nonetheless, there is some benefit in retaining the provision as it brings ADR processes to the 
forefront of the lawyer’s mind. This is not a matter about which lawyers ought to retain 
discretion. At all times, they and their clients should at least consider whether or not the 
matter is appropriate for ADR. 
 
The definition section of the current rules (which has been reiterated in the draft new 
rules) needs attention. As was mentioned in part 2, I think that the reference to ‘mediations’ 
actually means ‘mediators’ (the other two possibilities mentioned in part 2 make even less 
sense), but this interpretation is problematic. If legal practitioners owe mediators the same 
duties as they owe to judges, then it would seem that technically they are prohibited from 
making statements of opinion and misrepresentations about ‘immaterial’ matters to mediators 
(matters such as values, a client’s willingness to settle, bottom lines and so on.) In my 
opinion, this is a problematic situation for tactics of this kind are commonly used, and 
considered by many people to be indispensible to effective negotiation.  
 
My recommendation is to delete the reference to ‘mediations’ from the definition of 
‘court’. There is a strong case for arguing that the rule requiring candour to the court is 
irrelevant in the context of mediation since a mediator, unlike a judge, does not make a 
decision based on law (theoretically, he or she makes no decisions at all on substantive 
matters).
1099
 And mediation is not, in theory at least, a fact finding process. These 
considerations do not apply with respect to arbitration which, like litigation, is an 
adjudicative process. An arbitrator makes findings of fact and applies agreed standards (such 
as rules of law or custom) to arrive at a decision which is binding upon the parties to a 
dispute. The reference to ‘arbitrations’ in the definition sections of the professional conduct 
rules in Australia might therefore appropriately be retained. 
 
If the reference to ‘mediations’ is deleted from the definition section, the effect would be 
that legal representatives would not be specifically prohibited from making false statements 
to mediators (whether such statements concern law, fact, opinion, or non-material matters).  
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Review 207, 253-5. 
 ©2011 Bobette Wolski - 205 - 15- Aug-11 
 
This would not present a problem for: 
1. Legal representatives are still bound by a general duty to be honest with those with 
whom they deal. 
2. Legal representatives remain subject to the prohibition against misleading or 
deceiving an opponent with respect to material facts and law. 
 
Legal representatives would also not be subject to a duty of candour vis à vis mediators (the 
silent safe habour that exists between a legal representative and his or her opponent would be 
extended to cover communications between a legal representative and mediators). They 
would not be obliged to disclose relevant binding legal authorities and legislative provisions 
to mediators. The question of whether or not to reveal adverse facts to a mediator (and/or the 
opponent) would remain within the practitioner’s discretion (subject to client instructions) as 
is currently the case. 
 
If the reference to ‘mediations’ remains in the definition section of the rules, the rule 
drafters should clarify what exactly they mean by the reference. If they mean ‘mediators’, 
they should say so. If they amend the rules to read ‘mediators’, then legal practitioners are 
indeed required to inform mediators of any relevant binding authorities and legislative 
provisions of which they are aware. The rules should then stipulate whether or not the 
required disclosure can be made in a separate session with the mediator on a confidential 
basis (as opposed to needing to be made in a joint session with the other party). 
 
I do not see a problem with rule 30.1 of the draft Solicitors’ Rules 2010, if the rules are 
adopted in Australia. To some extent, it does erode the ‘safe habour’ of silence discussed 
above but only in a narrow band of cases. The provision might be activated eg when a 
solicitor makes an obvious error calculating settlement figures in a transaction to sell a 
property and the other party seeks to take advantage of the error. This type of exception to the 
rules regulating candour does not interfere with the ability to negotiate effectively. Rather, it 
ensures that ‘terms of settlement’ (and likewise, ‘consent orders’) do in fact accurately record 
the parties’ agreement and that the terms of settlement, as agreed, are implemented. 
 
I do not think that the Australian rules need to be amended to include a provision similar 
to the ABA Model Rules r 1.2(a) which provides that, with some limitations, a lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of the representation and consult with 
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the client as to the means by which the objectives are to be pursued. Courts in Australia have 
held that a practitioner is ‘not a mere agent and mouthpiece for his client, but a professional 
exercising independent judgment’1100  and have indicated that there is a need for serious 
consideration to be given ‘where the client’s instructions may run counter to normal ethical 
principles and a practitioner’s own personal standards’.1101  
 
I suggest that clause 6.2 of the LCA Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations be reworded. 
It currently states: 
The skills required for a successful mediation are different to those desirable in advocacy. It is not 
the other lawyer or mediator that needs to be convinced; it is the client on the other side of the 
table. A lawyer who adopts a persuasive rather than adversarial or aggressive approach, and 
acknowledges the concerns of the other side, is more likely to contribute to a better result.  
 
I recommend that it be replaced with something along the following lines: ‘a mediation 
advocate may use a variety of styles and approaches to mediation. He or she will consider 
solutions that accommodate the interests of other parties as well as those of their client, and 
help clients to see that solutions, not judgments, may be in their best interests’. 
 
7.5.2 Education and Training 
 
If the behaviour of legal representatives (and clients) in mediation does indeed need 
changing, rather than increasing the standards of conduct, a better option is to educate the 
parties and their lawyers about the potential benefits of mediation.
1102
 
 
Whereas professional conduct rules only target lawyers (and indirectly, their clients), 
education has the potential to reach everyone – even unrepresented parties. Appropriate 
education needs to take place in our homes, schools, law schools and in the community. Here, 
I address only the needs of law schools. 
 
                                                          
1100
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1101
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1102
 Boettger, above n 199, 39, 41; Lande, above n 189, 76, 115; Wolski, above n 72, 8 [2]; Bobette Wolski, 
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Perspective’ (1998) 10 Bond Law Review 7, 22. 
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It is now widely accepted that one of the primary goals of undergraduate legal education 
is ‘to introduce students to basic competencies required in legal practice’.1103 In an earlier 
article, I addressed the challenges involved in integrating requisite skills, values and attitudes 
into the law school curriculum. 
 
If they do not do so already, law schools should attempt to impart skills and theory in the 
following areas:
1104
 
1. Selection of cases suitable for ADR 
2. Negotiation (both interest-based and positional) 
3. Mediation and other dispute resolution processes 
4. Assessment of the potential for success in mediation 
5. Risk analysis and assessment 
6. The giving of advice on prospects of success and the likely outcome of litigation. 
 
Ideally, law schools should engage students in, and give them experience with, problem-
solving, expanding the issues of a problem (rather than narrowing them), creativity,
1105
 
addressing the needs and interests of clients and other parties, questioning and listening, 
practical judgment, co-operation, and coalition and team building. 
 
Almost all studies and reports into legal education and the legal profession emphasise the 
need to teach skills in the context of ethics,
1106
 values and professional responsibility.
1107
 
Obviously, I recommend that the ethics course should cover ethics and responsibility in 
mediation, as well as other contexts. It should not be limited to coverage of the formal rules 
of professional conduct as they apply in the context of litigation. 
  
                                                          
1103
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1104
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1105
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1106
 For a definition of ‘legal ethics teaching’, see June Chapman, ‘Why Teach Legal Ethics to Undergraduates?’ 
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Law schools also have an obligation to impart to students a critical understanding of 
personal and professional values where relevant values include ‘the lawyer’s obligations to 
truth, honesty, and fair dealing; the responsibility to improve the integrity of the legal 
system’, 1108  ‘the obligation to promote justice; and the obligation to provide competent 
representation’.1109  
 
7.6 Directions for Future Research 
 
A great deal more research is needed in this area. In closing I suggest some directions for 
future research.  
 
According to NADRAC, there is ‘a strong view’ that the conduct of some legal 
practitioners in mediation ‘leaves much to be desired’.1110 Undoubtedly some lawyers use 
mediation for strategic purposes eg to fish for information.
1111
 On the other hand, there is 
evidence that the presence of lawyers in mediation is helpful and that they do not interfere 
with the ability of parties to participate directly (albeit that this evidence is limited).
1112
 We 
need more qualitative and empirical evidence from which to draw firm conclusions about the 
behaviour of legal representatives in mediation. In particular, research should be aimed at 
discerning how and why lawyers behave as they do in mediation and at identifying the 
connections between mediator interventions and lawyer behaviour. 
 
Research should focus on providing answers to some of the following questions about the 
behaviour of legal representatives: 
 How often, and when, do they refer to the relevant rules of professional conduct? 
 Do they approach mediation differently than they do unassisted negotiation, and if so, 
why? 
 What do they understand by the terms ‘good faith’ and ‘cooperation’? 
 Under what conditions do they reveal (or conceal) information? 
                                                          
1108
 Stuckey et al, above n 57, 125.    
1109
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1111
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 Under what conditions do they act competitively as opposed to cooperatively? 
 Do they respond differently when mediators are using different models of mediation? 
If so how, and why? 
 When do they seek an evaluative mediator and for what purposes? 
 Do they act differently when the mediator is evaluative? 
 Do they act differently in court/private mediations and if so, how and why? 
 
We have entered an era of statutory and contractual attempts to increase the standards of 
conduct of participants in mediation. It is not clear that these attempts have been ‘successful’ 
in changing the conduct of participants. Further research is needed to determine: 
 If the conduct of parties and their lawyers actually improves with requirements 
imposed by contract and legislation (and as a subsidiary issue, what are the 
appropriate benchmarks and criteria by which to judge ‘improvement’) 
 What are the unintended consequences (both positive and negative) of these 
provisions (eg satellite litigation, inroads into confidentiality) 
 If the benefits to be gained outweigh possible adverse consequences. 
 
We should also try to identify differences, if any, between mandating such behaviour and 
allowing parties to agree to these standards through contract.   
 
Collaborative law and cooperative law are relatively new processes in the dispute 
resolution arena. Further research in this area could focus on answering the following 
questions: 
 What models predominate in Australia and what contractual variations have emerged? 
 Do participants behave differently than they do in mediation and if so, why? 
 Do participants engage more constructively in the negotiation process? 
 Are participants satisfied with the process? 
 Is there undue pressure on the parties (and how is it to be measured)? Where does the 
pressure originate from? 
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From the perspective of the parties, a world of research awaits. We need more evidence 
aimed at determining if lawyers negatively impact on the positive experience that mediation 
may have for parties and if so, how; and conversely, more evidence about the ways in which 
lawyers may improve the parties’ experience of mediation.  
 
Finally, we need to know more about the regulation of the behaviour of lawyers. Wilkins’ 
concept of having a set of ‘middle-level’ principles awaits further research. Many lawyers (eg 
lawyer mediators) are currently governed by more than one set of rules of conduct. What can 
this tell us about the practicality of having multiple sets of rules? 
 
Although the current professional conduct rules in Australia require clarification in some 
important respects as discussed above, the benchmarks set by the rules are appropriate for 
legal representatives in mediation. The rules safeguard important professional values and 
provide a framework from which legal representatives can arrive at ethical decisions in 
mediation. The resolutions suggested here are no more than suggestions. Ultimately each 
lawyer must weigh up a range of factors and arrive at a conclusion that he or she can justify. 
One of the great benefits of the existing rules is that they allow lawyers room to exercise 
discretion in their ethical decision-making. This should continue to be the case. If non-
adversarial principles are desirable, as is argued by commentators such as Professors Menkel-
Meadow and Kovach, then the choice and mode of application of such principles should be 
left to the discretion of individual legal representatives. 
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